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ABSTRACT 
 
Armed conflict and violence against civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
has persisted for years starting in the 1990s. The Eastern, Western and North-Eastern 
parts of the country have seen the presence of a multiplicity of armed groups that have 
caused an escalation of the humanitarian crisis. The United Nations, in the interest of 
civilian protection, peacekeeping and security sector reform in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo declared a mission under The United Nations Organisational Mission in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). Inspite of this mission, civilians 
continued in the Congo to suffer attacks and to endure human rights abuses by the 
armed militants that are fighting government and the government forces in shape of the 
Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC). This study examines 
the problematique of the mandate of MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
in light of the challenges that have made its success debatable. The success of 
MONUC has become debatable in light of the fact that inspite of its presence and 
implementation in the DRC, between 2007 and 2010, conflict and the violence against 
civilians escalated to unprecedented levels. This study examines the causalities of the 
failure and observes its effect while making propositions towards amelioration of the 
challenges and the failure of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This study seeks to examine the problematique that arose from the mandate that 
formed the basis of the activities of the United Nations Observer Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) from 1999 to 2010. The mandate of 
MONUC is examined and critiqued on how it enabled or disabled the United Nations 
mission to respond of the challenges and complications of violent conflict on the ground 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
 
An analysis of MONUC’s mandate and its problematique will be presented preceded by 
a chronological consideration of the different United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) 
Resolutions from 1999 to 2010. The chapter will highlight the challenges relating to 
establishing peace and maintaining security in the DRC which MONUC faced in 
carrying out its mission. MONUC’s mandate was: “to protect civilians under imminent 
threat of physical violence”. In addition, the discussion will provide an oversight on the 
qualification of the DRC conflict. The study will also look into the transformation of 
MONUC into the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Overall, it will analyse MONUC’s achievements, 
identify the risks that the mission faced and propose alternative perspectives for 
redefining the new mandate of MONUC. 
 
The introductory chapter provides a background to the study, outlines the research 
questions and objectives, discusses existing literature pertaining to the research topic, 
and presents the methodology that was used in the study. 
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1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT IN DRC  
 
This background to the research question is located in the historical chronology of the 
conflict and the intervention of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) and 
MONUC in the DRC. The DRC has been politically unstable since its independence 
from Belgium on 30 June 1960. The country experienced turmoil, recurrent coups 
d’Etat, wars, maladministration, insecurity, mistrust, internal and interstate conflicts, and 
human rights violations (Ngimbi, 2009: 3-8). Only five days after its independence, the 
Congolese army mutinied and caused extensive civil unrest between black and white 
civilians, which included a number of attacks on Belgian citizens. It was on 11 July 1960 
that Belgium deployed paratroopers in response to these attacks without the consent of 
the DRC government (Nzongola, 2002: 101). These troops were sent with instructions 
to protect fleeing white people and two mining areas, namely Katanga and South Kasai. 
To complicate matters, local politician Moïse Tshombé on the same day declared 
Katanga, DRC’s most mineral-rich province an independent State. The following month 
South Kasai also attempted to secede. As a result, the Government of Congo-
Kinshasa1 requested help from the United Nations (UN) on the 12 July 1960 with the 
intention to protect the country against the external Belgian aggression.2 
 
In response to this request the UN deployed the ONUC mission in the Congo-Kinshasa 
between 14 July 1960 and 30 June 1964.3 The UNSC supported the DRC government 
throughout the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/143) of 14 July 1960 which called for Belgium 
to withdraw its troops. The UNSC subsequently authorised the deployment of an UN 
peacekeeping force (ONUC) which included troops from 30 member States. At its peak, 
                                                 
1
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was formerly called Republic of Congo-Kinshasa, Zaire or Congo-
Kinshasa.  In this study, the name Republic of Congo, Zaire and Congo-Kinshasa will be used to refer to the DRC. 
2
 In response to Belgium’s intervention, both President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba called upon 
the UN to send military assistance on the 12 July 1960, declaring that Belgium had committed an act of 
aggression against the Congo. Invoking Article 99 of the UN Charter, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld 
called an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council. The first UN troops were deployed in Kinshasa on 15 July 
1960. 
3
 http://www.un.org/depts/DPKO/Missions/onucB.htm#Establishment, [accessed on 28 October 2013]. 
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in July 1961, the peacekeeping mission comprised 19 828 soldiers and 2 000 civilian 
experts and technicians.4  
 
The arrival of ONUC was initially welcomed by Prime Minister Lumumba5, who believed 
that the UN would help suppress the secessionist States (Katanga and Kasai) (Zeilig, 
2008: 110-101). ONUC's initial mandate, however, only covered peacekeeping. It also 
faced the immediate task of maintaining law and order and protecting the local 
population. The initiated discussions with the Belgian representative were meant to 
bring about the withdrawal of Belgian troops at an early date (UNSC Resolution 
(S/RES/143) of 14 July 1960). Viewing the secessions as an internal political matter, the 
United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) Dag Hammarskjöld objected to the use of 
UN troops to assist the DRC government against them (Molefi, 2007: 312). He argued 
that it would represent the loss of impartiality and a breach of the DRC’s sovereignty.  
 
This refusal of the UNSG Hammarskjöld was inadequate given the UNSC Resolution 
(S/RES/143) which authorised the UNSG to take the necessary steps, in consultation 
with the DRC Government, to provide the DRC Government with such military 
assistance. Through this UNSC Resolution, the DRC Government was seen as a united 
force with UN technical assistance to fully meet its tasks and regain national security. 
However, Lumumba was dissatisfied with the UNSG Hammarskjöld's refusal to use UN 
troops to subdue the insurrection in Katanga and decided to attempt an invasion of 
Katanga on his own and turned to the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
for help (Zeilig, 2008: 116-117). Lumumba, the charismatic leader of the largest 
nationalist faction in the DRC reacted by calling for assistance from the USSR, which 
promptly sent military advisors and other support. In addition to the views by 
Hammarskjöld, the DRC crisis was also a proxy conflict in the Cold War in which the 
USSR and the United States of America (USA) supported opposing factions. Freund 
(1998: 201) contended that Hammarskjöld believed that the crisis would provide the 
organisation with a chance to demonstrate its potential as a major peacekeeping force 
                                                 
4
 http://www.un.org/depts/DPKO/Missions/onucB.htm#Establishment, [accessed on 28 October 2013]. 
5
 Patrice Émery Lumumba was a Congolese independence leader and the first democratically elected Prime Minister 
of the Republic of the Congo after he helped secure its independence from Belgium in June 1960. 
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and encouraged the sending of a multinational contingent of peacekeepers to the DRC 
under UN command. 
 
This misinterpretation of UN peacekeeping task by Lumumba and the Hammarskjöld led 
to the UNSC subsequently modifying the ONUC mandate through the political influence 
of the USA at UNSC. The mandate now included maintaining the territorial integrity and 
the political independence of the DRC, preventing the occurrence of civil war, and 
securing the removal of all foreign military groups from the DRC, including paramilitary 
and advisory personnel not under UN Command, and all mercenaries (Doyle and 
Sambanis, 2006: 173-179). In addition, the UNSC Resolution A (S/RES/161, para. 1) of 
21 February 1961 authorised that the ONUC immediately take all appropriate measures 
to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the DRC, including arrangements for a 
ceasefire, halting of all military operations and prevention of clashes, but recommended 
the use of force, if necessary, as a last resort. 
 
The UNSG and the USA employed strategies designed to weaken Lumumba’s position, 
especially after August 1960, when he had requested and received military assistance 
from the USSR to suppress the regional rebellions in Katanga6 and South Kasai (Gibbs, 
2000: 82). Lumumba was subsequently abducted and later murdered by opposition 
politicians on 17 January 1961 (Nzongola, 2002: 111-112). The UN also authorised 
ONUC to use force, ostensibly to prevent civil war in the Congo (UNSC Resolution A 
(S/RES/161)). The use of force to remove all mercenaries from Katanga was reiterated 
in November 1961 (UNSC Resolution S/RES/169). Evidently, ONUC’s use of force had 
serious repercussions for the UN peacekeeping mandate in the DRC. As James (1990: 
298) indicated, the mission was widely perceived as a tool for USA foreign policy (who 
is the other reference; see also Gibbs, 2000). ONUC was eventually terminated in 
stages after February 1963 when Katanga was reintegrated into the national territory of 
the DRC. The last ONUC troops were withdrawn on 30 June 1964.  
 
                                                 
6
 UN peacekeepers used force shortly afterwards against Tshombé’s gendarmes and various mercenary and ‘foreign’ 
(mainly Belgian) elements in Katanga (although ONUC troops were also killed by rogue and undisciplined 
factions of the Congolese army in several incidents during 1961). 
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On 24 November 1965, General Mobutu Sese Seko took over the country’s presidency 
through a coup d’Etat. Needless to observe that his ascendancy to the presidency was 
by unconstitutional means7. A dictatorial regime was implemented that lasted 32 years 
(until 1997). He advocated the “Zairianization”8 of the country (Young and Tuner, 1985: 
326-340), a process which included renaming the country Zaire, and emphasised the 
use of African languages instead of French. President Mobutu systematically used the 
country’s abundant natural resources to consolidate his power, enriching himself and 
his allies in the process (Nest, Grignon and Emizet, 2006: 12-14). He also suppressed 
any kind of rebellion and resistance, imprisoned political opponents, and eliminated 
many of his rivals (Ibid). This is consistent with dictatorial regimes.  
 
Austin (1999: 36) posited that after 1990, Mobutu’s power started to wane due to 
diminishing international support which forced the country into a phase of transition to 
democracy. This transition, however, was delayed by corruption and manipulation 
(Braeckman, 1992: 198-203; Nzongola, 2002: 157-160). The most notable efforts 
towards a democratic society were made during the historic National Sovereign 
Conference (CNS)9 of 1992-1993. Unfortunately, these resolutions were derailed when 
President Mobutu suspended the CNS and refused to implement its resolutions and 
achievements (Nzongola, 2002: 189-198). After the failure of the CNS project, the 
country was plunged into almost two decades of political crisis and armed conflict. 
 
The situation took a decisive turn for the worse in 1994 in the Great Lakes region, when 
large numbers of armed refugees from Rwanda and Burundi moved to the eastern 
regions of the DRC following the genocide in these countries (Reyntjens, 2009: 16-20). 
The mass exodus of refugees during this period, mostly to the then Zaire and Tanzania, 
created a situation that triggered the invasion of Zaire by armed forces from Uganda 
                                                 
7
 This assertion will be dealt with at length in Chapter 4, under the sub heading chronicle of the crisis between the 
DRC government and MONUC 
8
  Zairianisation was an official state ideology of the Mobutu regime that originated in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. The authenticity campaign was an effort to rid the country of the lingering vestiges of colonialism and the 
continuing influence of Western culture and to create a more centralized and singular national identity. 
9
 The purpose of the CNS was for the citizens of Zaire to come together to discuss and analyse the situation in the 
country and to together find solutions to the ills that plagued the country. The goal has indeed been successfully 
achieved, and new bases were then thrown through the resolutions and the prior learning of the CNS. 
6 
 
 
 
and Rwanda in 1996 (Reyntjens, 2009: 45-58). Many of those who participated in the 
mass killings of Rwanda in 1994 fled to the Kivu provinces of the DRC where they 
sought refuge there. 
 
In 1997, an armed group, led by Laurent Desire Kabila, took control of the country 
through a coup d’Etat (Reyntjens, 2009: 45-79; Marriage, 2013: 47-50). Clement (2004: 
33) argues that all the agreements between Zaire and Rwanda which existed were 
suspended due to the aggression towards the territorial sovereignty of Zaire by the 
troops of the insurgency, which were established as a political movement called “the 
Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL-Z)” and the 
Rwandese Patriotic Army (APR). 
 
To make matters worse, the situation deteriorated on 2 August 1998 when a second 
war began in the DRC, backed by the coalition of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi and the 
rebel group10, against the DRC government. The DRC, then Zaire, became the centre of 
a regional (Central Africa) war in 1996, when an insurgency under the leadership of 
Laurent Kabila invaded from the east of the DRC (Lemarchand, 2001: 26-31).  
 
It was during this time that the MONUC was established and placed under Chapter VII 
of the United Nations Charter. Its mandate authorised the use of all means deemed 
necessary, within the limits of its capacities and in the areas of deployment of its armed 
units, to monitor the withdrawal of foreign armed forces, to protect civilians under 
imminent threat of physical violence and to contribute to the improvement of the security 
conditions (UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1279) of 30 November 1999). The UN 
peacekeeping forces’ role had therefore gone beyond observing, monitoring and 
reporting on Lusaka’s ceasefire agreements. 
 
 
  
                                                 
10
 Rally for Congolese Democracy - Goma (RCD-G) and Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) 
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1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
This study focuses on the political involvement of the UN mission in the DRC. It is the 
primary responsibility of the UN, in terms of its Charter, to ensure international peace 
and security.11 This dissertation analyses and evaluates the mandate of MONUC 
against the backdrop of the realities involved in the process of establishing peace and 
security in the DRC. The main research problem arises from the observation that 11 
years after the initial deployment of MONUC, the conflict in the DRC had not been 
solved and the conflict still persists as of 21 January 2014. This study therefore seeks to 
determine the main shortcomings and inadequacies of the current UN mandate in the 
DRC, and establish the reasons for these shortcomings. 
 
Many serious challenges beset MONUC in their pursuit of security, recovery and 
development since the historical and remarkable holding of elections in 2006 in the 
DRC. The security situation in the DRC as of January 2014 remained fragile, the peace 
process in the eastern DRC was still at risk of unravelling, human rights were still being 
violated on a wide scale, and many of the political complexities of the country remain 
intact.12 The UNSC Mission to Africa presented in a report, dated 11 June 2009 that the 
DRC; “remains one of the most complex and intricate environments ever faced by a 
peacekeeping mission” (Neethling, 2011: 191). Against this backdrop, the focus of this 
study is on the problematique of MONUC’s mandate. These following questions 
underpin the study: 
1. What factors explain the inability of MONUC to restore peace and security in the 
DRC after 11 years of operation? Why was MONUC unsuccessful in spite of 
being considered as the largest peacekeeping mission in the world?     
                                                 
11
 Article 1 of the UN Charter states that “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of 
acts of aggression […] situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.” 
https://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml, [accessed on 17 September 2010]. 
12
 Briefing of Martin Kobler, the UNSG’s Special Representative in the DRC warned that although the security 
situation in the DRC has vastly improved, it remains fragile and the gains are “not irreversible.” 
http://www.un.org.za/dr-congo-despite-improved-security-situation-remains-fragile-un-envoys-warn/, [accessed 
on 15 April 2014].  
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2. To investigate how MONUC’s mandate could be improved in order for the 
mission to effectively respond to the peace and security challenges with regard to 
the protection of civilians in accordance with chapter VII of the UN Charter? 
 
1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 
This study seeks to analyse the problematique of the UN’s mandate, which evolved 
from 1999 to 2010, including how it unfolded in terms of theory and practice of 
peacekeeping in the DRC. The objectives of this study are: 
a) To determine whether or not the UN’s mandate adequately interpreted the DRC conflict,  
b) The mandate entrusted to MONUC was adapted or maladapted for protecting civilian 
population under imminent physical threat, and  
c) The implementation of MONUC’s mandate considered all the challenges existing in the 
DRC. 
 
1.4.1 RESEACH QUESTIONS 
 
This study is aimed at analysing the problematique of the mandate given by the UNSC 
through various UNSC Resolutions from 1999 to 2010 and also to investigative the end 
of MONUC and the transformation into MONUSCO on 1 July 2010 by the UNSC 
Resolution (S/RES/1925) 
 
The following aspects will be investigated:  
1.  What strategies did MONUC employ in confronting the conflict in the DRC? 
2. Did MONUC approach the conflict in the DRC as a regional conflict or a civil war? 
3. What are the limitations of MONUC and its mandate in the DRC?  
4. Based on the observations, arguments and conclusions of the study, what are the 
propositions that the study suggest on how MONUC’s mandate could have been 
improved. 
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In examining MONUC’s mandate and its implications for the problematique of peace 
and security in the DRC since 1999, this study will in addition debate the definitional 
concept of the nature of the conflict. The reason is because the DRC conflict was the 
basis for the motivation for UN intervention in the DRC. The UN considered the conflict 
in the DRC to be a civil war between Congolese citizens from opposing parties, and 
therefore as “an internal conflict with external interference”, the UN also considered it a 
conflict similar to the one between 1960 and 1965 in the DRC (Kabungulu, 2000: 1). 
 
Contrary to this perception of the war in the DRC, the Congolese defined it as a foreign 
armed attack on the country with the aid of Congolese rebels (Prunier, 2009: 181-186). 
MONUC’s mandate was “robust” with regard to the tasks allocated to it by the UNSC.13 
Various international political researchers (Marriage (2007, 2013); Onana (2009); Tull 
(2009); Turner (2009); Beswick (2010); Veit (2010); UNSC (2010); Autesserre (2009, 
2011); Dahrendorf and Taylor, (2008); Nest et al., (2006); Onana and Vlassenroot, 
(2002); Kabungulu, (2000)) posited that the peace and security situation in the DRC 
could be viewed as an international or regional war. However, the number of 
neighbouring countries that took part in the conflict, namely Rwanda, Burundi and 
Uganda, do not appear in MONUC’s mandate as part of the problem.14  
 
This view is based on the fact that pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UN 
Charter, chap. VII, Art. 41 and 42), and despite the fact that some changes were made, 
the ability of MONUC to handle the situation effectively could be subject to a remedial 
approach of redefining the conflict more accurately. This should be done determining 
the causes, as well as reviewing the mandate and responding quicker, with the use of 
force. The UN Charter included several adjustment possibilities for their operations, to 
                                                 
13
 Interview with Mr Mijahid Alam, Former Head of MONUC, liaison office in Pretoria, held on 21 June 2010 at his 
offices in Pretoria, South Africa. 
14
 The war started by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi against the DRC and its allies (Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia). 
Some observers from the field of African politics speak about the First African World War. On the one side, there 
are Francophone African countries such as Congo Brazzaville, Gabon, Senegal, Chad, Cameroon and the Central 
African Republic supporting Kinshasa, and on the other side, there are countries such as South Africa, Botswana 
and Eritrea, which support the war against the DRC.                      
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be initiated by the UNSG or the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) with a view 
to resolving the inadequate measures adopted thus far by the UNSC.15 
 
1.5 RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
This study is significant given that MONUC’s mandate has been the most important and 
yet ununderstood UN mission throughout the world. However, arguably, the mandate 
was also ineffective in keeping or restoring peace and security in the DRC, as 
mandated by the UN Charter. The impact of MONUC on the DRC also deserves to be 
explores from the angle of its limited mandate, which contains certain deficiencies with 
regard to the security situation in the field. The study will therefore draw upon existing 
research in this area, but also aims to combine the approaches already adopted by 
describing not only the process of MONUC’s mandate in the DRC, but also its 
challenges and, most importantly, its contribution to durable peace and security. In so 
doing, it aims to provide a more comprehensive overview of MONUC’s mandate in 
terms of the DRC than previous studies. By making use of the evaluations, views and 
ideas of a wide range of local and international actors, this study aims to provide a more 
detailed insight into how MONUC’s mandate interventions were perceived.  
 
This study aims to provide readers with information to help them understand interpret 
and shed light on the conceptual challenges of UN missions with regard to security and 
peacekeeping throughout the world. Through this study, readers will be able to 
understand the implications of MONUC’s mandate in terms of the security and peace 
processes in the DRC and its transformation into MONUSCO. In providing concluding 
recommendations, this study also aims to contribute towards ideas on effective 
solutions that will potentially lead to durable peace and security in the DRC. 
Additionally, it seeks to understand the difficulties that have limited the mandate of 
MONUC by considering certain political factors of the UNSC in the analysis of the 
nature of the DRC conflict, as well as the transformation of MONUC into MONUSCO. 
                                                 
15
 Article 99 of the UN Charter states that the UN Secretary-General “may bring to the attention of the UNSC any 
matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security”. Up till now, none 
of these articles concerning the DRC have been used. 
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1.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The theoretical analysis of this study builds upon institutional liberalism assumptions 
and the proposition that international institutions like the UN, through MONUC, can 
contribute to a better understanding of the concept of peacekeeping as a relevant 
theory to deal with conflicts. 
 
The basic ideas of institutional liberalism in international politics according to Keohane 
(1988: 391) emphasises that the inadequacies of rationalism in analysing the 
fundamental practice of sovereign statehood, which has been instituted, not by 
agreement, but as a result of elaboration over time of the principle of sovereignty. The 
UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1304, para. 2) reiterates its unreserved condemnation of the 
fighting between Ugandan and Rwandan forces in Kisangani in violation of the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC. Therefore, Keohane’s view on 
sovereignty calls our attention once again to the significance of practices such as 
sovereign statehood for our understanding of the specific institutions of world politics 
(Ibid, 391). However, international institutions provided countries with a flow of 
information, opportunities to negotiate and implement commitments, hence their ability 
to make credible commitments in the first place and to strengthen the prevailing 
expectations about the solidity of international agreements.  
 
Institutional liberalism is an international politics theory designating a supra-nationalism 
that promotes the development of institutional cooperation between nations or States 
(Jackson and Sørensen, 2010: 110-111). These scholars argue that institutional 
liberalism is a contemporary theory that emerged in liberal thought which argued that 
international organisations such as the UN, Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the African Union (AU) or 
the European Union (EU) are international institutions or sets of rules that govern State 
action in particular areas (Ibid, 110). This strand of liberalism picks up on earlier liberal 
thought about the beneficial effects of international institutions. This theory is the most 
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prominent liberal internationalist theory explaining the way international institutions are 
controlled by strong States. 
 
Contributions above from Keohane are best known for his concept of the 
comprehensive peacekeeping operations framework whereby peace contains multiple 
initiatives at many different levels of society. This conceptual framework is relevant to 
this study because it explains some general ideas and key components that contribute 
to a better perception on the topic. Some of these ideas and components help to 
illustrate the liberal internationalist theory on the role that a UN peacekeeping operation 
plays in bringing about peace and security problematique in the DRC. 
 
However, the institutional liberalism perspective better informs the analysis of MONUC’s 
involvement in the peace and security problematique in the DRC. Since international 
institutions have the ability to influence States’ behaviours, the institutional liberalist 
approach can enhance the understanding of MONUC’s role in the DRC. The theory will 
determine how MONUC worked to achieve the peace and security, and mechanisms 
used towards civilian protection that were possible for MONUC with a proper mandate 
for peacekeeping. Once MONUC’s mandate is fully understood, it becomes possible to 
evaluate its involvement in the peace and security problematique. Moreover, Keohane 
and Martin (1995: 39-51) argued that institutions provide valuable information by 
facilitating cooperation for the settlement of distributional conflicts among states. 
Indeed, following the role of institutions in international politics, the importance of 
cooperation between States through international institutions is most important for 
addressing the interaction of policy environment outcomes. The institutional liberalism 
theory suggests a form of experiential implications on international institutions which 
can vary in their impact on interstate disputes. 
 
Therefore, in the interpretation of institutional liberalism used in this study, MONUC was 
simply a special mission mandated by the UNSC through which all belligerent factions 
involved in the DRC conflict negotiated for the implementation of peace operations in 
the country. Analysing MONUC’s mandate from Keohane’s contributions and comparing 
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this analysis to the achievement of peace and security gives a complete picture on how 
the protection of the civilian population was inadequate in the DRC. 
 
Based on the UN Charter’s Chapter VI the UN framework gives MONUC a number of 
ways of facilitating conflict resolution in the DRC through cooperation. This cooperation 
consists of supervising ceasefires and, delivering humanitarian supplies and protection 
of civilians under imminent physical threat. In addition, Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
gives the UN the basis for the use of force to maintain peace and security in the DRC in 
order to achieve its mission. This theory can be conceptualised as a primary instrument 
for fixing sets of MONUC’s mandate for the peace and security problematique in the 
DRC. MONUC played a central role in the DRC by providing a flow of information and 
creating opportunities to negotiate, while at the same time enhancing the ability of 
belligerent factions and the DRC government. MONUC also facilitated negotiation 
between the countries involved in the conflict to comply with the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement. In addition it has strengthened their expectations about the protection of the 
civilian population and the end of the conflict. 
 
Furthermore, institutional liberalism conceives that international institutions have an 
ability to influence both intrastate and interstate conflicts (Sørensen, 2006: 251-272). As 
a result, international institutions can be given attributes of information arbitrageur, 
mediator, and peacekeeping operations in order to overcome conflicts between States 
or belligerents through peace agreements. Institutional liberalism assumes that 
international institutions can be and are prominent in coordinating cooperation for 
common interests among States. Therefore, it was necessary for States to follow an 
institutional liberalism pattern in order to gain more frequent cooperation. 
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1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
1.7.1 Research design 
 
The study used a qualitative approach to support the arguments in this dissertation. A 
political analysis of MONUC’s involvement in the peace and security problematique of 
the DRC was undertaken by drawing from observation, interview materials, documents 
and newspaper reports, which were characteristic of the qualitative approach in the 
social sciences. This study also paid attention to an insider perspective of key actors 
and contextual dynamics of the peace and security question in the DRC. In addition, 
most published research on MONUC used qualitative methods (Kabungulu (2000); 
Autesserre (2009, 2011); Lemarchand (1997, 2001); Kinsagani and Nest (2006)). 
 
1.7.2 Data collection methods 
 
Different methods were used to answer the central question of this study. Most of the 
data were collected during field research in the DRC from August to November 2009. 
This method was supported by fieldwork that was conducted in Kinshasa, capital of the 
DRC, and most of the information was gathered from relevant books, articles, UN 
Resolutions and, UN and internet publications on this topic. Due to the fact that the 
main policies regarding MONUC’s mandate were developed on an international level 
and were being executed on the national level, additional information was gathered in 
Pretoria, South Africa. Other relevant data were collected before and after the 
researcher’s stay in the DRC. This data were collected through interviews conducted 
with the ISS, MONUC, South Africa and SADC, as well as conferences attended by the 
researcher. The methods used for data collection includes a literature review, 
secondary data collection, interviews, participatory appraisal techniques and 
participatory observation. These methods will be explained in more detail below. This 
study’s data collection methods can be divided into two categories: primary sources and 
secondary sources.   
 
15 
 
 
 
1.7.2.1 Primary sources 
 
This study made use of the following primary sources: observation, interviews and 
UNSC Resolutions. Observation refers to the researcher’s own experience of the 
conflict, peace settlements and MONUC’s deployment and activities in the DRC. The 
researcher lived in the DRC and only left the country in 2008 with regular visits in 2009 
and 2010. In addition, the researcher also conducted semi-structured interviews from 
2009 to 2011. Subsequent interviews were also held with MONUC officials in Pretoria, 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS) staff in South Africa, and officials from the DRC 
Embassy in South Africa. Interviewees also included members of the transitional 
government, such as Congolese academics, policy analysts and members of civil 
society. Further details on the list of interviewees and the content of the interviews are 
provided in the appendix. Finally, the researcher relied on UNSC Resolutions (from 
(S/RES/1234) of 9 April 1999 to (S/RES/1925) of 30 March 2011) with regard to 
MONUC, which are used as the basis for an analysis of the origin and evolution of 
MONUC’s mandate.   
 
1.7.2.2 Secondary sources  
 
This study made use of the following secondary sources: UN and MONUC reports, 
newspapers, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) reports and third party reports, 
audio-visual material, journals, and books and articles. UN and MONUC reports were 
used to develop a comparative approach to analyse and evaluate MONUC’s mandate 
against the backdrop of the reality of the peace and security process in the DRC. 
Unofficial reports on developing strategies in the DRC and internal documents regarding 
the achievement of MONUC activities were also used. In addition to academic reports, 
the researcher consulted numerous transitional NGOs reports in the field of human 
rights, with a track record of conducting field missions in the DRC, including Amnesty 
International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW), Oxfam, the International Crisis Group 
(ICG) and others, which have consistently reported on the human consequences of the 
conflict in the region. Magazines and newspapers were also consulted, as well as 
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reports from a range of international and regional organisations such as SADC, the EU 
and the AU. 
 
1.8 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY   
 
This study is divided in the following five chapters:  
Chapter One: serves as a general introduction and background to the study, and to 
discuss the research problem, together with the research question and the different 
UNSC Resolutions related to MONUC’s involvement in the DRC. In addition, the 
chapter outlines the research objectives, purpose of the study, theory relevant to this 
study, rationale for the study, and the methodology used.  
 
Chapter Two: analyses how MONUC discharged its mandate in the field of 
peacekeeping operations and security. It begins with an introduction, outlines MONUC’s 
mandate and provides an oversight of the literature review on peacekeeping operations. 
The discussion also focuses on the responsibilities determined by the UNSC. It provides 
analyses of MONUC’s mandate in the field of peacekeeping operations and security.  
 
Chapter Three: provides a critical analysis of MONUC’s implications for peace and 
security issues in the DRC. It provides an introduction on this chapter, and an outline of 
the qualifications of the DRC’s conflict. In addition, the discussion will focus on the 
implication of MONUC’s mandate to protect the civilian population. It also conducts a 
critical analysis of MONUC’s mandate of the implication for the problematique of peace 
and security, and the electoral process.  
 
Chapter Four: analyses the transformation of MONUC into MONUSCO. It begins with 
an introduction, followed by the chronicle of the relationship between the DRC 
government and MONUC. The discussion provides an assessment on how the climate 
of trust deteriorated between the DRC government and MONUC. In addition, the 
discussion focuses on the request for the withdrawal of MONUC; the future of MONUC; 
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the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1925) of May 28, 2010; and from peacekeeping to 
peacebuilding. It also outlines the mandate of MONUSCO.  
 
Chapter Five: presents the findings, recommendations and conclusions of the study. It 
also suggests how best to achieve peace and security in the DRC. In addition, it also 
outlines the outcome of the MONUC’s mandate regarding the protection of civilians. 
 
1.9 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has laid out the background and context of the study. The research 
objectives and questions have been fleshed out together with the justifications of the 
study that evaluates the mandate of the MONUC as a United Nations mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. This chapter has also enunciated the research 
methodology, research design and the theoretical and conceptual framework that the 
study deploys. An exposition of the primary and secondary sources that the study uses 
is followed by an outline of the chapters and this conclusion to the chapter. The 
following chapter delves into the mandate of MONUC in order to lay out a clear setting 
and context of this study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
AN ANALYSIS OF MONUC’S MANDATE IN THE FIELD OF PEACEKEEPING 
OPERATIONS AND SECURITY IN THE DRC 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines the nature of MONUC’s mandate, and the manner of its 
execution in peacekeeping operations in the DRC. The chapter begins by outlining 
MONUC’s mandate, as provided by the UNSC, with regard to its ability to abide by the 
rules,16 and looks at how the liberal internationalist theory is relevant to this study. The 
outline is followed by a brief overview of the literature on peacekeeping operations. In 
addition, subsequent discussions will focus on the responsibilities determined by the 
UNSC for conflict resolution which provides a mechanism for MONUC’s peacekeeping 
operations. A critique of the context of peacekeeping, as construed by an international 
organisation with a genuine ability to achieve success in peacekeeping operations, is 
also highlighted. The chapter concludes with a focus on the outcomes of MONUC’s 
peacekeeping operations and security mandate. With the developments of the situation 
in the field, especially in the eastern DRC, the UNSC imposed various obligations on 
the parties in several areas, including the responsibility of MONUC to “enforce or 
monitor their implementation”. This distinction may be useful in assessing the degree to 
which these obligations have been met by MONUC. 
 
The theoretical approach outlined in Chapter 1 of this study contributes to this study by 
establishing tools for analysing how the UN through MONUC’s mandate, could have 
achieved success in peacekeeping operations, to enhance conflict resolution within the 
DRC and the Great Lakes region. The institutional liberalism theory seeks to generalise 
about the social conditions under which the behaviour of self-serving actors converges 
toward cooperation or conflict, and the experiential implications for international 
institutions, which varies in terms of their impact on interstate disputes (Moravcsik, 
                                                 
16
 This concern was first expressed by the United Nations General Assembly, which “recommends that, in 
appropriate cases, the UNSC makes it clear to the parties, as it allows a new peacekeeping operation, that he is 
ready to take further measures in accordance with the UN Charter” (UNSC Resolution (S/RES/47/72, para. 7)).  
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1997: 517). Although a range of definitions exist, international institutions can be viewed 
as sets of rules which are meant to govern international behaviour. However, Ostrom 
(1990: 139) is of the view that rules, in turn, were often used as statements that forbid, 
require or permit particular kinds of actions. Keohane (1989: 3) defines institutions like 
the UN as ‘persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe 
behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations’, which makes it 
impossible to measure the impact of MONUC on activities and expectations.  
 
The institutional liberalism theory suggests that international institutions such as the UN 
are effective in fostering harmony among States, because they are capable of 
transforming State preferences, as well as promoting pacific global relations (Boehmer, 
et al., 2004: 1). According to Jackson and Sørensen (2003: 117-120) the UN is meant to 
play a central role in international relations by providing a flow of information and 
creating opportunities for conflicting parties to negotiate. It needs to enhance the ability 
to abide by the rules of MONUC, in order to resolve the peace and security 
problematique in the DRC through agreements, commitments and the use of force. This 
will enable the UN to meet expectations regarding the security of the civilian population.  
 
In view of the importance of the humanitarian disaster resulting from the DRC conflict 
and the number of armed groups in the Kivu provinces, the UN was faced with recurrent 
waves of conflict in eastern DRC, which threatened the overall stability and 
development of the country. Particular attention was paid in this dissertation to the 
UNSC Resolutions, and for this reason, this chapter will focus predominantly on the 
situation in the eastern DRC.   
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2.2 OUTLINE OF MONUC’S MANDATE 
 
Since its inception on 30 November 1999 by the UNSC, the MONUC’s mission has 
undergone significant changes, both in terms of its mandate and capabilities. However, 
11 years after its establishment, peace and security had not been achieved in the DRC. 
The persistence of violence in several regions, including Katanga, Oriental, North and 
the South Kivu provinces, as well as delays in the completion of the electoral processes 
are cases in point. In addition, the reform in the security sector and the implementation 
of the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Disarmament, 
Demobilisation, Reintegration, and Resettlement or Repatriation (DDRRR) processes, 
show that the challenges remained numerous and complex. 
 
Since the beginning of the MONUC mission, a variety of factors have, directly or 
indirectly, hindered the course of the largest ever UN peacekeeping intervention. In 
order to better address this issue, MONUC’s mandate changed significantly in 
accordance with the political events in the DRC. Nest et al., (2006: 27) conclude that 
these political events marked a critical phase in the history of the DRC. MONUC’s 
mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, between 1999 and 2003, was 
characterised by sign the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the search and sends troops of 
MONUC in DRC, the observation of the ceasefire and disengagement of forces and put 
an end to the armed conflict through a mandate of observation (UNSC Resolution 
(S/RES/1279, para. 5) of 30 November 1999). This period was characterised by the 
decision of the UN to send a peacekeeping mission observer to the DRC, as reported 
by Roberto Garreton.17 Between 2003 and 2006, the UNSC recognised that the DRC 
had become aggressive and recommended that all foreign armed groups had to respect 
the sovereignty of the DRC. The UNSC authorised MONUC to use coercive measures, 
including military force, to maintain or restore peace in situations where it had 
determined that the existence of a threat against peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression (UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1565)) were present. An armed conflict persisted 
                                                 
17
 Oral presentation by Mr Roberto Garreton, Special Reporter on the situation of human rights in Democratic 
Republic of Congo, UNAG Resolution (A/54/361), http://www.congonline.com/Forum1/Forum04/ 
Garreton01.htm, [accessed on 18 October 2010]. 
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in the Kivu provinces because of the presence of armed groups, and MONUC entered a 
peace enforcement phase in order to assist the DRC government to dismantle all armed 
groups, protect vulnerable civilians from physical violence at the hands of rebels, and 
establish the authority of the State and the rule of law (para. 4).18 MONUC’s mandate 
between 2006 and 2010 showed the UNSC’s commitment to focus on the protection of 
civilian populations.  
 
In reality despite the revised mandates given to MONUC by the UNSC, civilian 
populations remained under physical threat and the problematique of peace and 
security did not find a sustainable solution. In practice, the institutional liberalism theory, 
with regard to UN peacekeeping operations revealed some shortcomings, similar to 
those in the Darfur situation. The Darfur experience was problematic and, even when 
the UN acted in response to the conflict, especially that it failed to present a way 
forward in terms of cooperation and negotiation between belligerents. Instead of 
focusing on protecting the population at risk and facilitating cooperation, the UN 
condemned and sanctioned the country.19 As a result, internal conflict erupted in Sudan 
between Janjaweed Arab militias supported by the government and rebels. Similarly, in 
Somalia, the UN failed to end a civil war and famine which killed thousands of people 
(Murphy, 2007: 153-155). Murphy notes that there was no clear precedent for the type 
of peacekeeping operations envisaged and non-consensual intervention by the UN in 
the affairs of Somalia. Therefore, in many cases, peacekeeping missions did not 
achieve their goals. The UN failed to embrace the core objectives under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, because of the influence of five permanent members of the UNSC 
(China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States). From the 
above analyses, it was suggested that international organisations do not necessarily 
have an obvious effect on States, as they may either increase or decrease conflicts 
(Boehmer, et al., 2004: 3). Grignon et al., (2006: 65) argue that general optimism 
                                                 
18
 These measures were applied for peacebuilding. MONUC acting under the UN Charter was authorised to use 
force beyond self-defence, in order to defend the civilian population by means of "necessary measures" including 
the use of force. 
19
 Kuperman, A. 2009. “Rethinking the Responsibility to protect”, The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and 
International Relations, www.strausscenter.org/system/uploads/4/original/Kuperman-Whitehead-R2P-2009-
final.pdf?, [accessed on 6 November 2011]. 
22 
 
 
 
regarding the progress in terms of the DRC peace process from 2001 to mid-2003 has 
had to be tempered by the on-going situation on the ground. The adoption of a tougher 
approach since the end of 2004, however, tends to give credibility to MONUC (UNSC 
Resolution (S/RES/1565) of 1 October 2004). MONUC, in cooperation with other 
international partners, wanted to participate in strengthening the rule of law in the DRC 
by providing direct support for the reform of the judiciary and the various legislative 
reforms stated in the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1925) of 28 May 2010. Autesserre 
(2010: 89) criticised the way in which MONUC has used its limited resources, stating 
that this was inadequate and inappropriate and bound to fail because it did not engage 
the root cause of the DRC conﬂict. In spite of the important progress the DRC has made 
in solidifying its sovereignty since 2006, the UN still has the mandate and the legitimacy 
in its role as civilian protector and supporter of the Armed Forces of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (FARDC) to intervene in situations like this before they spiral out of 
control.  
 
This study is of the view that without a clear definition of MONUC's mandate based on 
the realities of the DRC conflict, the political UN observer’s mandate was similarly 
problematic and inadequate. The UN mission in the DRC did not need to put a 
peacekeeper ‘behind a shadow of peacekeeping’, as mission ofﬁcials often stated in 
order to foresee the problems in the DRC. It needed MONUC’s mandate to be more 
engaged with the FARDC. The MONUC’s mandate showed its inability to adopt forceful 
measures to protect civilians facing assault, and this undermined the very notion of 
civilian protection. 
 
2.2.1 Literature review on peacekeeping   
 
The concept of peacekeeping20 was largely related to the UN’s mediation operations, 
since most of these operations in the world have been undertaken under the auspices 
of the UN (Cox, 1967: 4-5). Diehl (1994: 1-5) indicates that peacekeeping still has 
                                                 
20
 While aware that there is first generation literature on peacekeeping, this study preferred to interrogate second 
generation literature on peacekeeping as, the case study, MONUC was a second generation peacekeeping 
operation. 
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numerous challenges at the conceptual level and is still known as undefined, 
contentious and disorganised international operations. However, MacQueen (2006: 2) 
defined peacekeeping operations as “ambiguous” and evaluated them by posing 
various questions to highlight their challenges from a conceptual or political perspective. 
MacQueen challenged the idea that the underlying function of peacekeeping has not 
undergone any significant qualitative change since the Cold War (Ibid 234). Therefore, 
Murphy, (2007: xi) suggested that peacekeeping was pioneered and developed by the 
UN as a means to fulfil its role under the UN Charter: maintenance of international 
peace and security. Moreover Diehl et al., (1998: 33) points out that the scope of 
international peacekeeping has undergone dramatic changes since 1990. 
 
According to Bellamy (2004: 17-28), a great deal has been written about the strengths, 
weaknesses and experiences of peacekeeping, but little reflection has been done in 
terms of what this tells us about global politics or the role of peacekeeping operations 
within it. He seeks to redress this imbalance by dividing opinions on the role of 
peacekeeping into Westphalian and post-Westphalian perspectives. In the former, 
stable peace was achieved by creating spaces and institutions for States to resolve their 
differences on the basis of consent, with a view that what goes on within States was not 
the concern of peacekeepers, unless their hosts invited them to participate. In a less 
overtly critical strategy, Paris (2003: 441-473) draws on the world polity theory to 
explain peacekeeping practices. The world polity theory sees the world as possessing a 
“distinct global culture that comprises the formal and informal rules of international 
social life”. He argues that peacekeeping mandates and practices emerge not only from 
prudential calculations about what works, but also from prevailing global norms that 
legitimise certain kinds of policies and de-legitimised others. 
 
Indeed, the obligations of UN peacekeeping operations are based on a consensual 
approach (Lagrange, 1999: 12-33). Lagrange argued that these obligations relating to 
the status of peacekeeping operations subscribed to acts that establish operations and 
which were listed in the UNSC Resolutions made on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN 
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Charter.21 The mandate for peacekeeping operations in this case becomes a source of 
new obligations in terms of peacekeeping operations and for parties involved in conflict. 
Diehl et al., (1998: 33-36) concluded that there are various kinds of approaches to 
clarifying peacekeeping operations. The most common classifications are traditional 
peacekeeping and second generation peacekeeping operations. Since the end of the 
Cold War, traditional peacekeeping has become less important, and second generation 
peacekeeping has become more important. The main objective of these obligations of 
UN peacekeeping operations is to ensure peace, security and stability at the global and 
regional levels.22 Hillen (1998: 26) noted that these second-generation peacekeeping 
missions were qualitatively and quantitatively different from traditional missions which 
the UN had characterised as mere ‘holding missions’. He noted that even though it was 
sometimes still called peacekeeping, the concept of a true peacekeeping unit simply 
interposed between two dormant factions that had evolved into an “untidy and intrusive 
host of soldiers and civilians who were supposed to demobilise guerrilla armies, run or 
monitor elections, train police forces and rebuild shattered infrastructures” (Ibid 27). 
 
In comparison to the first generation of peacekeeping operations23, those in the second 
generation, including MONUC have a more robust mission, with a multitude of political, 
humanitarian, social and economic functions, and work with the assistance of civil and 
military experts from the UN. The MONUC mandate as a second generation operation 
included comprehensive efforts to maintain peace and security, peacebuilding, 
administration, human rights, protection of civilians, promotion of democracy, electoral 
assistance, support for democratic institutions, humanitarian aid, repatriation of 
refugees and displaced persons, and rebuilding of infrastructure (Dwan and Wiharta, 
2005: 142).24  
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 Statement by the Chinese Ambassador Zhang Yishan at the 2006 Session of the Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, New York, 27 February. http://ias.cass.cn/en/show 
project_ls.asp?id=995, [accessed on 6 November 2011]. 
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 Traditional/first generation peacekeeping operations: Composed of small numbers of unarmed officers; Monitor 
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24
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From the point of view of this study, the MONUC mandate from the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement perspectives classified the UN mandate as second generation with 
particular tasks for peace enforcement. The DRC faced a particular situation of conflict 
which required both peacekeeping and peace enforcement. However, in 1999, MONUC 
was established with a mandate of the first generation operation as an observer 
peacekeeping mission. According to the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1279) of 30 
November 1999 the UN’s mandate would be to monitor the ceasefire, because the DRC 
conflict was a civil war. The biggest evidence of all, perhaps, has been the apparent 
erosion of the principle of minimum force and what Regehr highlighted as “the 
developing conventional wisdom that peacekeeping was evolving towards a much 
greater reliance on the use of force” (Regehr, 1993: 27-37). This falls under the realm of 
peace consolidation which was an alteration of the MONUC’s original mandate. Mainly 
in intra-state civil wars in today’s humanitarian emergencies, the consent of all parties 
concerned with UN operations has been extremely difficult to achieve and maintain.  
 
With regard to the MONUC mandate in the field of peacekeeping in the DRC, It was 
noticed it can be noted however that there were many achievements and failures 
according to the expectations of the Congolese population.25 Ryan (2000: 27-47) 
argued that the identiﬁcation of the different stages of conﬂict by conﬂict resolution 
literature suggests that it was possible to determine the most appropriate point at which 
peacekeepers should intervene. Armed conflict continued in the two Kivu provinces, 
despite various peace agreements that were signed between different belligerents in the 
DRC conflict. This led MONUC therefore on a phase of peace enforcement with a new 
mission to assist the DRC government to dismantle the Democratic Liberation Forces of 
Rwanda (FDLR), the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) and the 
March 23 Movement (M23) rebel groups, in order to protect vulnerable communities 
from all forms of violence, and to establish the authority of the State and rule of law 
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 According to Mr Bura, although UN peacekeeping operations have evolved over time, they have still not managed 
to address the protection of civilians in an effective way as this constitutes a relatively new role for UN 
peacekeepers. Olivier Ngambo Bura, Lecturer at the Department of International Relations at University of 
Kinshasa, Tuesday, 15 February 2010, at his office in Kinshasa/DRC.  
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(UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1856) of 22 December 2008). The MONUC mandate from 
observing peacekeeping to peace enforcement will be discussed in the next section.   
 
2.3 MONUC’S RESPONSIBILITIES AS DETERMINED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
 
This section analyses MONUC’s responsibilities as imposed directly by the UNSC in 
relation to its mission in the DRC. It looks at:  
1. The role of MONUC troops,  
2. MONUC’s collaboration with other UN structures and partners,  
3. Assistance provided by MONUC to the FARDC,  
4. Withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory and the role of the Joint Military 
Commission (JMC) with regard to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, which was 
the source of the creation of MONUC.  
 
MONUC, as an official mission of the UN, enjoyed the privileges and immunities 
recognised under the UN Charter and were mandatory to all UN member States (UN 
Charter, 1945: Articles 104 and 105).  
 
Following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (S/1999/815) of 23 July 1999 
between the DRC and five regional States (Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and 
Zimbabwe) in July 1999, the UNSC established the UN Mission based on UNSC 
Resolution (S/RES/1279). Its initial plan was to observe the ceasefire and 
disengagement of foreign forces, as well as to maintain liaison with all parties to this 
Agreement. Later, in a series of UNSC Resolutions, the mandate of MONUC was 
extended to the supervision of the implementation of this Agreement, and it was 
assigned various additional related tasks.26 
 
Analysing the MONUC and its responsibilities is important because it will help to clarify 
the policies, processes, and practices of the UN in the field of peacekeeping. MONUC, 
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 Additional tasks included the protection of civilians, promotion of national reconciliation and internal political 
dialogue, electoral assistance, voluntary return of refugees, provision of training for FARDC, facilitation of 
DDRRR and DDR, contributing to the promotion of good governance, etc. 
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as an example of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation in complex emergencies, 
was directly involved in focusing on the problem of how to achieve security and peace, 
and to make a difference in the DRC situation. The UN mission also demonstrated the 
beginnings of an innovative strategy to integrate a variety of approaches into an 
operation, including coercive protection. Improving protection of civilians in the context 
of UN peacekeeping operations must therefore be addressed holistically, with a view to 
improving the performance of all actors who have a stake in protecting innocent civilians 
from physical violence. 
 
2.3.1 Role of MONUC troops according to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 
 
It is important to recognise that MONUC peacekeeping played a vital role in helping 
parties in the conflict to end their hostilities. Improvements were achieved in recent 
years in UN peacekeeping, including the deployment of integrated missions in complex 
situations, as well as in highlighting the need for embarking on operations with adequate 
capacity to counter hostilities and effectively fulfil their mandates (UNGA (A/RES/60/1, 
para. 92) of 24 October 2005).  
 
A key element of the agreement was a request for a UN force for the DRC, even though 
the UN was not a party to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.27 A Chapter VI 
peacekeeping operation was normally deployed to help keep peace, and the 
peacekeepers were not authorised to use force, other than for self-protection. Chapter 
VII peacekeeping operations also referred to as “Peace Enforcing” operations, authorise 
UN peacekeepers to use military force if necessary to restore peace and security. 
MONUC was a Chapter VI operation with one Chapter VII component that allowed self-
protection and limited protection for civilians.  
 
The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (S/1999/815) stipulated in its Article III, 11 (a) that: 
The UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and in collaboration with the 
African Union (AU) (it was called the Organisation of Africa Union (OAU)), was 
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 The UN was not a signatory to this Agreement, but was invited by all signatory parties as a UN force of 
monitoring. 
28 
 
 
 
requested to constitute, facilitate and deploy an appropriate peacekeeping force in the 
DRC to ensure implementation of this Agreement. In addition to that, taking into 
account the peculiar situation of the DRC, mandate the peacekeeping force to track 
down all armed groups in the DRC. In this respect, the UNSC was requested to 
provide the requisite mandate for the peacekeeping force. 
 
This Agreement determined the role of MONUC troops and authorised that: the UN, in 
collaboration with the AU for MONUC’s mandate included peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement operations (Ibid Art. 8). These defined roles were a guide for all MONUC 
peacekeeping observers to ensure that they did not stray from their mission in the DRC. 
This UN mission had to be carried out under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in cases of 
threats against peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression.  
 
However, Diehl et al., (1998: 33) alleged that the scope of international peacekeeping 
has undergone dramatic changes. Archer (2001: 111) argued that it was difficult to 
imagine the contemporary world without international organisations which could 
potentially play important roles and intervene to keep peace within the international 
political system. Darby and MacGinty (2003: 7) claimed that economic, ideological and 
strategic developments can have a major impact on conditions of sustainable peace. 
When efforts to prevent conflict fail, one of the highest priorities must be to protect 
civilians from mass atrocities. Throughout the country, DRC civilians were deliberately 
targeted because the State was the aggressor, and there was a particular risk of 
genocide. Over the last decade, the UNSC has frequently expanded the mandate of UN 
peacekeepers so that they can physically protect civilians who are threatened with 
violence.28 In September 2005, at the UN World Summit which took place at UN 
Headquarters in New York in the USA (UN A/RES/60/1), all countries formally agreed 
that if peaceful methods were inadequate and if national authorities were “manifestly 
failing” to protect their populations from mass atrocities, States should act collectively in 
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 Civilians have increasingly become the victims of armed conflict. In response, the UNSC has mandated a number 
of peacekeeping operations with the protection of civilians (POC) from physical violence. 
https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/civilian.shtml, [accessed on 22 June 2011]. 
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a “timely and decisive manner,” through the UNSC and in accordance with the UN 
Charter.  
Below are instances of States that acted to protect civilians against violence: 
 
 In Libya, the international community moved quickly to stop the government from 
killing its own citizens. UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1973) of 17 March 2011 
enabled an international coalition to intervene to stop the killings of those who 
were protesting against the Gadhafi regime. 
 In Côte d’Ivoire, the UNSC unanimously adopted UNSC Resolution 
(S/RES/1975) on 30 March 2011, condemning the gross human rights violations 
committed by supporters of both ex-President Laurent Gbagbo and President 
Ouattara. Violence followed the presidential elections in November 2011, and a 
UN military operation was authorised to prevent the use of heavy weapons 
against civilians. 
 In the case of Syria, despite rising numbers of dead and displaced people, and 
dire warnings from the UN’s top officials, including repeated warnings from the 
UNSG, the UNSC was unable to unite behind a common call for action. 
While debates have raged as to the legality of various actions led by the USA, the newly 
established AU learnt the lesson of UN inaction in Rwanda and witnessed effective 
interventions without the UNSC authorisation. The West African States in Sierra Leone 
and Liberia, decided to forego the need to seek approval of the UNSC to act on the 
African Continent. Furthermore, with the coming into force in December 2003 of the 
Protocol establishing an African Peace and Security Council, African States have 
introduced the use of four new justifications allowing for the invocation of the use of 
force. Thus widening the parameters of what is to be considered as legal projection of 
military might on the continent. 
       
In the case of the DRC, the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1234, para. 1, 2, 3, 39 and 51) of 
9 April 1999 was based on those paragraphs implicitly recognising the act of aggression 
against the DRC and the natural right of the latter to self-defence, whether individually 
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or collectively.29 This political conception of the nature of the DRC conflict by the UNSC 
resulted in MONUC’s troops being inadequately informed with regard to the realities in 
the field of peacekeeping, and the protection of civilians under the UN and was very 
soon criticised. Hillen (1998: 22) stated that UN military observers rarely had the military 
manpower to effectively carry out their mandate without the active cooperation of the 
parties involved and certainly had no power to coerce them into cooperation. If military 
observers were in danger from an aggressive environment, they were usually withdrawn 
or reduced significantly, as in Angola, where civilians were physically threatened with 
violence. 
 
Nevertheless, there were great achievements along the way. A far more concerted 
international effort was made than ever before to establish and implement new agendas 
on a whole range of social, economic and development issues, including women, 
children, the environment, indebtedness and catastrophic diseases. However, 
disappointments were also immense: the failure to respond effectively to large-scale 
atrocity crimes in Rwanda, the DRC, Lebanon and Sudan, and the USA’s invasion of 
Iraq in 2003 without the consent of the UNSC. There was a general sense that the 
whole UN security system was still too geared towards the central preoccupation of its 
founders of 68 years ago – States waging aggressive wars against each other – and 
was not responding adequately to the much wider range of human security threats and 
challenges likely to be faced in the 21st century. 
 
The UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1234) stated that the UNSC must be: committed to 
safeguarding the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC and all other 
States in the region; was concerned by reports that the forces opposed to the 
government have taken in the eastern part of the DRC in measures violating the 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC; reaffirmed that all States have 
an obligation to respect the territorial integrity, political independence and national 
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 UN Charter, Article 51 stated the following: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the UN, until the UNSC has 
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the 
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the UNSC and shall not in any way affect 
the authority and responsibility of the UNSC under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
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sovereignty of the DRC and other countries in the region, and are obliged to refrain 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any State; and deplored the continuing fighting and presence of foreign forces in 
the DRC, in a manner inconsistent with the principles of the UN Charter, and called 
upon those States to bring an end to the presence of these uninvited forces and to 
take immediate steps in this regard. 
 
The UNSC as an important body of the UN, which all the nations of the world have 
entrusted under Article 24 of the UN Charter, with the “primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of peace and international security” did not recognise foreign aggression 
in the DRC in UNSC Resolutions (S/RES/1234) and (S/RES/1258). This was in spite of 
the fact that there were seven official armies fighting on DRC territory. Had the act of 
aggression been recognised, as well as the violation of the territorial integrity of the 
DRC and the presence of uninvited foreign forces (because these forces are invited in 
accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter), the UNSC would have applied the 
provisions of the UN Charter including those provided for in Articles 41, 42 and 43. In 
this case the UN peacekeeping force would have been responsible for the following 
tasks: 
a) To verify the effective withdrawal of uninvited foreign forces; 
b) To deploy forces at the DRC border, in order to secure it against any recurrence 
of conflict, as well as the borders of the aggressors.30 
On the contrary, the UN troops were deployed to ensure the implementation of a very 
typical agreement that breached the purposes and principles of the UN. In proposing to 
pursue “all armed groups in the DRC”, the UNSC reduced the regular armed force of 
the country to the same level as the rebel armed groups and foreign forces. 
 
The argument to pursue all “genocidaires” that took refuge in the DRC and seeked to 
destabilise Rwanda and Uganda, which was presented by the aggressors of the DRC to 
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 See Article 12 of Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, which stated that: “the final withdrawal of all foreign forces from 
the national territory of the DRC shall be carried out in accordance with the Calendar in Annex B of this 
Agreement and a withdrawal schedule to be prepared by the UN, the OAU and the Joint Military Commission”. 
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justify their military presence in the DRC territory, was not well-founded, according to 
many researchers on the DRC crisis (Kabungulu, 2000; Ludo, and Breackman, 2001; 
Reyntjeans, 2009; Marriage, 2013). The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was also an 
instrument that supported this argument. The aggressors had to wage war and not 
peace in the DRC, in order for them to justify their argument for continuation, 
intensification and perpetuation of the war by advocating disarmament of armed groups 
in the eastern DRC, which were a constant threat to them. 
 
It was surprising in this context that the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1291) of 24 February 
2000 was made almost null and void by the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. This UNSC 
Resolution contradicted and did not entrust MONUC troops with the mandate to protect 
civilians in accordance with the provisions of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in its 
Chapter 8.2.1. (f), (Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (S/1999/815)). Thus UNSC Resolution 
(S/RES/1291) was therefore in flagrant contradiction to UNSC Resolution 
(S/RES/1234), which had stated that, the UNSC:  
 Condemns all massacres occurring in and around the territory of the DRC, and 
urges that an international investigation into all such events be carried out with a 
view to bringing to justice those responsible (para. 7).  
 Calls upon all parties to the conflict in the DRC to protect human rights and to 
respect international humanitarian law. This was in particular, as applicable to 
them, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977, and 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 
1948 (para. 6); 
 
While UN troops were tasked by the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in its Article 8, to 
“provide humanitarian assistance and protection of displaced persons, refugees and 
other affected persons”, this was therefore in contradiction to MONUC’s missions, as 
determined by UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1291). UN troops facilitated the delivery of 
humanitarian aid and ensured compliance with human rights by giving special attention 
to vulnerable groups, including youth, children and demobilised soldiers provided that 
MONUC deemed it to be within its capabilities and under acceptable security conditions. 
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This UNSC Resolution further instructed MONUC “to cooperate closely with the 
Facilitator of the National Dialogue, to give him support, technical assistance...”, a 
mission that does not appear in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. 
At the period of implementation of the Ceasefire, UN assistance was summarised with 
the drafting of an agreement and the definition of terms of reference for an observer 
mission in the DRC, including its human resource needs and equipment. This marginal 
involvement of the UN was due to reluctance of the UN and the UNSC to fully commit 
itself to providing assistance in the DRC. It should also be noted that UN involvement 
came as a result of the request of the Secretary General of the then OAU, and not at 
the UN’s own initiative (Kabungulu, 2000: 17).  
 
The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement defined the Joint Military Commission (JMC) as a 
decision-making body composed of two representatives of each political party (Chapter 
7.2 Annex A to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement31), whose responsibilities included the 
need to “develop mechanisms for the DDR of armed groups which were in illegal 
possession of weapons” (Chapter VII.4. (g) and (h)). The tasks of the JMC were 
inadequate for the reality of working in the field despite contributions from Uganda, 
Zambia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, the OAU, the USA32, various European countries 
(including Belgium, France, Britain and Sweden33) and the EU34. As a result the JMC 
did not function effectively due to limited financial resources which did not allow it to 
have a permanent structure that would improve its effectiveness.  
 
The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was developed consultatively and articulated the 
nature of the intervention and with all parties involved expecting the UN to provide 
peace in the DRC and the Great Lakes region. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement called 
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 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, Article 9 states that:  The JMC, with the assistance of the UN/OAU, shall work out 
mechanisms for the tracking, disarming, cantoning and documenting of all armed groups in the DRC, 
http://www.ieru.ugent.be/lusakaceasefire.pdf, [accessed on 15 February 2010]. 
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 IRIN-CEA Update 787 for the Great Lakes, 26 October 1999. http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin787.html, 
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for the deployment of a Chapter VII UN peacekeeping operation in the DRC. In the spirit 
of the Agreement, the ‘appropriate’ UN force was expected to be deployed for several 
months after its entry into force (which was December 1999) and to carry out both 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement. With regard to peacekeeping, the mission was 
to ensure the full implementation of the agreement and disarm the warring parties. In so 
far as peace enforcement was concerned, the MONUC’s mission in collaboration with 
other UN structures and partners was to track down all armed groups in the DRC while 
screening for mass killers, perpetrators of crimes against humanity and other war 
criminals as well as disarming and repatriating members of foreign armed groups.35 
 
The Political Committee of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in the DRC, and the 
mission of the UNSC in the Great Lakes region (UNSC Resolution (S/RES/355, para. 2) 
of 15 June 2001) aimed to coordinate the humanitarian activities of MONUC together 
with other UN agencies. This was also the case for the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC), which was both a member of the verification mechanism, and of the 
three parties which worked in collaboration with MONUC (UNSC Resolution 
(S/RES/1445, para. 2 and 3) of 4 December 2002).  
 
According to UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1856, para. 3, I), MONUC in collaboration with 
international partners, including the European Union operations European Union 
Security Sector Reform Mission in the DRC (EUSEC) and European Union Police 
Mission in the DRC (EUPOL), contributed to the efforts of the international community to 
assist the DRC government. This assistance was in terms of the initial planning process 
of the security sector reform, building credible, cohesive and disciplined Congolese 
armed forces, and developing the capacities of the Congolese national police and 
related law enforcement agencies. Support for rehabilitation, socio-economic 
development and humanitarian assistance were the critical areas in which 
peacekeeping operations played a limited supporting role.  
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2.3.2 Assistance provided by MONUC to the FARDC for the demobilisation, 
disarmament and reintegration of combatants 
 
The technical assistance that the MONUC Mission would provide to the national 
programme for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration was closely linked to the 
mandated security sector reform activities. The national programme of DRR (UNSG 
Report (S/2008/728, para. 67) of 21 November 2008) received additional funding of $72 
million to fulfil the process from the International Development Association (IDA) and the 
African Development Bank (AFDB). The national programme continued to work with key 
partners to plan for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of 131,400 
combatants, including 31,200 in the Kivus (Ibid). Progress towards the implementation 
of the programme impacted on, and was affected by, the pace of FARDC integration 
and the consolidation of the integrated brigades. In this context, the Mission’s continuing 
objective was to promote and optimise coordination between partners and the national 
authorities, with a view to mobilising the political will and resources needed to complete 
urgent disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, as well as army integration tasks. 
 
According to the UNSG’s Fourth Special Report on MONUC (S/2008/728), many 
challenges have remained with regard to the DDR programme. The majority of the new 
target groups were located in the eastern part of the DRC, where the security situation 
was not conducive to the implementation of the process. There were many outstanding 
questions regarding modalities of military integration and disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration, including the link between the regrouping processes, as envisaged in 
the Operation Amani Leo36, and the brassage/disarmament process. Furthermore, as 
many elements within the target groups were expected to be ineligible for disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration because of the strict “one-person-one-weapon” 
criterion, there was an urgent need to develop alternative assistance packages for those 
individuals.  
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In this regard, the UNSC requested MONUC (S/RES/1906, para. 21) in close 
collaboration with the DRC Government, to continue to coordinate its operations with 
the brigades of the FARDC Forces deployed in the east, with the understanding that the 
protection of civilians must come to the forefront of its priorities and that operations must 
be joint planning with the brigade, according to the guidance document referred to in 
paragraph 23 below: 
a) To disarm foreign armed groups and [...] or disarmament, demobilisation, 
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration; 
b) To keep the territories taken by armed groups to protect civilians; 
c) To assist the DRC government to restore its authority over these territories, 
particularly in the east, in areas with armed groups and occasions in major 
mining areas; 
d) To intensify efforts to prevent any support from illegal armed groups, including 
through the grounds of economic activities and illicit trafficking in natural 
resources.  
 
It should further be noted that paragraph 22 of the same UNSC Resolution identified the 
conditions for supporting the FARDC. It reiterated, in accordance with sub paragraph (g) 
of paragraph 3 and paragraph 14 of the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1856), that the 
support of MONUC operations conducted by the FARDC forces against armed groups 
should be strictly based on compliance of the forces with international humanitarian law, 
human rights law and international refugee law, [....], and if the situation persisted, the 
UNSC requested MONUC to withdraw its support for these FARDC units. 
 
MONUC was directly involved in combat alongside the DRC’s national army, the 
FARDC, and against the FDLR. Starting in January 2009, MONUC provided support to 
three military operations in the Kivu region aimed at weakening and eventually 
eradicating the FDLR. Vircoulon37 noted that MONUC supported some of FARDC’s 
operations against army groups in the eastern DRC. Launched in January 2009 in North 
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Kivu, Operation Umoja Wetu was spearheaded by Rwandan troops and lasted for only 
35 days. It was quickly followed by Kimia II, a ten months campaign in north and south 
Kivu conducted by the FARDC with MONUC’s logistical support. The third military 
operation Amani Leo began in January 2010. Unfortunately these military operations did 
not succeed to fully pacify the eastern DRC region in spite of having harsh 
consequences for civilian populations. 
 
It was evident that there was poor management under operation Amani Leo as the 
objectives were not articulated properly to all the parties (DRC and MONUC). In this 
respect, the study emphasised that effective action against the FDLR on the ground in 
the DRC was imperative. Action was needed by States to fulfil their obligation to take 
appropriate legal and political measures to cut off the expatriate leadership from its 
base. Furthermore, action was needed to prevent arms traffic and illicit trade in natural 
resources, as well as the movements of funds that aided armed groups in the DRC, in 
particular the FDLR. In addition operation Amani Leo aimed at regaining control of 
mining sites from the FDLR and combating illegal trafficking in minerals and other 
natural resources. It was expected that stability in key economic zones would enable 
the DRC Government to control mining operations and prevent trading in minerals that 
sustained conflict. 
 
2.3.3 Withdrawal of foreign troops from the DRC 
 
On 2 August 1998 the Banyamulenge from the province North Kivu province, in the 
town of Goma (Goma is the main town) erupted into mutiny. Rwanda offered immediate 
assistance to the Banyamulenge. It could, however, be argued that Rwanda offered this 
assistance on the basis that the Banyamulenge in the DRC and the Tutsi in Rwanda 
shared the same ethnicity and interests. The Banyamulenge were to later renounce that 
name and were to be known as the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD). The 
movement was composed primarily of Banyamulenge and backed by Rwanda, and later 
Uganda was also involved and created Movement de Liberation du Congo (MLC) 
(Prunier, 2009: 180-182). This group, however, quickly came to dominate the resource-
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rich eastern provinces and based its operations in Goma. The RCD quickly took control 
of the towns of Bukavu and Uvira in the Kivus. The Tutsi-led Rwandan government 
allied with Uganda, and Burundi also retaliated, occupying a portion of north-eastern 
DRC (Ibidi 179). To help remove the occupying Rwandans, L.D. President Kabila 
enlisted the aid of refugee Hutus in eastern DRC and began to agitate public opinion 
against the Tutsis. The rebel offensive was abruptly reversed as Kabila's diplomatic 
efforts bore fruit. The first African countries to respond to Kabila's request for help were 
fellow members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Reyntjens, 
2001: 311–317). While officially the SADC members were bound to a mutual defence 
treaty in the case of outside aggression, many member nations took a neutral stance to 
the conflict. However, the governments of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe supported 
the Kabila government after a meeting in Harare, Zimbabwe, on 19 August 1998 (Ibid 
319).  
 
The UNSC when passing its Resolutions initially did not point out that: “all States have 
an obligation to refrain from the use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence” of the DRC. The UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1304, para. 4 a) of 16 June 
2000 demanded that Uganda and Rwanda, which violated the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the DRC, withdrew all their forces from the territory of the DRC without delay. 
This was in order to conform to the timetable of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and 
the Kampala disengagement plan of 8 April 2000. The UNSC has often looked beyond 
the Ugandan and Rwandan forces, by stating that “all other foreign forces [...] to take 
urgent measures to accelerate their withdrawal” (UNSC Resolutions (S/RES/1332, para. 
10); (S/RES/1341, para. 2); (S/RES/1355) and (S/RES/1445, para. 3 and 2)). In all 
plans for the withdrawal of foreign troops,38 MONUC was only playing a monitoring role 
when accompanying the parties and reporting to the UNSC. The establishment of a 
transitional government in Kinshasa, the disarming of rebel groups, and the withdrawal 
of foreign troops constituted the basis of what was done to advance the peace process 
in the DRC. 
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The withdrawal of foreign troops from the DRC territory was an important key response 
by the UN peacekeeping operations to the problems of securing peace and protecting 
civilians. Even with a Chapter VII clause in its mandate to “protect civilians under 
imminent threat of physical violence”, MONUC initially behaved more like a Chapter VI 
observer mission, using force only in self-defence and doing little to physically protect 
civilians. Small contingents of MONUC troops were deployed from March to April 2002, 
to the strategic rebel occupied north-eastern town of Kisangani. In June 2002, the 
UNSC approved a revised concept of operations for MONUC, entailing the mission’s 
presence in Kisangani and strengthening its logistic support capabilities.39 MacQueen 
(2006: 11) argued that despite these steps, peace operations remained ‘largely 
Westphalian’ because they were concerned primarily with regulating a state-based 
international system. MacQueen was partly right, because the liberal peace theory tells 
us that democratisation and liberalisation within States are a necessary precursor to 
peace between them. The adoption of the Pretoria Agreement between the DRC and 
Rwanda (S/2002/914) on 30 July 2002 was on the withdrawal of the Rwandan troops 
from the DRC territory and the dismantling of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces in the 
DRC. The Luanda Agreement of 6 September 2002 between the DRC and Uganda 
entailed that the total withdrawal of Ugandan troops from the DRC, normalisation of 
relations and cooperation, be amended to provide for a new framework, the work of the 
Ituri Pacification Commission (IPC). Nearly all Rwandan and Ugandan forces were 
withdrawn before the end of 2002. Meanwhile, troop withdrawals were also initiated by 
Angola, Burundi, Namibia and Zimbabwe, and it was especially mentioned that MONUC 
observed the departure of foreign forces.40 MacQueen argued that an increasing 
number of peace operations were primarily concerned with the internal nature and 
composition of States themselves rather than with relations between States. 
 
MONUC’s DDRRR programme officially began on 22 February 2001, after the UNSC 
passed UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1341), which authorised the deployment of 550 UN 
military observers to the DRC and set a timetable for the signatories of the Lusaka 
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Ceasefire Agreement to withdraw their military forces (Kisangani et at., 2006: 113). In 
practice, however, it was not until the second half of 2002 that implementation began in 
several towns, and this was only on an ad hoc basis pending deployment of the two 
task forces, which were based in Kindu and Kisangani, as recommended by UNSG’s 
special report (S/2002/1005) of 10 September 2002.    
 
In a Presidential statement, read by UNSC President Adolfo Aguilar Zinser (Mexico), the 
UNSC welcomed the 10th report of the UNSG mission in the DRC (S/2002/169) and 
stressed that the DDRRR process of armed groups was another key element in the 
settlement of the conflict. It requested, in this regard, MONUC to first do an assessment 
of the number of members of Rwandan armed groups in the territory, based on which 
the UNSC would determine whether or not further support should be given to MONUC 
in the execution of the task of withdrawal of foreign troops from the DRC.41 This 
Presidential statement was wholly inadequate in terms of Annex A, Chapter 9.1, of the 
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. This inadequacy of tasks in relation to the realities of the 
conflict limited the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and MONUC mandate to be fully 
implemented. So far, this created same armies’ groups with different names as RCD-
Goma, RCD-ML, RDC/KM, MLC, Mai-Mai, CNDP, and M23.  
 
2.4 MONUC'S MANDATE IN THE FIELD OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND 
SECURITY IN THE DRC 
 
This section analyses MONUC’s mandate in the field of peacekeeping operations 
relating to the different resolutions passed by the UNSC regarding various acts of 
aggression and rebellions in the DRC. After the double trauma of massacres of civilians 
by different armed groups mentioned above, in Ituri (2003) the capture of Bukavu (2004) 
and severe criticism from the Congolese population, opinions showed that MONUC was 
limited use of force. 
 
                                                 
41
 UNSC, in Presidential statement, reiterates call for withdrawal of all foreign troops from DRC, (SC/7306) of 25 
February 2002, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7306.doc.htm, [accessed on 10 April 2013]. 
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MONUC’s activities were operational guidelines laying down the conditions under which 
fighting units of the UN Mission could use their firepower, especially for military UN 
helicopters. These guidelines were provided by the Commander of MONUC, in order to 
allow the Chief Commanders of units to make decisions based on the evolving situation 
on the ground, without having to systematically refer to the Staff Commander Force in 
Kinshasa. This was made possible by a combination of elements under the UNSC 
Resolution (S/RES/1565, para. 3) of 1 December 2004. For example, Diehl and his 
colleagues pointed out that other typologies forgot that operations might involve the 
performance of multiple tasks simultaneously or alternating between different types 
(Diehl et al., 1998:38). In this regard, it was decided to increase MONUC’s strength by 
5,900 personnel, including up to 341 civilian police personnel, as well as to deploy 
appropriate civilian personnel and proportionate air mobility assets and other force 
enablers. The above UNSC Resolution expressed its determination to keep MONUC’s 
strength and structure under regular review, taking the evolution of the situation in the 
field into account. MONUC was limited to deploying and maintaining a presence in the 
key areas of potential volatility, in order to promote the re-establishment of confidence 
and discourage violence, in particular by deterring the use of force to threaten the 
political process, and allow UN personnel to operate freely, particularly in the eastern 
part of the DRC. 
 
MONUC’s experiences illustrate some elements of civilian protection and its 
requirements. The mission also demonstrated the beginnings of an innovative strategy 
to integrated differing approaches within an operation, including coercive protection. 
Firstly, a lack of capacity limited what the UN Mission could do to protect people. With 
on-going insecurity in the DRC, consent based, no-interventionist methods of protecting 
civilians proved largely ineffective, and MONUC initially had insufficient troop strength, 
equipment, and firepower to engage in coercive protection. Secondly, MONUC needed 
conceptual clarity as to the meaning and scope of its protection mandate. Mission 
leadership did not start with a coherent strategic framework for civilian protection and for 
how much force the mission should exercise. After years of struggling, MONUC had 
begun to develop and implement such a framework.  
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The following section focuses on the results of the incompatibility of the MONUC’s 
mandate of observation in the various aspects of peacekeeping operations in the DRC. 
 
2.4.1 MONUC’s observation mandate with regard to the conflict in Kisangani 
 
Few provisions were made to actually disarm the armed groups in the DRC. The UNSC 
deployed about 90 MONUC peacekeepers in August 1999 with the observation 
mandate to support the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement implementation (UNSC 
Resolution (S/RES/1258, para. 7) of 6 August 2000. In addition, their observer mandate 
was also to establish contacts and maintain liaison with the JMC and all parties to the 
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (Ibid para. 8). However, in the months that followed all 
sides accused the others of repeatedly breaking the ceasefire, and it became clear that 
small incidents could trigger attacks.  
 
Tension was building up between Rwanda and Uganda on taking control of Kisangani, 
with both countries trading accusations that one was preparing to launch a war against 
the other. Their relations hit low ebb with the Ugandan government alleging that the 
Rwandan army and their allies of the Rally for the Congolese Democracy (RCD-G) 
rebels attacked and captured the north-eastern town of Kanyabayonga, in North Kivu.  
On 5 April 1999 tensions within the RCD-G about the dominance of the Banyamulenge 
reached a boiling point when RCD-G leader Ernest Wamba dia Wamba moved his base 
from Goma to Uganda-controlled Kisangani to head a breakaway faction named Forces 
for Renewal (ICG 2000: 9-12).  
 
The Ugandan and Rwandan official armies clashed three times in Kisangani between 
May and August 1999 and June 2000, killed 3000 both civilian population and soldiers, 
and destroyed infrastructures (Marriage, 2013: 5). The key reason for these clashes 
was the battle for the control of Kisangani which has vast gold reserves and is 
strategically located near the Congo River. The battle used heavy weapons spanned 
between 5 and 10 June 2000, and saw human rights violence and defiance of 
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international humanitarian law.42 Despite the presence of MONUC observers when 
these armies clashed, the UN deployed 5,537 peacekeepers and 500 observers with 
the same observer mandate, but declined to oppose the massacres forcefully or send 
patrols to deter human rights abuses43 (UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1291, para. 4)). 
Nevertheless, this UNSC Resolution contradicted the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 
which was asking the MONUC to have an enforcement mandate. The events in 
Kisangani led to some of the first discussions in the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) on the meaning of civilian protection as a military task for MONUC’s 
engagement and the ability of MONUC to intervene in such conditions (Holt and 
Berkman 2006: 160). The objective of MONUC’s DDR and DDRRR processes were the 
return to civil peace through the disarmament of all foreign-armed groups named in the 
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement who were based in the DRC and the return of former 
combatants to their respective countries of origin. Following the Kisangani massacre, 
UN headquarters personnel were aware of MONUC’s shortcomings in protecting 
civilians, even if they might not have envisioned the exact implications of an 
overambitious mandate and undermanned peace effort. 
 
This period was characterised by mixed results with respect to the mandate of 
MONUC’s peacekeeping operations in the field. Between February and December 
2000, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was repeatedly violated by the parties to the 
conflict, who continued to clash at various front-lines. The fiercest battles were fought 
against those who opposed the Rwandan Patriotic Army (APR) troops from Rwanda 
and the Ugandan Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) from Uganda in May 1999. In August 
1999, with increasing international pressure for the RCD-G to sign the Lusaka 
Agreement (S/1999/815), the latent crisis between Rwanda and Uganda for the control 
of RCD-G had degenerated into open conflict in Kisangani. On the morning of 7 August 
1999, soldiers of the APR and UPDF clashed for several hours using heavy weapons, 
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without causing any injuries among civilians. In the days that followed, the situation 
grew calmer. However, after this, tension began to rise steadily and both sides 
reinforced their positions and distributed large amounts of arms throughout the city.44 In 
the wake of the Kisangani massacres the UN’s inclination to tone down civilian 
protection if it felt that aggressive action could offend the conflicting parties, was again 
displayed (Holt and Taylor, 2009: 258). 
 
After the war ended, Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers raided several locations in 
Kisangani.45 After three days of fighting, representatives of Uganda and Rwanda signed 
a ceasefire to provide for the demilitarisation of Kisangani and relocation to Bunia on 1 
October 1999, at the headquarters of the Ugandan branch of the pro-RCD, RCD-
Kisangani Liberation Movement (RCD/KML), which was led by Professor Ernest 
Wamba dia Wamba. Over the following months, the Eastern Province was divided 
between a “Rwandan zone” controlled by RCD-G and a “zone of Uganda”, which was 
dominated by the different movements supported by Kampala. 
 
In May 2000, however, tension between Ugandan and Rwandan armies in Kisangani 
arose again. The UPDF reinforced its military positions in the northeast of the city and 
the APR responded by acquiring additional weapons. On 5 May 2000, the APR and 
UPDF made use of heavy weaponry in densely populated areas, killing over 24 civilians 
and injuring an undetermined number of others. Before the start of hostilities, the 
Ugandan army had warned the public of the imminent bombing and asked for the 
evacuation of several schemes in the vicinity of their targets.46  
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Through international mediation, a team of UN military observers arrived in Kisangani 
on 12 May 2000. Both parties agreed on a plan to demilitarise the city, which began on 
29 May that year. However, fighting resumed, leading to the war known as “Six Days” 
from 5 to 10 June 2000. This limitation, however, was extended to humanitarian 
personnel, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which had 
been assisting the wounded for several days.47 However, MONUC still remained totally 
powerless against the deterioration of the situation with its observer mission. The 
Congolese people questioned the importance of the UN presence in the DRC, asking 
what MONUC was doing while foreign troops clashed in Congolese territory.48 Wanting 
to avoid further clashes between Ugandan and Rwandan troops based in Kisangani, 
MONUC had initiated discussions with the military hierarchies of the two armies, namely 
the RPA and UPDF. This allowed it to reach an agreement on the withdrawal of troops 
from the town and cantonment within a radius of 100 km or less. In Kisangani, when the 
Rwandan army and RCD-G had left town, the Ugandan army and the Movement for the 
Liberation of the Congo (MLC) made a reluctant commitment to demilitarisation.49 This 
gives credence to the argument advanced by this research; that the UN’s initial 
mandate on the DRC conflict was inadequate for the realities of the conflict. It can be 
argued that in the initial form the UN’s mandate on the DRC conflict was bound to fail as 
it seemed to promote dialogue as a means to an end on the then on-going conflict. The 
reality was that of a full scale war and so an observer mission was not suited for that 
reality.   
 
Thus, the mandate of MONUC had been readjusted and the UNSG was forced to 
change its mission in the DRC from observation mandate to peacekeeping with 
particular attention to the civilian population. The UN was forced to first change its 
conception of this conflict and then take appropriate decisions. UNSC Resolution 
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(S/RES/1291) authorised the expansion of MONUC, by increasing its troops to 5537 
military personnel and decided on the mandate of MONUC. In addition to this new 
mandate, MONUC was authorised to use the necessary measures in the areas of 
deployment of its infantry battalions. It was also deemed to be within its capabilities to 
protect the UN personnel, facilities and equipment, to ensure freedom of movement of 
its personnel and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. 
 
The contradiction between the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the UNSC Resolution 
was evident in on the mandate of MONUC that led to the clashes in Kisangani. 
According to the understanding of the UN, this mission was not interposition, much less 
intervention, because the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was destined to bring peace in 
the DRC. However, this point of view was inadequate with the realities of the DRC 
conflict. The mandate of MONUC should have been to integrate the importance of 
protecting the civilian population at the beginning of its mission. In order to achieve its 
mission in the DRC, MONUC’s bases with a large logistic system were installed in the 
Congolese cities of Mbandaka, Kananga, Kindu and Kisangani. Particular attention was 
paid to Kisangani, a city where Rwandans and Ugandans were living and where they 
could, at any time clash again and compete for control. 
 
2.4.2 MONUC’s response to the massacre of civilians in Ituri 
 
The district of Ituri, situated in the Oriental Province of the DRC, was an area of 
spiralling violence. The conflict of 2003 in the eastern DRC, particularly in this district 
was a major concern and UNSC finally granted MONUC the mandate and provided 
necessary resources to improve the humanitarian and security situation in the field. In 
its mission of maintaining peace and security in the field, MONUC had not been 
challenged as much as it was in the district of Ituri in Bunia. However, this intervention, 
authorised by UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1484) of 30 May 2003 was clearly totally 
insufficient and turned out to be a quagmire for the UN troops in the DRC. The war on 2 
August 1998 had finally taken a turn in this particular area, which was occupied by 
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Ugandan troops.50 Clashes between Hema (elevators) and Lendu (farmers) over land 
ownership and rights over land for grazing have broken out on several occasions in the 
last three decades. However, the deadliest phase of the tension between the two 
communities started in May 1999. Each group attempted to expel the other from 
contested areas in a policy of local ethnic cleansing.51 
 
Indeed, as with Rwanda with the agreement of 31 July 2002 in Pretoria (UNSG Report 
S/2002/914), the DRC concluded an agreement with Uganda on 6 August 2002 in 
Luanda for the peaceful settlement of their conflict. However, in the field, the Ugandans, 
who had looked with such lust at Ituri's natural resources (gold, oil, etc.) since 1998 did 
not want to return to their country.52 Thus, in order to extend their presence in the 
region, they created a scenario to pit the Lendu against the Hema, thus fuelling their 
hatred towards each other. MONUC, however, remained totally powerless over the 
deteriorating situation in Ituri, which was characterised by fighting between small armed 
groups, and inter-ethnic violence from February 2003 onwards. It had to have the 
physical capability and political backing to use its Chapter VII mandate robustly against 
some degree of potential armed opposition and was geared towards the restoration of 
DRC sovereignty. Roessler and Prendergast (2006: 279) criticised the fact that MONUC 
only had ten military observers in the region in 2002 and little solid intelligence even 
though it had known since 2001 that the situation was ‘highly explosive’. The inability of 
the UN mission to stem the surge of violence (UNSC Resolution S/RES/1484) led the 
UNSG to seek the timely intervention of a force from the European Union (EU).  
 
In June 2003, the EU sent Operation Artemis, its first military mission outside Europe 
and independent of NATO, to the DRC. While it ultimately received an EU badge, its 
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origin, command and control were French. The objective of Operation Artemis was to 
contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions in the district of Ituri, to improve 
the humanitarian situation, and to ensure the protection of displaced persons in the 
refugee camps in Bunia. Its mandate was to provide a short-term interim force for three 
months until the transition to the reinforced MONUC. The EU’s Interim Emergency 
Multinational Forces arrived in Ituri with 1 400 troops under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter to bring stability to Bunia in close coordination with MONUC (UNSC Resolution 
S/RES/1484). However Operation Artemis was allowed to pursue its own objectives, 
largely without political interference. The EU forces comprised about 100 French and 70 
to 80 Swedish Special Forces, helicopters, armoured vehicles, and the ability to call on 
French fighter aircraft in Uganda (Holt and Berkman, 2006: 170). 
 
Although limited in time, scope, geographical area of action, clear mandate and 
objective, and the number of forces involved, Operation Artemis was nevertheless 
significant in many different ways. MONUC had subsequently had mixed success in 
continuing the pacification of Ituri because of its observation mandate with many tasks. 
Another factor to notice was that none of the participants in Operation Artemis were 
willing to re-hat with MONUC. This placed the mission’s credibility at risk since MONUC 
lacked the Special Forces, intelligence and over flight capabilities that were crucial to 
the success of Operation Artemis. In addition, Operation Artemis has been a remarkably 
positive experiment in cooperation between the UN and a regional organisation, in the 
domain of peace and security. Perhaps more importantly, it also had the political will to 
use force when needed, something for which MONUC’s troop-contributing countries 
were loath to provide. Operation Artemis, however, provided a stopgap to the UN, 
limited in time and space than was MONUC, which allowed it to better prepare the 
transition from peacekeeping, to peace enforcing. In a situation where, particularly, 
there was not much peace to keep, but rather a war in progress (which had to be 
stopped) and a peace to build (Malan and Gomes, 2003: 210). Its mandate was limited 
to the northwest area of the Ituri District, it lasted for three months, and it benefited from 
the groundwork that MONUC had already laid.   
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While the situation seemed to be improving in Bunia, armed groups continued to 
operate, and safety for the population did not exist. Several cases of killings were 
therefore recorded.53 The strengthening of MONUC's mandate in July 2003 was in 
response to this concern, as well as the current deployment of peacekeepers 
throughout Ituri. Even then, MONUC’s mandate did not, on face value, provide for a 
stronger mandate to protect civilians whereas UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1291, para. 4), 
called on MONUC to take necessary action to protect civilians under threat of imminent 
violence in deployment areas of its infantry battalions. UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1493, 
para. 25) of 28 July 2003 authorised MONUC to take the necessary measures for a 
similar purpose but within the deployment areas of its armed forces.  
 
The MONUC, however, failed to secure the civilian population in Ituri. The town was 
thrown into chaos by two weeks of fighting between Lendu and Hema, and ethnic 
cleansing occurred next to the UN compound. In short, this meant that the chasm 
between mandate and capacity was narrowing, thereby bestowing on the mission the 
means to fulfil its civilian protection clause. Therefore, MONUC reinforced its presence 
on 1 September 2003 with additional troops.  
 
2.4.3 MONUC’s mandate with regard to the war in North Kivu  
 
After the Ituri’s conflict, the mandate of MONUC was strengthened to improve the 
situation the North Kivu. The UNSG asked for an increase of 13,100 soldiers (UNSC 
Resolution (S/RES/1565, para. 3 and 4) of 1 October 2004) and authorised a 
reinforcement of 5,900 military personnel and defined the mandate with strategic 
military objectives. The mandate allowed MONUC to deploy and maintain a presence in 
the key areas of potential volatility in order to promote the re-establishment of 
confidence, to discourage violence, in particular by deterring the use of force to threaten 
the political process. It also allowed MONUC’s personnel to operate freely, particularly 
in the Eastern part of the DRC. In addition, MONUC was mandated to ensure the 
                                                 
53
 International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, “Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo”, the report 
estimates vary between 7 million deaths throughout the DRC since the beginning of the war. 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-drc, [accessed on 22 June 2012].  
50 
 
 
 
protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel, under imminent threat of 
physical violence (Ibidi para. 4). Since the 1990s, the DRC, and particularly the eastern 
provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Orientale were shattered by a human tragedy 
which has been described as the deadliest conflict since World War II (Coghlan, B. et 
al., 2006: 44-51), culminating in ‘Africa’s First World War’ (Reyntjens, 2009: 195-200). 
 
Despite the formal end of the war in 2003, Eastern DRC was facing one of the world’s 
most complex humanitarian crises, marked by the presence of numerous armed groups, 
massive displacement, land and food insecurity, and extreme poverty (Reyntjens, 2009: 
207). Violence directed against civilians erupted continuously in an unpredictable way, 
hence inhibiting the achievement of a stable situation which would enable state and civil 
society institutions to be rebuilt (Cox, 2012: 2). The eastern DRC was paying the price 
for the 32 years of Mobutu’s bad governance, which led to the collapse of the national 
state, and ultimately led to the war. MONUC thus proved that it lacked capacity to 
promote conflict resolution as clearly mentioned in all UNSC Resolutions (ICG, 2003: 
27). 
 
The situation in Ituri which was headlines news deteriorated and was but also part of a 
larger set of inextricably linked challenges to peace that applied throughout Eastern 
DRC. The situation in the Kivus provinces was arguably more tragic and with potentially 
more far reaching consequences. Serious fighting took place, both direct and proxy 
confrontation between local, national and regional participants in the DRC conflict since 
the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed in 1999. This Rwandan genocide and the 
aggression of the DRC led to the creation of informal groups based in eastern DRC 
such as the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (DFLR), Mayi-Mayi, RCD, CNDP, 
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), M23, and Allied Democratic Forces Nalu (ADF-Nalu), 
(Stearns, et al., 2013: 15-30).  
 
The Kivus provinces were the powder keg where ethnic massacres first exploded in the 
1990s and regional wars in 1996 and 1998. The situation was complicated by direct 
military involvement of external actors, multiplication of local warlords and active 
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exploitation of natural resources by both. All regional actors were making concerted 
efforts to mould the provinces to their own strategic needs. The withdrawal of most 
Rwandan and Ugandan troops in 2002 did not fundamentally change this dynamic. 
 
Insecurity persisted in the East, despite the presidential elections, specifically in Ituri 
and Kivu. As the simmering ethnic hatred between Hutus and Tutsis boiled over in the 
form of genocide in Rwanda, the spill over reached the Kivu provinces in the eastern 
DRC, such that ‘in a matter of days in October 1996, a large swathe of eastern Zaire 
erupted into an orgy of violence’ (Lemarchand, 1997: 173). 
 
The rebel soldiers ousted General Laurent Nkunda's Tutsi, formed the National 
Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) and fought with the FARDC. Doubts 
were raised as to whether both Nkunda and the government were genuinely committed 
to it. The process offered Nkunda the opportunity to strengthen his authority in North 
Kivu, legitimised his operations against the FDLR and replenish his ranks.54 Many 
attempts at a cease-fire, which led to the signing of the Deed of Commitment for lasting 
peace in the two Kivu provinces at the peace conference in Goma on 23 January 2008, 
were made between all parties. However, none were really effective for all dissident 
troops. In the autumn of 2008, the CNDP launched a major offensive against 
government positions in North and South Kivu, and MONUC was obliged to use force 
against the CNDP (UNSG letter (S/2008/703). In order to stabilise the region, the UN, 
through its UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1843, para. 2) of 20 November 2008 provided for 
a temporary increase in the authorised military personnel (2785 items) and police units 
(300 units). This UNSC Resolution also stipulated the immediate deployment of 
additional resources until 31 December 2008, and intended to extend this authorisation 
in connection with the extension of MONUC's mandate, noting that the length of stay for 
additional forces would depend on security conditions in the Kivu provinces.  
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FARDC and MONUC were, however, not able to stop the rebel offensive backed by 
Rwanda, and the CNDP thus seemed to be well positioned to take the provincial capital 
of Goma. UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1856, para. 1), asked MONUC to attach the highest 
importance to the crisis in the Kivu provinces, particularly in terms of the protection of 
civilians, and to gradually concentrate its efforts during 2009 on Eastern DRC. From its 
inception until about the end of 2008, the CNDP seemed to present the largest threat to 
the DRC government, and the FARDC even occasionally allied with the FDLR against 
Nkunda’s group (ICG, 2007: 102-113). However, in early 2009, following an apparent 
rapprochement between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda, Nkunda was 
deposed as head of the CNDP and arrested in Rwanda, and the CNDP members were 
assimilated into the FARDC through an ‘accelerated’ process (UNSG Report 
(S/2009/603, para. 180-199)). While the integration process was deeply imperfect, it 
cleared the way for ex-CNDP to ﬁght alongside the FARDC to disarm the FDLR. 
 
It was then, in a turnabout, that the DRC and Rwanda experienced a reversal of 
alliances. General Laurent Nkunda was replaced by General Bosco Ntaganda as the 
head of the CNDP, who signed a peace agreement in March 2009, in which Ntaganda 
committed himself to in the peace agreement and to integrate the national army. In 
exchange, the combined forces of FARDC (enriched by CNDP soldiers) and the 
Rwandan army launched a military campaign against rebel Hutu FDLR (Autesserre, 
2010: 164). Autesserre noted thereafter, that only FARDC, supported by MONUC, 
fought the Rwandan dissidents. This situation placed MONUC in an awkward position 
because FARDC had committed atrocities against civilians during the fighting.55 
MONUC was pursuing its activities in relation to the DDRRR. The large number of 
crimes against humanity, which were rampant in these areas, resulted in MONUC 
embarking on a special fight against impunity. This situation was complex because a 
few months previously, on 19 June 2008, the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1820) stated 
that rape and other forms of sexual violence could constitute a war crime, a crime 
against humanity or a constitutive act of genocide.  
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The CNDP exposed the weaknesses in MONUC’s operational capacities, especially its 
inadequate troop levels, lack of coherence and poor understanding of the utility of force. 
When Nkunda and his troops also entered the town of Goma, MONUC was not able to 
resist the thousands of rebels and many peacekeepers fled into their compounds, 
leaving the population to defend themselves (Holt and Berkman, 2006: 162-164). More 
fundamental was the misunderstanding within the mission of the UN’s role in the DRC.56 
High-ranking officials in the UN have suggested that MONUC did not have a coherent 
military strategy to speak of and this coupled with a wider doctrinal void within the UN, 
contributed to serious failures.57 MONUC’s mandate therefore fell dramatically short of 
what was needed for a successful peace process in the Kivu provinces. 
 
2.4.4 MONUC’s role in Operation Kimia II 
 
In March 2009, Generals Etumba Didier, Chief Staff of the FARDC, and Babacar Gay, 
Force Commander of MONUC, signed a Joint Operations Management Kimia II in a 
commitment to military operations against the FDLR.58 In terms of the agreement, 
MONUC was mandated to support FARDC with logistics, food, fuel and direct 
involvement in operations related to tracking down the FDLR (UNSC Resolution 
(S/RES/1856, para. 3). In all this, support was given to FARDC, in order to avoid their 
usual excesses, which ultimately violated the rights of civilians. The commitment of 
MONUC was evident in its concern for the protection of civilians. 
 
During 2009 and 2010 two joint FARDC/MONUC military operations took place. In 2009 
Kimia II was established, which aimed at eliminating the FDLR threat. Upon conclusion 
of the operation, MONUC determined that the FDLR’s strength was reduced by half, 
from approximately 6,000 to an estimated 3,200 elements (Reynaert, 2011: 19). 
However, Reynaert argued that Kimia II caused major internal displacements 
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(approximately 500,000 IDPs) and many civilian casualties. MONUC’s efforts to root out 
militia and push them further into the bush resulted in increased population 
displacement as militia destabilised new areas. Furthermore, by using force against 
particular groups, MONUC found that aid organisations reduced their cooperation if they 
feared that they would lose access to vulnerable populations and endanger the safety of 
their unarmed workers. Moreover, the population faced attacks from undisciplined 
FARDC elements, as a result of the fast-tracked integration of former militias and rebel 
groups, especially the CNDP, into the regular army. It was fully consistent with 
MONUC's mandate for its armed units to participate in operations that were led by 
FARDC integrated brigades and jointly planned with the FARDC with a view to forcibly 
disarm recalcitrant FDLR elements, in order to ensure their participation in the DDRRR 
process, and preventing the provision of support to the FDLR, including support derived 
from illicit economic activities. However, Kimia I and II were two operations that took 
place in different contexts. In fact, while Kimia I took place in the context in which the 
DRC government was simultaneously facing the rebellion of Laurent Nkunda in North 
Kivu, Kimia II intervened, in March 2009, in the context of peace-making in Kivu. This 
happened after the CNDP rebels decided to make peace with the DRC government. 
Oxfam affirmed in 2007, that MONUC “brought stability and security to large parts of the 
country” (Oxfam, 2007). However, Oxfam had also already found that MONUC 
overstretched its resources and that it should focus on the protection of civilians. 
Criticism was directed by Oxfam at the UN involvement during the operation of Kimia II 
in 2009. Kimia II was a joint military operation between the FARDC and MONUC 
against the FDLR in the eastern part of the DRC. 
 
The UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1906) was innovative, in that it determined that MONUC, 
under the conditionality policy, may suspend support to FARDC brigades violating 
human rights.59 This policy regulates the cooperation between MONUC and the FARDC 
in joint military operations, offering leverage to the UN peace mission in the sense that 
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its support may be withdrawn from those brigades whose senior elements have 
committed human rights violations.  
 
In January and March 2009, the political situation in the DRC experienced a dramatic 
turnaround. It could be said that secret talks between the Congolese, Rwandan and 
some senior CNDP members took place in order to exclude Laurent Nkunda from the 
discussions. Indeed, after the intervention of Rwandan forces in the DRC, the CNDP 
leader, Laurent Nkunda, was forced to leave, abandon the rebellion and agree to 
integrate the ranks of the FARDC, if the DRC government agreed to launch joint military 
operations with the Rwandan army against the FDLR.60 It should be noted that one year 
after the launch of Kimia II, the Congolese population in general and that of Kivu in 
particular were satisfied and the image of MONUC had suddenly and dramatically 
improved. It was interesting, according to Weir and Smith61, to see how the protection of 
civilians by MONUC had changed, especially in North Kivu.  
 
In operations that aimed to protect civilians against attacks, primarily by FDLR, 
MONUC, in co-operation with the people of North Kivu, had established a system of 
monitoring and reporting (monitoring centres and appeals that worked effectively for 
everyone). Call centres were open day and night, and were equipped with an interpreter 
and MONUC soldiers, who could direct the patrols to the places where incidents were 
occurring.62 
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2.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter notes that MONUC’s mission in the field of peacekeeping operations 
showed its limitations and inefficiencies, due to the mandate given by the UNSC being 
in disequilibrium with the reality of the DRC conflict. An unforeseen consequence of the 
failure of UN intervention under the “Chapter VII” mandate as recommended by the 
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, MONUC was observing the massacre of civilian 
populations. The premise of this analysis is that strict adherence to the principle of the 
use of force in peacekeeping operations to protect civilians was the only option 
available to peace enforcement. In support of this premise, it was shown that the nature 
of the MONUC’s mandate, which necessitated the adoption of coercive enforcement 
measures, inevitably led to its role to ensure the protection of civilian populations under 
imminent threat of physical violence. Murphy (2007: 14) argued that the adoption of 
UNSC Resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter by the UN involving 
enforcement measures has been one of its most controversial actions in recent years. 
However, Murphy demonstrated that the problem was not the legality of such activity, 
but the question of which States decide when it was appropriate and what criteria was 
used to form that decision. Likewise, UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1906, para. 4, 5, 7 and 
8) recognised the interrelated nature of the effective protection of civilians, reduction 
and removal of the threat of armed groups and the strategic objective of peace and 
stability in the DRC. This was one of the key drives of MONUC’s objectives according to 
the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.  
 
The weaknesses inherent to UNSC were due to the political impact of policy decisions 
surrounding the UNSC and the influences of donor countries and the five permanent 
members of the UNSC on peacekeeping missions. Murphy stated that the current 
practice allowed the permanent members of the UNSC to determine the agenda, thus 
facilitating a very selective, secretive and undemocratic response to international crises 
(ibid). After 11 years of the UN mission in the DRC, MONUC’s mandate remains 
questioned with regard to what was published in An Agenda of Peace by then UNSG 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali. This was an important report that stimulated a major 
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international debate about the role of the UN in securing and maintaining peace and 
security in the world. Subsequent events have highlighted the deficiency in the UN 
system, in particular the controversy over UN action and policy in Somalia and Rwanda, 
and the failure to secure peace and protect Bosnia in former Yugoslavia. In the DRC, 
the case of the Ituri crisis showed that, most UN troops were not equipped, trained, or 
organised effectively enough to intervene to protect civilians. MONUC contingents were 
deployed with different understandings of their role. Some believed that they were only 
to protect the UN mission and the civilians in their immediate area. Others believed that 
they would only conduct Chapter VI operations. Autesserre (2006: 88-90) suggested 
that the way in which MONUC used its limited resources was also inadequate and 
inappropriate, and was bound to fail because it did not engage in the DRC conflict at its 
grassroots level. Instead, the UN and diplomats decided to only bolster a weak central 
government and an army of limited capability and discipline, which engaged in local 
conflicts almost as often as it prevented them. It was important to recognise the 
concepts and theories that inform the way in which the UN peacekeeping operations 
and their relationship with world politics in general can be understood.  
 
Although MONUC’s mandate has become more robust throughout the years and the 
protection of civilians has become the mission’s top priority, its mandate remains 
ambiguous when it comes to civilian protection. The mandate language continues to be 
vague, as it is not clear what it entails, for instance, to protect civilians under imminent 
threat of physical violence, or what it means to undertake preventive action to deter 
possible spoilers. Although civilian protection was created to provide guidelines for 
MONUC peacekeepers in Kivu provinces, they remain largely in the dark when it comes 
to civilian protection and rely on their own intuition in the field. Moreover, according to 
HRW (2009: 152) “there is no formal training on the guidelines, no mechanism for 
monitoring and evaluation on whether and how these guidelines are followed, and 
nothing in the Agreement of MONUC status, rules of engagement, or force directives 
instructing UN troops to follow these guidelines in the field of peacekeeping operations 
in the DRC”. 
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Furthermore, there seems to be a contradiction between theories (mandate language) 
and practices (actions in the field). While MONUC’s mandate (UNSC Resolution 
(S/SER/1906)) stated that MONUC could undertake preventive action to deter possible 
spoilers, peacekeepers only acted proactively between 2005 and 2007. Autesserre 
(2006: 90) agreed that the elections and Ituri were important examples of what can be 
done when the international community decided that it would not accept failure.  
 
Thus, the reality of the politicisation of the UN mandate to MONUC greatly affected the 
reality in the field, especially in terms of the protection of civilians who were under 
imminent physical threat. It was no wonder, therefore, that MONUC’s primary mode of 
operation has always been triage. However, from a humanitarian perspective MONUC 
did a remarkable job in the field of peacekeeping operations in the DRC. Any criticism of 
peacekeeping in the DRC needs to begin with the undeniable fact that the UNSC has 
never given MONUC the resources it needed to reconstruct the DRC’s security. This 
affected the implications of MONUC for peace and security, and its mandate to protect 
civilian populations under imminent threat will be analysed in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: 
IMPLICATIONS OF MONUC   
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents a critical analysis of the implications of MONUC with regards to 
peace and security issues in the DRC as guided by its mandate. It begins by outlining 
the qualification of the DRC conflict. To qualify the DRC conflict is to determine the 
nature and actors involved in this conflict and to provide an answer to the principal 
question in relation to this topic. This will be followed by a discussion and an analysis of 
the implications of MONUC‘s mandate for peace and security issues in the DRC. In 
addition, critique on the context of how MONUC carried out its mandate to protect 
civilian populations and the role played by MONUC in the electoral process will also be 
discussed. The chapter concludes by focusing on the critical outcomes, strengths and 
weaknesses of MONUC’s provision of peace and security, in its efforts to resolve the 
conflict in the DRC. To achieve international peace, peacekeeping is one of the conflict 
resolution procedures which allowed the UN’s involvement to be represented in the field 
by deploying personnel and the military with the consent of belligerent parties with the 
objective to separate them so as to prevent and remove threats to peace. 
 
Peacekeeping operations are primarily aimed at reducing international conflicts and the 
number of deaths resulting from wars or conflicts throughout the world. They are linked 
to conditions that are more or less favourable to a de-escalation of violence in domestic 
or international conflict. Lejbowicz (2006: 77) explains that the goal of these UN 
missions was to create favourable conditions for this de-escalation, without waiting for 
the parties involved to create these conditions for themselves. Dominique (2005: 37) 
noted that the intervention of UN troops was not foreseen by the UN Charter, but had 
emerged from 1956 as a main method of action by the UN. The UN Charter gave the 
UNSC primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in the world (UN 
Charter, Art. 24, para. 1). 
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The institutional liberalism theory recognises international institutions such as MONUC 
as important organisations that contribute towards the peace and security process by 
promoting norms and values, as well as making cooperation easier by seeking harmony 
between and within member States in international politics. In addition, by playing its 
role, the UN contributes naturally and voluntarily, enabling States to achieve harmony 
with each other, as well as promoting common interests and mutual goals. According to 
the theory, through various actors, UN commitment to dispute resolutions reduces the 
States fear of each other. Nevertheless, Keohane, (1989: 383-384) argues that it was 
the mark of a practice that the behaviour of those engaged in it can be corrected by an 
appeal to its own rules. The rules must be durable and must prescribe behavioural roles 
for actors, besides constraining activity and shaping expectations. In other words, 
institutions differentiate between actors according to the roles that they were expected 
to perform, and hence institutions can be identified by asking whether or not patterns of 
behaviour are indeed differentiated by role.  
 
Institutional liberalism assumes that international institutions can be and were prominent 
in terms of coordinating cooperation for common interests among States. Therefore, it is 
necessary for States to follow an institutional liberalism approach in order to gain more 
frequent cooperation to avoid conflict. The case study is the culmination of the 
institutional liberalism theory, which considers the implications of the UN for both 
interstate conflict and aggression in the DRC. A key element of these analyses that 
relates to the impact of the UN on dispute behaviour is the implication of the mandate, 
member cohesion and the institutional structure of the peacekeeping operation for 
MONUC’s involvement in the peace and security problematique of the DRC. 
 
It is important to note that the theoretical approach outlined above, contributes to the 
present study by underpinning tools for a critical analysis of how MONUC’s mandate 
could have resulted in a successful peacekeeping operation for facilitating conflict 
resolution within the DRC. Above all, international institutions such as the UN, through 
MONUC’s mandate, play a vital peacekeeping role in determining the nature of the DRC 
conflict, either as interstate conflicts or an act of aggression, and to determine the 
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nature of actors participating in this conflict. The term ‘intrastate conflict’ or ‘aggression’ 
in this study refers to armed conflict that took place in the DRC and the numerous 
threats against the civilian population, or those who were under imminent threat of 
physical violence (UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1565) of 1October 2004). 
 
3.2 OUTLINE OF THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE DRC CONFLICT  
 
Although international humanitarian law63 is a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian 
reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict (UNHR, 2011: 5), it does not include a 
complete definition within its material scope. It is true that the relevant conventions refer 
to various types of armed conflict and allow one, therefore, to foresee the legal contours 
of this multifaceted concept. However, these instruments do not provide sufficient 
precise criteria for determining the content of each of these categories without the risk 
of ambiguity. This sub section will focus on the characterisation of the DRC conflict, 
which is based on the nature of this conflict and the identification of the actors involved. 
 
3.2.1 Nature of the DRC conflict 
 
The Geneva Convention of 1949, under its common Article 2.1, stipulates: “cases of 
declared war or other armed conflict arise between two or more High Contracting 
Parties”, even if the State of war was not recognised by one of them.64 The situations 
described here were applicable to situations only between States’ actors. The “High 
Contracting Parties” mentioned in this text were indeed sovereign entities. Depending 
on the circumstances, these situations may take the form of a direct confrontation 
between States, which constitutes an intervention in an internal conflict that already 
exists. In the second case, there was the internationalisation of the conflict. This occurs 
when a foreign power sends uninvited troops on the ground to support an opposition 
movement against a local government. Intervention may also take place by proxy, 
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whereby this power supports and guides the rebellion from the outside.65 In this case, it 
is then necessary to determine what level of control is sufficiently needed in order to 
describe the conflict as international. Therefore, there has to be greater involvement 
than mere support, but this involvement does not imply that all actions of the group 
concerned are State-run and performed by external stakeholders. The attack must be 
characterised by an intention to harm the enemy, which excludes cases where the use 
of force is the result of an error. Similarly, where there is no armed conflict without 
involvement this does not imply that all actions of the groups concerned are performed 
by external stakeholders. 
 
With regard to the nature of the conflict in the DRC, according to UNSC Resolution 
(S/RES/1234, para. 1 and 2) of 9 April 1999, forces mentioned by the UNSC that were 
opposed to the DRC government were deemed to have violated the national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC. However, these forces mentioned were 
not clearly identified as Congolese or foreign forces? The UNSC remained silent on this 
point and never distinguished those forces in question. How can one determine whether 
or not the “rebel movements” were or may be related to this UNSC Resolution, in which 
they were described as “forces opposed”66 to the DRC government? This lack of clarity 
was problematic, both because it made it harder to understand such violence, but also 
because it reinforces stereotypes of the UN as primitive and anarchic, driven by political 
influences within the UNSC and unable to clearly determine the nature of the conflict in 
the DRC. This study applies the institutional liberalism theory to better understand the 
nature of the DRC conflict which appeared as an interstate or an aggression with more 
than seven countries clashing in the country, resulting in a lot of deaths. The study 
focuses on ways to avoid interstate conflict by regulating State behaviour. The precise 
distribution and nature of the “stakes” explains differences in State policy and 
behaviour. Therefore, the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1304, para. 4 (a)) of 16 June 2000 
further demanded that Uganda and Rwanda, who had violated the sovereignty and 
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territorial integrity of the DRC, withdraw all their forces from the DRC territory without 
further delay, in conformity with the timetable of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and 
the 8 April 2000 Kampala Disengagement Plan. Keohane & Martin (1995: 40-45) have 
accepted the fact that institutions will not be significant if a conflict of interest exists 
between two States at the international level since such a conflict cannot possibly be 
resolved by institutions alone due to the pursuit of interests by each state. 
 
The prohibition against the use of armed force in International Politics is categorical, 
except with regard to self-defence (Article 51 of the UN Charter) and a coercive military 
action decided by the UNSC under Chapter VII of the Charter. Aggression is a violation 
of this prohibition (Reuter, 1992: 263) and presents the use of armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or 
any other manner inconsistent with the UN Charter. According to UNGA Resolution 
(S/1974/3314) of 14 December 1974, aggression was displayed in the invasion of the 
DRC’s territory by the armed forces of Rwanda and Uganda. Section 3 of this UNGA 
Resolution gives an exhaustive list of acts of aggression as a crime against international 
peace. These two countries (Rwanda and Uganda) justified their acts in terms of 
wanting action as an act of “preventive self-defence”, and the International Court of 
Justice had repeatedly ruled on this case67 under international law (Dupuy, 2004: 594). 
Unfortunately, the concept of self-defence in international law has been a matter of wide 
controversy ever since the adoption of the UN Charter. There has been deep 
disagreement about its content and circumstances in which the right of self-defence 
may be invoked and exercised. Indeed, the right of individual and collective self-defence 
still represents one of the most disputed matters in international law. Dupuy explains 
that the concept of “preventive war” was conceived and implemented by the USA, 
particularly against Iraq in the name of the fight against international terrorism and other 
threats after 11 September 2001. The concept of anticipatory self-defence requires that 
a State has the right to take armed action outside its borders in order to prevent a 
planned attack against its sovereignty and territorial integrity. This notion is closer to the 
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idea of preventive war, in that it goes against common sense and the law of war to wait 
to be attacked before fighting back or asking for help from the UN. This is important, 
when the impending attack is going to occur by means of weapons of mass destruction 
or a terrorist organisation which gives clear signs of wanting to use them against a State 
(Ntirumenyer, 2004: 5). 
 
Anticipatory self-defence was mentioned by Uganda, before the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), as a means of defence with regard to armed activities in the DRC’s 
territory (ICJ, 2005: para. 24). The Uganda government argued that it was acting in self-
defence against the rebel forces launching attacks against it from within the 
neighbouring territory of the DRC (Ibid, para.146). Uganda had not reported these 
escalating attacks to the UNSC, nor had it ever claimed to have been subjected to an 
attack by the armed forces of the DRC (Ibid, para. 145). The ICJ noted that there was 
no proof that the DRC was involved in any armed attacks that had been launched 
against Uganda from the DRC’s territory. The ICJ rejected allegations that Uganda had 
been subject to intermittent attacks by DRC-based rebel forces which were supplied 
and equipped by the DRC (Ibid, para. 120). Thus, the ICJ found that ‘the legal and 
factual circumstances for the exercise of a right of self-defence by Uganda against the 
DRC were not present’ (Ibid, para. 147), and since ‘the preconditions for the exercise of 
self-defence’ were also absent, the Court saw no need to consider ‘whether and under 
what conditions contemporary international law provides for a right of self-defence 
against large-scale attacks by irregular forces’ (ibid, para. 147). 
 
Having found that Uganda had no grounds for self-defence (ICJ, 2005: para. 149), the 
ICJ (ICJ, 2005: para. 165) concluded that Uganda had violated the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the DRC, and that its unlawful military intervention was ‘of such a 
magnitude and duration’ that the ICJ considered it to be ‘a grave violation of the 
prohibition on the use of force’ in art 2(4) of the UN Charter. However, the ICJ (ICJ, 
2005: para. 23 and 24) avoided making a finding of aggression, which the DRC had 
specifically asked the ICJ to do against Uganda. It was not until three months after the 
outbreak of hostilities that Rwanda acknowledged the presence of its armed forces in 
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the DRC territory. According to Curtis (2005: 4), the considerable size of the 
reconstituted Hutu force, while a cause for concern, was only one factor in Rwanda’s 
overall strategic plan which resulted in the decision to intervene in the DRC. Curtis 
emphasised that according to former Rwandan Vice President and Defence Minister 
Paul Kagame, it was not just the size, but rather the proven ability of the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe to launch attacks into Rwanda that was so alarming. This presence 
in the DRC did not begin in November 1998. The logical sequence of certain political 
events can attest to the almost undeniable and irrefutable fact that this presence dated 
back to 2 August 1998, long before the creation of the RCD as a politico-military party.68 
 
However, Ludo (2001: 28-49) noted that the Rwandan government also claimed a 
significant portion of eastern DRC, which was considered to be “historically Rwanda”, as 
well as the fact that former President L.D. Kabila was planning to commit genocide 
against the Tutsi Rwandan in the Kivu region. Ludo argues that the official reason cited 
by Rwanda for this new rebellion in the DRC was given by Theogene Rudasingwa, the 
Rwandan ambassador to the United States, who stated that: “The DRC continues to be 
a sanctuary for those who have committed genocide.” President L.D. Kabila provided a 
new drive and gave genocide Rwandan weapons in an attempt to destabilise Rwanda. 
The rude and bigoted statements made, against Tutsi Rwandan, deliberate lynching of 
Rwandan origin and the reactionary rhetoric of empire ‘Tutsi’ were all elements of the 
genocide regime in Rwanda, and especially its spokesman on the “radio Mille Collins” 
(Ibid, 58).  
 
The facts described above constitute a violation of the prohibition against the use of 
armed force in international relations under Articles 2 and 4 of the UN Charter, which 
was itself the result of a violation of the obligation towards the peaceful settlement of 
disputes in terms of Articles 2 and 3 of the same Charter. The timing of the beginning of 
the aggression by Rwanda and Uganda against the DRC (Autesserre, 2010: 176) 
                                                 
68
 During the first six months of fighting, Uganda repeatedly voiced its displeasure toward Rwanda’s “unilateral” 
creation of the RCD. The political face of the rebellion did not emerge until three weeks after the initial uprising 
when, at the behest of Rwanda, the RCD was founded by an eclectic mix of Congolese politicians opposed to L.D. 
Kabila. 
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showed, moreover, that it was not only an international armed conflict, but also had 
local, national and regional dimensions of violence that remained closely linked in most 
of the eastern DRC. 
 
3.2.2 Identification of actors involved in the conflict 
 
If the UNSC could mask the nature of the conflict in the DRC as an act of aggression, it 
could not silence the identification of actors involved in this conflict. The actors who 
were involved in the DRC conflict, without naming those actors by the UNSC, the UNSC 
Resolution (S/RES/1234) stated that it “deplores” the fact that the fighting continues and 
the forces of foreign States in the DRC remain in conditions which are incompatible with 
the principles of the UN Charter. This UNSC Resolution asked the countries who 
violated the sovereignty of the DRC “to end the presence of these uninvited forces and 
take immediate action to that effect” (para. 1). However, Kabungulu (2000: 6) indicated 
that although it identified the force of foreign States, the UNSC Resolution did not say 
what it meant by ‘uninvited forces’. The UN called upon all parties to the conflict in the 
DRC to protect human rights and respect international humanitarian law. It particularly 
quoted the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols 
of 1977, as well as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide of 1948, which all applied to them (UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1234, para. 6)). 
 
The UNSC is the main UN body tasked with peacekeeping and international security, 
yet the concepts of aggression and aggressor were not clearly mentioned in its various 
UNSC Resolutions. In UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1234, para. 2), the UNSC deplored the 
continuing fighting and presence of forces of foreign States in the DRC in a manner 
which was inconsistent with the principles of the UN Charter, and called upon those 
States to take immediate steps to bring the presence of these uninvited forces to an 
end. Another UNSC Resolution stated that Rwanda and Uganda “... have violated the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC...” (UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1304, para. 
4) of 16 June 2001). The institutional liberalism theory posited that, the rules must be 
durable, and must prescribe behavioural roles for actors, besides only constraining 
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activity and shaping expectations (Keohane, 1988: 384). Despite repeated accusations 
made by the DRC against Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, the UNSC did not mention a 
single country as being among the aggressors, nor did it mention the fact that those 
three countries itself had acknowledged the reasons69 of their involvement as actors in 
the armed conflict in the DRC. According to the theory, institutions differentiate among 
actors according to the roles that they are expected to perform, and institutions can be 
identified by asking whether patterns of behaviour are indeed differentiated by role. 
Besides the power relations that govern the rules within the UNSC, the concept of 
“internal conflict with the participation of foreign forces”, was applied to the DRC armed 
conflict by the UN Special Reporter Roberto Garretson on the Human Rights Situation 
in the DRC. Garretson fundamentally influenced the central organ of the UN until the 
formulation of the abovementioned UNSC Resolution. Nevertheless, according to him, it 
remains clear that the DRC government, as well as all the Congolese people, viewed 
the conflict as an act of aggression. 
 
The UN implicitly characterised the situation in the DRC as a conflict among the 
Congolese that was to say, as in the case of the Congo in 1960, “a civil war or internal 
collapse” that was complicated by outside interference (Gendebien, 1967: 279). In fact, 
for the DRC government, this crisis was far from being an institutional crisis or 
constitutional conflict of the era which was characterised by extreme fragmentation of 
power, trends and political opposition factions. Yet, according to the UN, they were 
dealing with a civil war, or even better, an internal struggle for political power. However, 
the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the UN Charter are clear: 
 
Nothing in the present UN Charter shall authorise the UN to intervene in matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement proceedings under this UN Charter, 
but this principle does not in any way affect the application of enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII. 
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 The presence of Rwanda in the DRC conflict was justified by the permanent menace of the FDLR’s presence in 
the eastern part of the DRC since 1994.  Uganda’s reason was for self-defence against the intermittent attacks by 
DRC-based rebel forces which were supplied and equipped by the DRC. And the involvement of Burundi was 
very limited, especially in some police operations aimed at securing its border with the DRC.  
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The legal uncertainty of these first two UNSC Resolutions (S/RES/1234) of 9 April 1999, 
and (S/RES/1258) of 6 August 1999 was to become the source of much controversy 
between the UN and the DRC government and led to differences of interpretation. 
Undefined roles of actors involved often caused the confusion in an analysis of the 
situation. When the armies of Rwanda and Uganda clashed in Kisangani, for the first 
time, the UNSC named the actors of the DRC conflict. Its UNSC Resolution 
(S/RES/1304, para. 2) of 16 June 2000 reiterated its unreserved condemnation of the 
fighting between Ugandan and Rwandan forces in Kisangani in violation of the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC, and demanded that these forces and 
those allied to them desist from further fighting. However, those principles mentioned 
above by Keohane (1989) created doubts that the behaviour of the actors within the 
UNSC could shape expectations of sustainable peace in the DRC.  
 
The disappointments have also been immense from the actors within the UNSC in 
some cases such as the failure to respond effectively to large-scale atrocity crimes in 
Rwanda in 1994, the Balkans and Sudan in 1991; the by passing out of the UNSC in the 
2003 invasion of Iraq; the complete politicisation and loss of credibility of the Human 
Rights Commission. Autesserre (2010: 89) argued that reducing the local tensions, 
therefore, would also reduce the major instances of fighting that resulted in the massive 
displacement, death and sexual violence that were the hallmarks of the DRC’s crisis. 
 
It can be noted, however, that the qualification of the conflict was taken minimally. In 
other words the causative agent was soon determined by the spirit and letter of all 
subsequent actions in the peaceful settlement of the dispute. For example, there was a 
confusing and paradoxical, conceptual error which regularly condemned the DRC 
authorities with references to “rebels”70 by the media and international public opinion, 
thereby reinforcing the belief of the aggressors that the crisis was internal. 
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 For the DRC’s authorities, the RDC and MLC were the rebel movements created by the aggressors Rwanda and 
Uganda for hiding their presence in the DRC.   
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3.3 IMPLICATIONS OF MONUC FOR PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES IN THE DRC 
 
An analysis of the implementation of the MONUC mandate and its involvement in the 
peace and security process in the DRC shows a mixed record of actions. The nature of 
MONUC’s observation mandate in relation to the nature of the DRC conflict was one of 
inadequacy, and several factors played a role in this regard. On the one hand, some 
difficulties were predictable because of, the geographical size of the DRC, the existence 
of several armed groups,71 and the involvement of several foreign countries72 in the war. 
On the other hand, the volatile environment in which MONUC operated required 
constant adaptation, especially with regard to its observation mandate.73 The DRC 
armed conflict was characterised by a plurality of actors, not only those who signed the 
cease-fire agreement in Lusaka, but also many other armed groups that continued to 
emerge. Hence, the choice had to be made between negotiating with rebel groups and 
the aggressor countries; and UN intervention for peace enforcement. Between these 
two positions, UN intervention was preceded by the signing of a peace agreement 
(Global and All Inclusive Agreement of 2002) between the warring parties, which 
contradicted Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the mandate that was given to the UN 
by the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Therefore, the UN mandate of peace enforcement 
to protect the civilian population under Chapter VII of the UN Charter was inadequate to 
this peace agreement. The inappropriate interpretation of the nature of the DRC conflict 
by the UNSC as internal conflict with the participation of foreign forces has influenced 
the MONUC mandate for peace enforcement. Moreover, during the first eight years 
(1999-2006) of its establishment MONUC’s mandate seems to have chosen first 
generation peacekeeping in the context of aggression.   
 
Nevertheless, the political influence determined the decisions of the UNSC after the 
tremendous impact of unilateral actions taken by the US and its allies in Iraq in 2003 
(Hassler, 2013: 1). Hassler criticised the fact that the UNSC appeared to be powerless 
to prevent its members from taking unilateral action in this instance, just as it had when 
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 MLC, RCD, RCD/ML, CNDP, FDLR, LRA, Mai-mai, ADEF, etc. 
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 Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi against the DRC and its allies (Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe) 
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 Interview with Mr Mamadou Kuyate, MONUC Head Office, Pretoria/RSA, Friday, 1 October 2010. 
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it failed to intervene effectively in the DRC. Tull (2009: 19) also criticised the political 
influence mentioned above since decisions of the UNSC about on-going peacekeeping 
missions took into account the extent to which mandates were being implemented. The 
increased activities of the UNSC through MONUC’s observation mandate highlighted its 
inadequacies when seven official and more than 10 armed groups were clashing in the 
DRC.  
 
It was four years after the creation of MONUC that the signing of the Global and All 
Inclusive Agreement of 17 December 2002 took place (Reyntjens, 2009: 250-261). This 
time lapse may explain the delays and political difficulties that were experienced by the 
UNSC, in identifying the real problems of the DRC conflict before the establishment of 
MONUC. Furthermore, the slowness evolution of the MONUC intervention and the 
inadequacy of operational capacity in relation to the DRC territory hampered progress in 
the field of peacekeeping. Autesserre (2010: 19) emphasises that the UN had a major 
organisational interest in fully pacifying the DRC. If it wanted to preserve its credibility in 
peacekeeping issues, it could not afford to let the DRC collapse on its watch, and have 
its largest and most expensive mission be regarded as a fiasco. In this regard, on the 
one hand, the increase in the number of UNSC Resolutions demonstrated its interest in 
the situation in the DRC, but on the other hand, one may wonder whether this did not 
destabilise MONUC officials, who had to constantly adapt to the injunctions of the 
UNSC in response to realities in the field. 
 
Moreover, a passive approach by MONUC characterised the first four years of MONUC, 
and this delayed the achievement of peace and security in the DRC and seriously 
threatened Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Thus, the absence of action by peacekeeping 
operations against threats incurred by civilians contributed to the discrediting of 
MONUC. There was a need, in this regard, for clear extensive communication as well as 
integration mechanisms. It was important to communicate the MONUC mandate known 
to ensure that it was understood by local Congolese populations and on regional levels. 
MONUC faced harsh criticism about its effectiveness and sustainability from the 
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Congolese population and Great Lakes region’s authorities.74 Three events illustrate the 
inability of the UN mission: the battle of Kisangani between Rwandan and Ugandan 
soldiers in 2000, fighting between armed militias in Bunia in spring 2003, and the 
capture of Bukavu in June 2004 by the troops of General Nkunda and Colonel 
Mutebuse, as well as the wars in North Kivu in 2008 and 2010.75 
 
However, the adoption of a more robust approach and increased operational 
capabilities of MONUC since October 2004 has produced positive results (UNS 
Resolution (S/RES/1565)). On the one hand, there was the disarmament of 12000 
militiamen in Ituri, and on the other hand, the announcement on March 31, 2005 by the 
ex-FAR and Rwandan Interrahamwe of a unilateral cease-fire, as well as their 
willingness to cooperate with MONUC for their disarmament and repatriation to Rwanda 
(UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1592)). In other words, after being criticised, a proactive 
approach by MONUC had contributed significantly to the restoration of peace and 
security in the DRC. MONUC’s diplomatic influence on the inter-Congolese dialogue 
and the humanitarian actions was successful. Unfortunately, a scandal of sexual abuse 
committed by some members of MONUC in 200476 and a repetition of the war in North 
Kivu again discredited MONUC. 
 
The role of MONUC in peace and security issues have produced mixed results. The 
contextual constraints in the DRC conflict hindered the adequate treatment of problems 
which were at the root of the war (Autesserre, 2010: 15). Peace and security were not 
evident in this country, despite the presence of MONUC’s mandate under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. Accordingly, in late 1999 the UN began, very slowly, to deploy a small 
observer force in the DRC, which was tasked with ratifying the Lusaka ceasefire 
agreement. It took several years for the UN to complete MONUC’s deployment, and the 
mission continued to expand both in size and mandate. These constraints could include 
the presence of high levels of hostility and the low capacity of the MONUC mandate for 
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 http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/demo cratic-
republic-of-congo.html, [accessed on 17 September 2013].  
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 http://www.irinnews.org/report/40667/drc-rival-militias-to-meet-in-kisangani, [accessed on 12 November 2010]. 
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peace, a significant likelihood of spoilers, the existence of hostile neighbouring States or 
networks, the lack of a clear peace agreement before the MONUC intervention and 
ambiguous or confused mandates. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse MONUC’s 
involvement in the achievement of peace and security in the DRC under the following 
points: 
 
3.3.1 Restoration of peace  
 
The presence of an impartial representative of the international community contributed 
just in theory to the primary purpose of the UN. For example, a ceasefire was 
precarious in the eastern part of the DRC but the UN presence reassured the parties 
involved in the Global and All Inclusive agreement of 2002. With regard to the UN 
observation mandate, the UNSC showed its ineffectiveness in ensuring peace and 
security throughout the DRC, and also its limited resources used were inadequate and 
inappropriate. The UN only showed its presence when civilians were under physical 
threat and the number of the dead among the civilian population mounted. Virally (1972: 
486) wrote that the peacekeeping operations aimed to ensure the physical presence of 
the UN in areas disturbed by fighting. De Coming (2001: 17-21) emphasises that 
peacekeeping was a way to control the implementation of peace agreements or 
ceasefires for the prevention of violent conflict after gaining the permission of precarious 
and divided groups. However, Human Rights Watch (2002: 2) reported that there were 
in fact military observers and 1000 MONUC troops stationed in Kisangani at the time of 
the massacre. Unfortunately, they did not intervene to protect the civilian population due 
to the character observe mandate that was given to the MONUC by the UNSC. The 
peacebuilding process included targeted measures to reduce the risk of a resumption of 
conflict77 and lay the foundation for sustainable development, including through the 
strengthening of national capacities for conflict management at all levels.  
 
Therefore, In order to provide a clearer perspective on the design of the UN mission, the 
case of ONUC in 1964 was discussed by Druckman, et al., (1997: 151-165), who 
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criticised the problematique of the mandate and its activities, the basis for which were 
provided by the UNSC Resolution. They argued that the UNSC Resolution expressed 
concern about the danger of “widespread civil war” and urged the UN to take immediate 
and appropriate measures including, if necessary, the use of force as a last resort, in 
order to prevent its occurrence. They concluded that, confusion of purpose within the 
UN was, however, evident in the fact that while the resolution spoke of the use of force 
to prevent civil war, its preamble declared that “the solutions of the problems of the 
Congo lies in the hands of the Congolese people themselves without any interference 
from outside”. MONUC’s mandate quickly evolved and diversified with the adoption of 
several Resolutions. In particular, there was the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1291) of 24 
February 2000, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in which the UNSC considered the 
situation in the DRC to be a threat against international peace and security in the Great 
Lakes region of Africa. As a result, MONUC was strengthened in its size and mandate, 
and the UNSC Resolution also authorised the expansion of MONUC’s military 
personnel and observers (Ibid, para. 4). MONUC was also authorised to use force 
beyond self-defence to defend the civilian population. The UNSC Resolution 
(S/RES/1355, para. 32) of 15 June 2001 authorised MONUC to provide assistance for 
the DDRRR programme in the DRC. MONUC’s activities in 2002 were intensified on the 
one hand with military observers who continued to monitor the ceasefire along frontiers 
especially in the Ituri district, while on the other hand the team was investigating 
violations of human rights perpetrated by various armed opposition groups such as the 
MLC and RCD-Goma. In September 2003, MONUC placed a contingent in Ituri with a 
task force to the district which encouraged the DRC government to deploy a contingent 
of 700 Congolese police in Bunia for the security of the territory.78 MONUC troops were 
targeted in Ituri in 2004, by militia groups while rebel general Laurent Nkunda occupied 
Bukavu. In 2005, MONUC actions in the Ituri and Kivu provinces were targeted by militia 
groups that allowed the DRC government to arrest militia leaders among them Thomas 
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Lubanga Dyilo, who is the leader of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC), and was 
accused for killing UN peacekeepers in Ituri.79  
 
As a result of the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1794, para. 1 and 2) of 21 December 2007, 
the UNSC decided to extend the mandate and capacity of MONUC, as set out in UNSC 
Resolution (S/RES/1756), until 31 December 2008. The UNSC also requested MONUC 
to attach the highest priority to address the crisis in the Kivus in all its dimensions, in 
particular through the protection of civilians and support for the implementation of the 
Nairobi Joint Communiqué. The fighting in North Kivu at the end of 2007 between 
FARDC and Laurent Nkunda's CNDP, and the war fought by the various armed groups, 
including the Mai-Mai and FDLR, led to the reinforcement of the MONUC presence in 
the region. This was in support of operations conducted by the FARDC in order to 
restore the authority of the State and achieve the realisation of the brassage process. 
Despite the Peace Conference which was held from 6 to 25 January 2008 in Goma, and 
which resulted in the signing of two Acts of Engagement for the two Kivu provinces by 
all parties involved, violations of the cease-fire occurred fairly quickly and significant 
progress in the DDR process could be seen. MONUC supported the FARDC and 
participated in joint operations with FARDC, and MONUC also attempted to address 
issues through the organisation of basic training and frequent evaluations. This process 
was to be performed by MONUC in collaboration with the FARDC forces in achieving 
DDRRR, especially for the ex-FAR and Interahamwe Rwandan, whose presence in 
eastern DRC since July 1994 was one of the sources of instability in the region 
(Sabahara, 2005:158).  
 
3.3.2 Disarmament of national and foreign armed groups in the DRC  
 
Since its creation on 30 November 1999 by UNSC, the MONUC’s mission had 
undergone significant changes, both in terms of its mandate and capabilities. However, 
11 years after its establishment, peace and stability were not present in the DRC. The 
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persistence of violence in many parts of the country, especially in the East (North and 
South Kivu), as well as delays in the implementation of DDR and DDRRR, showed that 
many challenges had to be faced before it would be possible to provide the country with 
stable and legitimate institutions.  
 
The disarmament of armed groups was not clearly defined in either MONUC’s mandate 
or, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. The UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1341, para. 7) of 
22 February 2001 urged all the parties to the conflict, in close cooperation with MONUC, 
to prepare, by the 15 May 2001, for immediate implementation of prioritised plans for 
the DDRRR.80 The involvement of MONUC’s DDRRR in these operations was 
reinforced by the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1445) of 4 December 2002, authorising the 
increase of its personnel to 8,700 soldiers, in order to enable it to carry out its activities 
in a hazardous environment. 
 
After four years of MONUC activities, the UNSC was clearly defined in the DDR of the 
DRC armed groups, which was evident in the MONUC mandate from 2003. The UNSC 
Resolution (S/RES/1493, para. 17) of 28 July 2003 authorised MONUC to assist the 
Government of National Unity and Transition in disarming and demobilising those 
Congolese combatants who had voluntarily decided to enter the DDR process in 
cooperation with the UNDP and other UN agencies. This process, which was provided 
for in the Global and All Inclusive Agreement of Pretoria, sought their voluntary 
departure, with the assistance of MONUC. The implementation of the National Plan of 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (PNDDR) and the National 
Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (CONADER) received 
valuable resources assistance from MONUC, as well as the Structure for Military 
Integration (SMI).81 The integration of the army occurred in several phases to the 
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cantonment point (for checking lists of names) and those armed groups or individuals 
who were about to be disarmed by MONUC.  
 
The MONUC mandate was strengthened by the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1355, para. 
32) of 15 June 2001, which authorised MONUC to assist the DRC government in the 
DDRRR, especially with regard to Interahamwe. This mission of the DDRRR was clearly 
determined by other UNSC Resolutions, because the issue of armed groups constituted 
a real threat to the process. According to UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1493, para. 25 and 
26) of 28 July 2003, MONUC was authorised to take the necessary steps in the areas of 
deployment of its armed units, and as it deemed within its capabilities, to use all 
necessary means to fulfil its mandate in the Ituri district, as well as in North and South 
Kivu. The UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1794, para. 5, 6 and 7) of 21 December 2007 
encouraged MONUC, in accordance with its mandate, to give priority to the protection of 
civilians in decisions regarding the use of available capacity and resources. It also 
instructed MONUC to support the integrated FARDC brigades, with a view to disarming 
both the recalcitrant foreign forces and DRC armed groups. This particularly applied to 
the FDLR, ex-FAR/Interahamwe and dissident militia of Laurent Nkunda, in order to 
ensure their participation in the DDRRR processes where necessary. All these armed 
groups were located in the mountains and forests of North and South Kivu’s provinces.    
 
The central activities of MONUC were then focused on activities that included the 
DDRRR process and a contribution to the DDR programme. These activities also dealt 
with the establishment of a stable security environment which included the protection of 
civilians under immediate threat. This was one of the indicators that contributed to the 
failures of the DDRRR process because there were no agreed set of parameters that 
would be used to ascertain when and how civilians were considered to be under 
immediate threat. Such clauses rendered the process difficult to execute. This aspect 
was central when considering the disastrous humanitarian situation in the Kivus, which 
involved substantial movements of people and a situation of widespread insecurity, and 
also greatly complicated access to populations in need of humanitarian organisations. 
 
77 
 
 
 
Unfortunately, MONUC failed in its effort to disarm national and foreign armed groups in 
the DRC. The reasons for this were the failure of the UNSC to give a clear mandate to 
MONUC, because of the political influences of donors and their refusal to engage their 
troops in this process, and by contributing countries to DRC peacekeeping’s lack of 
national harmonisation, including lack of coordination between MONUC and the DRC 
government for the DDRRR. The DRR was also getting poor results because of poor 
management of the implementation of the DDR programme and lack of financial 
resources. 
 
3.4 ROLE OF MONUC’S MANDATE TO PROTECT CIVILIAN POPULATIONS  
 
The DRC provides a rich case study of the MONUC mission demonstrated by the 
interpretations of what the charge to “protect civilians” means for peacekeeping forces. 
The MONUC mandate has changed dramatically since 2004, developing from an 
observer mandate to a mandate with tasks to protect civilians under imminent threat of 
physical violence as priority (UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1565, para. 4, (b)). The concept 
of civilian protection in this study should be understood: as a task for UN peacekeepers; 
as support to humanitarian space; and as a central goal for UN military forces. MONUC 
further demonstrated issues of protecting civilians when peacekeepers operated with 
differing understandings of their mandate that shifted from Chapter VI to Chapter VI. 
Fundamentally, the DRC case illustrates the enormous difficulties of addressing a 
humanitarian crisis during on-going conflict, where MONUC forces were drawn into a 
grey area between peacekeeping and war fighting. 
 
The Protection of Civilians (PC) was extremely important in contemporising 
peacekeeping operations: it was required by the mandates, but the credibility of 
peacekeeping missions and legitimacy in the eyes of the local and international 
community depended on it. Since 1999, the various UN peacekeeping operations82 
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 This refers to the following missions: UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), UN Mission in the DRC 
(MONUC), UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), UN Operation Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), UN Mission for 
Stabilisation in Haiti (MINUSTAH), UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB), UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and AU 
Hybrid Operation-UN Darfur (UNAMID). 
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authorised by the UNSC have explicitly mentioned the UN’s protection of civilians.83 
Whether or not protection has always been part of the work of peacekeeping personnel 
(military, police and civilian), recent events84 have shown that the ability to respond at 
the right time, provide a comprehensive strategy and taking the necessary steps were 
sometimes lacking. 
 
The UNSC in 2004 gave MONUC a robust mandate of peacekeeping based on Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, which explicitly provided for the protection of civilians and UN 
personnel. Since then, the size and number of staff working within MONUC continued to 
increase, but the protection of civilians still remained a central problem with regard to its 
mandate. MONUC’s experiences illustrate some elements of civilian protection and its 
requirements. The mission also demonstrates the beginning of an innovative strategy to 
integrate differing approaches within an operation, including coercive protection. 
However, despite MONUC’s mandate to protect civilians, the DRC’s population 
including women and children, still remained under imminent threat of physical violence. 
 
3.4.1 Protection of civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence 
 
Protection of human rights is central to the UN actions. Abuses and violations of human 
rights were at the heart of the most recent conflicts, and were experienced by many 
displaced persons and refugees as in the case of the DRC. Arguably, the most serious 
abuses of human rights have often occurred during the DRC’s armed conflict. All UN 
entities are responsible for protecting and promoting human rights through their work 
related activities (UNDPKO, 2005: 47), and this is reiterated by the UNSC Resolution 
(S/RES/1856, para. 3, a) and f)) of 22 December 2008. The UNSC Resolution also 
“emphasises that the protection of civilians […] must be given priority in decisions about 
the use of available capacity and resources, over any of the other tasks […]”. This 
means that the protection of civilians was explicitly established as an overriding priority 
                                                 
83
 Some mandates, such as the following expressions, describe the protection of civilians charged with the mission 
“under imminent threat of physical violence’, “within its limited resources”, “in areas of deployment of its units”, 
“without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government”, etc. 
84
 Different conflicts in the eastern part of the DRC, where MONUC was criticised for its lack of capacity to protect 
civilians in the areas of conflict by NGOs such as HRW, ICG, OXFAM, etc.  
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in MONUC’s mandate. MONUC was facing one of the most complex emergencies in 
Eastern and North-eastern DRC.  
 
Assembling and preparing well-equipped troops was only part of the challenge, as 
decisions about strategy were also important. For example, the crisis in Ituri resulted 
from a clear strategic disconnection between the UNSC and MONUC: the UNSC 
pressured the Ugandan forces to withdraw from Ituri before sufficient peacekeepers had 
arrived to replace them. This compromised the protection of the civilians in Ituri district 
as they were left vulnerable to attack by other militias operating in the vicinity. This 
position was shared by the UNSG which had warned for years that foreign troop 
withdrawal would result in instability. As early as 2001, the UNSG had argued that “the 
UN should examine what it can do to help prepare for the situation developed in the 
DRC following the withdrawal of foreign forces, responsible for the security of the 
civilian population under their control” (UNSG report, (S/2001/373, para. 118)). 
Likewise, the UNSG anticipated that the rising number of peacekeepers in the DRC 
could create public expectations for civilian protection (UNSG report, (S/2002/621, para. 
71)). The UNSG expressed concern in September 2002 that more forces might result in 
calls for “all concerned to urgently address the deteriorating security situation (UNSG 
special report, (S/2002/1005, para. 61)).” Thus, even as the UN leadership anticipated 
the challenges in Ituri and recognised that MONUC should be expected to protect 
civilians, the UNSC failed to support a positive strategy to meet these challenges. As a 
result in 2004 in Bukavu, and 2007 and 2009 in Goma, civilian populations were under 
imminent threat of physical violence. Key protection issues were related to widespread 
human rights violations in the course of attacks by foreign armed groups, notably the 
FDLR and the LRA, and remnants of Congolese armed groups, and due to acts of 
undisciplined soldiers of the FARDC. 
 
The highest priority of the MONUC mission was the protection of civilian populations, 
which necessarily involved the neutralisation of significant local and foreign armed 
groups. Due to the extent of war crimes committed against the Congolese civilian 
population, protection of this population became the cornerstone of the MONUC 
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mandate.85 Several warring belligerents’ use of child soldiers was strongly condemned 
by the international community, which resulted in many pronouncements of the UNSC. 
The UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1612) of 26 July 2005 focused on the protection of the 
civilian population, in addition to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child of 25 May 2000 on the involvement of children in armed conflict. As the 
need to operationalise protection was relatively new, a cultural shift in the organisation 
was required to meet the new obligations. Inclusion of specific provisions for the 
protection of children in the mandates of UN peacekeeping operations, deployment of 
child-protection advisers on a case-by-case basis, and to ensure that the need for and 
the number and roles of child-protection advisers were systematically assessed during 
the preparation of each UN peacekeeping operation. Implementation methods were still 
very much in the developmental stage. Criteria for when to intervene to protect must 
take into account the need for peacekeepers to possess knowledge of the dangers 
faced by civilians in a given situation, and of the peacekeepers’ capacity to make a 
difference in that situation. 
 
The DRC case demonstrates the dilemmas faced by the UN in leading forces tasked to 
protect civilians, without having all the tools to do this. The experience of MONUC also 
highlights the impact of concepts of operation, capacity, mandates and training on 
peacekeeping operations aimed at protecting civilians. MONUC’s experience further 
identifies standard questions for future military missions: the definitions of vicinity and 
capacity, the integration of actors, clarity on the use of force and the role of 
peacekeepers in providing broad security in lieu of a State’s responsibility and the 
operational concept of protection. Given the continuing trend to direct military forces to 
protect civilians, these key areas deserve further consideration.  
 
Nonetheless, this dilemma faced by the UN was highlighted by Marriage (2013:51-60) 
who demonstrates the salient features of the DRC armed conflict: massacres of 
defenceless civilian populations, plundering of public and private companies, poisoning, 
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 The first accused before the ICC was UPC’s president Thomas Lubanga, who was charged with using children 
under 15 years of age to participate actively in hostilities during armed conflict in the Ituri/DRC. 
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murders, torture, rape, persecution, collective punishment, summary and extrajudicial 
executions; incitement to ethnic hatred, and general and systematic attacks against 
civilian populations followed by massacres. The comprehensive assessment 
undertaken on the lack of knowledge and practices in peacekeeping activities has 
affected the MONUC mandate to ‘protect’ the civilian population. Marriage concluded 
that these acts were committed in the territory of the DRC during this period as crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and possibly genocide, as understood by the statutes of 
the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In any 
event, the various reports86 by UN authorities were described, namely the Special 
Report of the UN Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the 
DRC. 
 
Moreover, the atrocious and devastating war in the DRC caused enormous suffering of 
women, girls and children who were disproportionately affected. These categories of 
people were victims of widespread sexual violence. In addition, there was the illegal 
exploitation and forced enlistment of children in the army. Marriage (2013: 56) argued 
that the sexual violence reinforced power relations by force but also implicated its 
victims, who did not report rape, particularly in the reinforcement of power. The actions 
of MONUC were certainly significant, but the mandate to protect the civilian population 
was inadequate to stop the worsening of the tragic situation of the Congolese 
population in areas controlled by armed groups. The Kivus were most affected by the 
abuse of human rights, without anyone being able to make a reliable quantification.87 In 
this regard, the action of MONUC should have resulted in a decrease in the number of 
civilian victims of conflict. In fact, during the first phase of its mandate, MONUC was 
simply unable to play a significant role in protecting civilians under imminent threat of 
physical violence. 
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 Read CN. 4/2001/41, E/CN.4/2001/40/Add.1 and E /CN.4/200/42. These reports and many others, including 
UNSC Resolutions and decisions by relevant UN bodies on the situation of human rights and humanitarian law in 
the DRC, can be accessed online at: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/7/a/mcon.htm, [accessed on 22 October 
2011]. 
87
 The armed conflict in the DRC was believed to have caused between 1998 and 2011, the deaths of about 6.8 
million people, mostly civilians during the fighting and following the humanitarian catastrophe due to massive 
violations of human rights, which were most often characterised by physical violence.  
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The lack of leadership and clear strategy affected the UN forces that were sent to 
protect civilians. The innovative continuum approach to civilian protection in the DRC 
was the beginning of recognising how differing concepts of protection can work together 
effectively. However, this approach was not a substitute for a sustainable strategy for 
military forces and for preparing troops with their own concepts, training and leadership 
for these kinds of operations. The UNSC supported peacekeeping missions, and must 
have noticed that such missions were in urgent need of conceptual clarity and better 
tools to prepare and support those troops sent to enforce peace. MONUC’s experience 
in the DRC showed that these issues were addressed by both the DRC and the UN for 
any future peacekeeping mission or intervention aimed at offering protection to the 
civilian population. 
 
3.4.2 Protection of women and girls against abuse by armed groups 
 
The sexual abuse of women and girls by armed groups became a common practice of 
the war in the DRC in 1998 where armed conflicts, impunity and poverty contributed to a 
context of widespread violence. Continuing insecurity provided by a multitude of armed 
groups active in this part of the country did not seem to be smoothening things over. 
Marriage (2013: 55) argued that women were kidnapped by armed men, detained and 
forced into sexual slavery, raped, forced to do domestic work and to submit to forced 
marriages with members of various factions, and sometimes to pay the ransom required 
by the militias. It has been noted that children who have grown up during the war had 
not received proper education and are ill-prepared for peaceful and productive activities. 
Survivors suffered in silence and could not speak openly about their ill-fated 
experiences due to the lack of protection. Perpetrators of rape were often known by the 
Congolese authorities and MONUC. However, neither the police nor the Congolese 
judicial authorities nor MONUC could make a firm decision in a rape case. Several 
alleged perpetrators of the massacres and killings are found today in the political 
institutions of the DRC through the mechanism of reconciliation from the political 
agreement that was signed at Sun City in 2002 (MONUC Magazine, 2O10: 5-12).  
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The Constitution of the DRC particularly listed sexual crimes committed against 
girls/women as crimes against humanity.88 It emphasised that the achievement of the 
protection of women and girls could be achieved mainly through their participation in 
decision-making in the affairs of the State. The Constitution also recognised their right 
to participate in the management of public affairs. It also required parity in terms of the 
constitutional principle that there should be 30% representation of women in parliament 
and government.89 This higher order goal cannot be achieved without first safeguarding 
the physical wellbeing of girls and women. In order to integrate a gender perspective 
into its peacekeeping operations and ensure the implementation of peace agreements 
in the DRC, MONUC established, in March 2002, pursuant to the UNSC Resolution 
(S/RES/1325) of 31 October 2000, an office for gender-specific issues, called “Office 
Genre”. Its roles included, in particular, the assessment of women's involvement in 
decision making in the DRC, networking and information exchange, and participation of 
women in the peace process (MONUC Magazine, 2006: 7). 
 
Regional instability in the Great Lakes Region also contributed to the problematique of 
MONUC’s mandate in the DRC. The FDLR, present in the DRC since the Rwandan 
genocide of 1994, were the main abusers, while some of the FARDC were also 
perpetrators of sexual violence in the provinces of North and South Kivu.90 The United 
Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) noted that humanitarian agencies had welcomed the 
efforts of the Congolese government to stop rape by its soldiers, but stressed that much 
more could have been done to put an end to impunity. In addition, the LRA, and 
Ugandan militia known for abducting children to serve as soldiers or sex slaves, 
continued its attacks against civilians in the Orientale Province in the north-east of the 
country. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that 
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  The Constitution of the DRC, dated February 18, 2006, in its Article 15, states that: “The public authorities shall 
ensure the elimination of sexual violence. Notwithstanding the international treaties and agreements, any sexual 
abuse of any person, with the intention of destabilise, dislocate families and to eliminate an entire people is 
criminalised against humanity punishable by law”. 
89
 This position was in line with the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1325) of 31 October 2000, in particular, which 
required Member States to ensure that women were better represented at all levels of decision-making, national, 
regional and international institutions for conflict prevention, management and resolution. 
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 http://www.un.org/apps/newsFr/storyF.asp?NewsID=21176&Cr=femmes&Cr1=#.UPCDU_KIyfE, [accessed on 
12 March 2010]. 
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according to data released by the UBN in 2010, in 2009, the LRA killed 849 civilians and 
abducted 1,486 people, including 185 children.91 Therefore it can be noted that given 
the above events, the protection of women and children was not achieved by MONUC.  
 
3.4.3 Protection of children engaged in the DRC armed conflict 
 
Over the past 20 years, the recruitment of boys and girls into armed forces and groups, 
which is a violation of international human rights law, has been of grave concern in the 
DRC, notably in the eastern part of the country. Despite awareness-raising campaigns 
and attempts to pacify armed groups, recruitment of children remained endemic in the 
country, with high numbers of children recruited in the past two years as a result of 
renewed hostilities in the east of the country. Against this background and in the 
framework of UN support to the DRC Government to stop and prevent underage 
recruitment and use of children for military purposes, MONUC analysed patterns of child 
recruitment by armed groups in the areas most affected by the armed conflict. 
Recruiting children to take up a weapon and fight or in any way support adults, who 
have chosen to take up arms, is a crime. It is a violation of the rights of boys and girls to 
a healthy life, within the shelter of their families and communities. It is a violation of their 
rights to education, love, affection, adequate and appropriate care, freedom of 
movement and expression. 
 
Children continued to be recruited and served in the DRC conflict, and were used as 
combatants or forced to work as sex slaves by armed groups. They were abused and 
raped over many months or years, and the girls were rarely released from captivity at 
the hands of armed forces and groups. An estimated 30,000 children were demobilised 
in the DRC in 2011.92 Faced with this conflict, the DRC officially launched a DDR 
programme in July 2004, in order to help children return to civilian life. The UNSG has 
repeatedly defined the protection of children in situations of armed conflict as a matter 
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  Ibid. 
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 This was the number of the DDR programme for children confirmed by the government of the DRC and the 
World Bank, http://www.irinnews.org/fr/report/100311/analyse-une-aide-cibl%C3%A9e-est-n%C3%A9cessaire-
pour-les-anciens-enfants-soldats-de-rdc, [accessed on 12 March 2010].  
85 
 
 
 
of security and peace and international commitments to protect children in these 
situations in its UNSC Resolutions (S/RES/1261, S/RES/1314, S/RES/1379 and 
S/RES/1460). In addition to the UNSC, other organisations and UN agencies have 
taken measures to resolve the issues raised by the DRC conflict and, more specifically, 
the protection of children. 
 
The UNSC (UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1612, para. 1) of 26 July 2005) strongly 
condemns the recruitment and use of child soldiers by parties to armed conflict in 
violation of international obligations applicable to them and all other violations and 
abuses committed against children in situations of armed conflict. The MONUC child 
protection mandate also included engagement in dialogue with perpetrators to end the 
recruitment and use of children associated with armed forces and groups and other 
child rights violations. The operational framework of this programme in theory meant 
that armed forces and groups who chose to adopt the process had to bring their 
members, including children, to centres where they were disarmed and sent for 
counselling and demobilisation. After being housed for a maximum of 48 hours, 
separated from adults, they were assigned to local or international NGOs mandated to 
welcome them to Centres in Transit and Orientation (CTO). This procedure had the 
advantage of allowing the authorities to filter and check the quality of fighters who came 
forward. Unfortunately, it was not implemented as required by the Operational 
Framework. Most of the time, children were detained for longer than 48 hours without 
being separated from adults, because of the inadequacy of reception facilities and the 
lack of staff to handle their requests quickly. 
 
In Eastern DRC, where the recruitment and re-recruitment of children associated with 
armed forces and groups were rampant, only 20% of children supported by UNICEF93 
and its partners were girls. Since 2004, when the DDR programme commenced,94 the 
actors in the protection of children had facilitated the release of more than 36,000 
children associated with armed forces and groups. In 2009, a total of 5,930 children 
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 http://www.unicef.org/french/media/media_65154.html, [accessed on 12 March 2010]. 
94
 http://www.un.org/apps/newsFr/storyF.asp?NewsID=21215&Cr=Congo&Cr1, [accessed on 12 March 2010]. 
86 
 
 
 
were demobilised, including 1,222 girls. Nevertheless, the efforts of the DRC 
Government were commended with the adoption of the Law of 10 January 2009, which 
prohibits the use of children in armed forces and groups in DRC groups.95 Most of these 
children were demobilised in the both Kivus, and were excluded from the process of the 
rapid integration of armed groups into the FARDC in early 2009. The Watchlist report 
(2003: 27) stated that release initiatives were hampered by the difficulties created by 
daily persistent conflict, widespread poverty, and the deterioration of the socio-
economic base and the new waves of recruitment.  
 
Thus, the MONUC had called on the army, all rebel groups and militias to demobilise all 
child soldiers in its ranks and hand over any minors held by military tribunals to civilian 
jurisdiction. However, up to the time this study was done, only the FARDC demobilised 
child soldiers after integrating all parties in 2003. One of the main obstacles to 
evaluating the success of DDR programmes for children was the lack of available data 
on the course of those who have been reintegrated into society. All the other militias 
and rebel groups namely CNDP, LRA, FDLR, FNL and UPDF continued to recruit 
children. Mobile teams were established throughout the country, with partners such as 
MONUC, Save the Children, Cooperazione Internazionale COOPI and other NGOs, 
pleading with leaders and commanders to release as many children as possible from 
armed forces and groups, with a greater emphasis on girls. 
 
3.4.4 Protection and promotion of human rights 
 
The issue of protection and promotion of human rights was not new in the DRC. Most of 
the Congolese traditions and customs are carriers of values related to human rights, 
including respect for human life, human dignity, and individual and collective fulfilment. 
All these values were violated by the dictatorship of President Mobutu and the wars that 
had taken over in this country. Massive violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law during the war in the DRC pushed the UNSC to consider this issue 
and appoint MONUC to ensure the protection and promotion of human rights in the 
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 http://www.un.org/apps/newsFr/storyF.asp?NewsID=21215&Cr=Congo&Cr1, [accessed on 12 March 2010]. 
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DRC (UNSC Resolutions (S/RES/1756) of 15 May 2007; (S/RES/1794) of 21 December 
2007; (S/RES/1856) of 22 December 2008). This mandate was particularly important 
because for a long time the situation of human rights had not improved in the DRC. This 
required the participation and cooperation of all levels of Congolese society to drive out 
all perpetrators of violations of human rights. 
 
MONUC’s Division of Human Rights provided consultative expertise on issues related to 
the protection and promotion of human rights, supported the process of ensuring that 
violations of human rights committed in the past did not go unpunished, and monitored 
the development of human rights in the DRC. This Division of MONUC recorded 
arbitrary executions, rapes, arrests and detentions, torture, cruelty, inhuman and 
degrading treatment, and looting committed by state agents and armed groups.96  
 
Moreover, this Division was greatly appreciated by the Congolese population through its 
direct contact with the population and the results of its actions on the ground. Zeebroek 
(2008: 15) emphasised that this assessment was far from meeting unanimously 
because the Congolese population were still spared the atrocities of the rebels and from 
soldiers of the FARDC. Therefore it can be noted that it was also a disappointment to 
note that members of the MONUC were repeatedly found guilty of violations of human 
rights and non-compliance with their code of conduct particularly in sexual abuse 
matters.97 
 
The violence was extreme, especially in the east of the country. Interventions by rebels 
and their foreign allies were terrorising the civilian population. The Mai-Mai’s 
involvement was seen as a response to this suffering according to the report of the 
Special Report (E/CN.4/1999/31) on the situation of human rights in the DRC dated 8 
February 1999 which had the support of the population. The health infrastructure was 
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 MONUSCO Division of Human Rights, www.monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=4141.  [accessed on 
25 October 2011]. 
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 Investigations by the Office of Internal Oversight Services of the United Nations (OIOS-OIOS) reveal that as 
many as 296 cases of sexual abuse of minors have been opened for the period 2004-2006. And 140 confirmed 
cases were reported primarily among peacekeepers. Only 169 people were laid off or returned to their country, a 
few dozen have been sued by their national authorities. http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8649.doc.htm, 
[accessed on 22 March 2012]. 
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completely destroyed and the population had to revert to traditional medicine. The 
impression gained by the Special Reporter on his two visits to this area was the same: it 
was a reign of terror. The inhabitants of the occupied territory knew that the primary 
responsibility for the violence perpetrated against the civilian population was in the 
hands of the Interahamwe and Mai-Mai, followed by Rwandan soldiers.  
 
As such, the positive outcome of MONUC regarding the promotion of human rights was 
the demobilisation of 5250 child soldiers, 2600 of which came from the ranks of the 
Congolese Armed Forces (FAC) and 2,650 of which came from the ranks of the rebel 
RCD-Goma. With regard to the evolution of the general situation of human rights in the 
country, MONUC failed to improve it. During the reporting period, the situation of human 
rights continued to deteriorate throughout the territory, with a worsening of the situation 
occurring in the East.  
 
Thus, the most serious abuses of human rights were documented in several reports and 
resolutions since the beginning of the conflict in the DRC. The bitter truth was that the 
accelerated integration of armed groups into FARDC and the launching of Operation 
Kimia II against the FDLR coincided with a sharp increase in the number of violations of 
human rights by the FARDC. UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1906) of 23 December 2009 
requested UNSG to conduct a strategic review of the situation in the DRC and 
MONUC’s progress, and to achieve, the reconfiguration of the mandate of MONUC in 
close collaboration with the DRC government and the countries which had contributed 
troops and police. This UNSC Resolution recommended the elimination of the threat of 
foreign and Congolese armed groups, in particular the FDLR and the LRA, 
strengthening its efforts with regard to DDR and DDRRR and military operations, and 
helping the government to stabilise areas from where these armed groups were 
expelled. Thirdly, the UNSC Resolution sought to help the DRC government to make 
progress in reforming the security sector, including the reform of the FARDC, national 
police and, judicial and correctional systems.  
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3.5 MONUC’S ROLE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 
 
The electoral assistance mandate given by the UNSC authorised levels of involvement 
ranging from executive authority to technical and logistical support. The domestic 
ownership of the electoral process and the mission's role in coordinating international 
assistance have been increasingly emphasised in peacekeeping mandates. The 
peacekeeping missions were primarily asked to provide technical expertise and 
logistical assistance. Recent mandates have also included specific references to 
thematic issues of particular concern to the Council (e.g. gender, human rights, or use 
of media) to ensure that they are made mission-wide priorities. MONUC was mandated 
by the UNSC to continuously implement multiple political, military, rule of law and 
capacity-building tasks, including trying to resolve on-going conflicts in a number of the 
DRC provinces. 
 
The involvement of MONUC's mandate in the electoral process in the DRC was 
preceded by two UNSC Resolutions ((S/RES/1493) and (S/RES/1565)) whose aims 
were to ensure technical support and provision of assistance to the Independent 
Electoral Commission (IEC) and its officials in the provinces. MONUC was thus actively 
involved in civic education of the IEC, staff training, communication and programmes of 
information technology, education on voter registration, routing materials and electoral 
equipment in both major cities and rural areas.  
 
Electoral assistance has become a core task of MONUC’s peacekeeping missions and, 
as such, should be approached in a manner that reflects its importance. In addition to its 
mandate, the UNSC, in its UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1493, para. 5) of 28 July 2003, 
mandated MONUC “to provide assistance, during the transition period, for the reform of 
the security forces, the re-establishment of a State based on the rule of law and the 
preparation and holding of elections throughout the territory of the DRC,” and 
welcomes, in this regard, the efforts of the Member States to support the transition and 
national reconciliation. To ensure effective coordination of the electoral process, several 
consultation frameworks were put in place by the technical assistance programme 
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coordinated by the Electoral Assistance Division of the MONUC. These included 
frameworks for government institutions, civil society, political parties, the international 
community, and national and international NGOs.98 
 
The project integrated into the general framework by providing additional support, 
particularly in areas not covered by the prerogatives of the Electoral Division of 
MONUC. It was structured around a three-pronged strategy: 
1. Develop the institutional capacity of the IEC of the DRC; 
2. Mobilise and manage financial resources for the organisation of elections; 
3. Coordinate the contributions of donors to the electoral process in the DRC; and Support 
MONUC Electoral Division in the harmonisation of technical assistance to the IRC, with 
the objective of creating a dynamic environment for the conduct of free, transparent and 
democratic elections in the DRC. 
 
Between 2003 and 2009, the MONUC Electoral Division (ED) received several 
mandates from the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1856, para. 4, d). This UNSC Resolution 
instructed MONUC to prioritise the protection of civilians in the context of the electoral 
crisis, especially in the Kivu provinces. The intervention of MONUC in the electoral 
process was much needed because of the vastness of the country and, the effects of 
armed conflict challenges faced by the institutions of the Republic. Many other reasons 
formed the basis for strengthening MONUC’s action on the ground. 
 
MONUC therefore, faced multiple challenges in assisting the DRC electoral process. It 
had limited infrastructure to accommodate 25 million registered voters, 12,000 polling 
centres and about 50,000 polling stations. There were also problems regarding 
communication; particularly that the different communication systems were 
incompatible. Another challenge was limited resources in many areas of services that 
included transportation and systems to disburse salaries of election workers and police 
officers in 12,000 communities. Insecurity in some parts of the country threatened to 
deter a number of voters from casting their vote on the Election Day in the eastern part 
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of the country. The late approval of MONUC’s US$ 144,730,750 budget99 by the UNSC 
in 2006 affected MONUC’s implementation of its mandate. Given all these challenges 
enumerated here, the implementation of MONUC’s mandate was bound to be 
ineffective. 
 
The distribution of election materials and the collection of results in the vast territory of 
the DRC, the massive destruction of its transport and communication infrastructure, and 
the inaccessibility of some areas of the country made this task very difficult to perform. 
These challenges were recognised and addressed by the logistical support provided by 
MONUC which enabled the reaching of the greatest possible number of Congolese 
citizens, resulting in greater participation in the national elections. MONUC’s focus on 
the conduct of the presidential and legislative elections was to be effective from the 30th 
of July 2006 until the announcement of the first round before investing in operations of 
elections. In the second round of the presidential and provincial elections of 29th of 
November 2006, the DRC was to still benefit from the demonstrated commitment of 
MONUC for the elections. 
 
MONUC’s assistance with the electoral process, succeeded despite the difficult 
environment in which the elections were held. The security situation in Kivu remained 
hopeless. Certainly, the challenges were many and the contribution of MONUC 
remained significant. A response to these comments was provided by UNSC Resolution 
(S/RES/1925) of 28 May 2010, which underlined the commitment of MONUSCO to 
provide technical and logistical support for the organisation of national and local 
elections at the express request of the Congolese authorities and the limits of its 
capacity and resources. 
 
As previously mentioned, this interpretation of the MONUC Resolution differed slightly 
from that issued by government authorities, which created conflict between the 
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government and the UN, and eventually resulted in the establishment of MONUSCO, 
which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.  
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
 
A critical analysis of the role of MONUC in peace and security issues in the DRC calls 
for an analysis of the outcome of MONUC’s achievements and limitations of their 
mandate. MONUC’s first mandate of observation was successfully implemented. The 
assessment of MONUC’s significance in the problematique of peace and security in the 
DRC has, however, on balance showed more failures than successes. Since 2007, 
MONUC has increased its support in accordance with the evolution of its mandate, yet, 
despite numerous initiatives the DRC army still faces many challenges.  
 
MONUC showed great determination and commitment to reduce the humanitarian 
disaster that was occurring in the DRC. Despite the fact that its mandate was focusing 
marginally on the protection of civilians, in practice, in the field of peacekeeping, the UN 
exhibited some limitations. UN missions with a mandate “to protect civilians under 
imminent threat” required a mandate of the use of force, coupled with the authority and 
expectations that peacekeepers would act. Without these parameters, most UN forces 
would find that mandates to protect civilians lie outside their capacity—hence 
undermining the meaning of the mandate. Capacity was especially important where 
conflict continued and where parties to a peace agreement provided only partial consent 
to a UN or multinational peacekeeping force. In general, well-armed and experienced 
troops in sufficient numbers may have been able to provide security for vulnerable 
populations in a challenging region such as the DRC, but poorly trained troops in 
insufficient numbers with limited supplies were, on the other hand, unlikely to provide 
more than a presence—if at all. Quality information and a clear chain of command were 
also essential, as the tragic events in Ituri and Bukavu demonstrated. 
 
The UNSC needed to provide MONUC with conceptual clarity about how the operation 
should approach the protection of civilians, rather than an observation of their mandate. 
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Ideally, this strategy should have been consistently understood throughout the 
leadership of the mission, by the troop contingents, and within the UNSC. After 
struggling for years, MONUC had developed a clearer concept by 2005 because the 
mission had operated more in accordance with its Chapter VII mandate. Peacekeepers 
conducted cordon-and search operations and worked with local populations to identify 
spoilers to the peace. MONUC leadership began to use the goal of protection as an 
organising tool to integrate civilian and military roles. A new mission strategy attempted 
to address civilian vulnerability across the board, from human rights monitoring and 
reporting, to the provision of humanitarian space and coercive physical protection. No 
single concept defined the mission’s civilian protection efforts but rather, the mission 
embraced multiple ideas and strategies. 
 
MONUC has also played a central role through the actions of the 750 police officers that 
had been deployed. It supported the DRC government in the establishment and 
implementation in 2005 of a National Plan for police training. The support of MONUC in 
this process was significant. It collaborated with and supported the IEC with financial 
resources, security equipment and logistical plans. 
 
Thus, the roles of MONUC in peace and security issues, from a human rights 
perspective, were far from satisfactory. This is evident because the Congolese people 
have continued to suffer atrocities at the hands of the rebels and national army soldiers. 
Much progress still needs to be made in this regard. An analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of MONUC’s mandate to resolve the DRC conflict shows its limits gauging 
by its set mandate. In addition, the political situation in the DRC was much better in 
2001 to 2009, hence it became necessary to configure the mandate of MONUC. The 
next chapter reviews the mandate of MONUC in terms of conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF MONUC INTO MONUSCO 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The chapter discusses the transformation of the UN Organisation Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) into the United Nations Organisation 
Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), with the 
objective to achieve peace and security, with a particular emphasis on the protection of 
civilian populations and stabilisation according to its mandate. The chapter begins by 
providing a chronicle of the crisis between the DRC government and MONUC, followed 
by a discussion regarding the request by the DRC government for the gradual 
withdrawal of MONUC’s troops from the country. In addition, this chapter examines the 
deterioration of the climate distrust between the DRC government and MONUC; the 
future of MONUC according to the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1906) of December 2009 
and the means for the reconfiguration of MONUC’s mandate; it also provides an 
overview of the mandate of MONUC in relation to MONUSCO through the UNSC 
Resolution (S/RES1925) of 28 May 2010. The chapter then concludes with a focus on 
the outcome of MONUC’s involvement in the peace and security problematique of the 
DRC.  
 
The controversies involved encouraged this study to analyse the situation in the DRC, 
with special reference to the principles established by the practice and doctrine 
regarding the withdrawal of an UN peacekeeping mission. The withdrawal of the UN 
peacekeeping forces had to be planned and implemented in consultation with all local 
and international stakeholders, in order to minimise the disruption of international 
programmes and their impact on the population, including the general environment of 
the country (UNPKO, 2008: 99-101). The institutional liberalism theory makes provision 
to negotiate thereby providing instances of cooperation, albeit with minimal institutional 
structures for support (Keohane, 1988: 380). Keohane argues that a fundamental aim of 
any peacekeeping action or operation is to influence, through its presence, belligerent 
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factions in conflict to come together in a sustained peace process. In this regard, this 
assessed the mixed outcome of MONUC’s mandate in relation to the issues of peace 
and security, which highlighted the weaknesses of MONUC after 11 years of its 
operation. These mixed outcomes are evident in the fact that although the political 
situation appears to be stable since the establishment of political institutions after the 
2006 elections, many other challenges100 continue to beset the country.  
 
4.2 CHRONICLE OF THE CRISIS BETWEEN THE DRC GOVERNMENT AND 
MONUC 
 
Initially, after a period of intense conflict in the DRC resulting in violent and bloody war, 
the UN remained silent in spite of the fact that a total of seven African countries’ official 
armies were involved. After the realisation of the enormity of the crisis, stopping this 
violence became an urgent priority for the sake of ordinary people who were innocent 
victims. Many rounds of peace negotiations were subsequently initiated under the 
auspices of the UN, which led to a series of peace agreements. However, these 
agreements were in many ways insufficient for the conflict. Despite the failure of these 
agreements, the UN was committed to the implementation of a peace process, and 
showed this by sending one of the largest and most expensive peacekeeping 
operations to the DRC (Berkman and Holt, 2006: 154-166).  
 
According to Keohane (1988: 380) the institutional liberalism theory correctly interprets 
the conditions under which international institutional cooperation takes place. It is 
therefore necessary to understand how MONUC operated, including analysing the 
conditions under which it came into being. After 11 years of UN presence in the DRC in 
the form of peacekeeping operations, the mission entrusted to MONUC has evolved 
over time. Initially created for the monitoring and observation of the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement, MONUC has been given enormous tasks, starting with the observation of 
the cease-fire, monitoring of the disengagement of troops towards recovery, taxation 
and the consolidation of peace in the DRC.  
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This study analyses the three major indicators which led to a crisis between the DRC 
government and MONUC, namely President Mobutu’s authoritarian regime, the 2006 
elections, and the regional interference in the Kivus.  
 
The first indications of an impending crisis in the east were the negative outcomes 
associated with President Mobutu’s authoritarian rule, under which the eastern 
provinces were important only insofar as they provided natural resources. These were 
used to service patronage networks through which Mobutu and his elite controlled the 
State (Reyntjeans, 2009: 13-23). Consequently, amongst its many mistakes, the 
government failed to address rising tensions over citizenship and access to land which 
defined local politics in the eastern part of the DRC. In particular, it never successfully 
determined the political and social position of the population with a Rwandan 
background like Banyarwanda in North and South Kivu (Vlassenroot, 2006: 54; Prunier, 
1997: 195-198). By the early 1990s the Banyarwanda, numbering less than a million 
(Mamdani, 2001: 235), were increasingly marginalised from political and public life. The 
province of North Kivu in particular was progressively under total control of the army 
group and government was no longer controlling it (Tull, 2003: 433).  
 
The second sign that heralded a crisis in the east appeared at the end of 2006, 
following the announcement of the results of presidential, legislative and provincial 
elections. The stinging defeat in its stronghold, ― North Kivu, ― in favour of Kabila’s 
AMP against the Rwandan-backed RCD, meant that the latter lost power and control 
over the economic and political environment in Goma and the surrounding territories 
(Sriram, et al., 2009: 123-124). Although a peace deal was signed between the warring 
factions in Goma in January 2008, violence continued to occur intermittently. Despite 
the fact that North Kivu’s history forms an important backdrop the CNDP’s emergence 
was more immediately linked to political changes in North Kivu which were brought 
about after 2003 by the political transition. The province has a history of conflict, a 
legacy of citizenship crises, and was heavily affected by the security concerns and 
economic designs of neighbouring States (Vlassenroot, 2006: 52).  
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Thirdly, the regional interference in the Kivus and Congolese politics in general, had 
economic dimensions which remain relevant even in 2014, and pose significant 
challenges for the relations between the DRC government and MONUC. It was 
considered to be vital to restore peace, provide security for citizens, secure extensive 
borders and tackle the looting of DRC’s resource wealth by warlords and neighbouring 
States (Nest, 2006: 11-54). Nest posits that the fact that the resulting war economy has 
been dominated by armed actors working in close collaboration with domestic and 
foreign private companies, as well as criminal activities have been an intrinsic element 
of the war economy. The UNGS report (S/2001/357) went so far as to allege that a 
scramble for DRC’s mineral wealth was a primary factor for the continuation of the 
conflict. Such networks facilitated the export of Coltan and tin by rebel groups and the 
intervening armies, and this contributed directly to the high levels of insecurity in the 
region which resulted from the financing of their operations (Global Witness report, 
2005). Rwanda, in particular, has economic interests in the Kivus, which their 
interventions helped to facilitate and protect. 
 
The above three major indicators have arguably not been taken seriously by the UNSC 
in its considerations. However, MONUC solely focused on the belligerent signatories to 
the Global and All Inclusive Agreement of 2002, neglecting the real core causes of the 
conflict in the DRC. As a result, these indicators resulted in the creation of armed 
groups like AFDL, RCD, MLC, Mai-Mai, CNDP, and later M23 who had the same 
agenda. MONUC’s efforts in the DRC since the official end of the conflict in 2003 have 
focused primarily on enhancing empirical statehood. Nevertheless, the position of 
peacekeepers was sometimes the most uncomfortable. The changing pattern of conflict 
particularly after an eventual peace agreement arose, with new factions that did not 
recognise the UN mission’s mandate, thereby placing MONUC’s operation in a 
precarious position. Thus, the Brahimi report (A/55/305–S/2000/809, para. 51) stated 
that the UNSG was able, depending on the circumstances, to consider the worst case 
scenario. Brahimi recommended that the peacekeeping forces, in their planning, should 
anticipate situations where the local actors, for example the Mai-Mai, who had 
historically exhibited worst-case behaviour, did not cooperate. It means that UN 
98 
 
 
 
mandates should, therefore, specify an operation’s authority to use force, in which case 
the operation should be given more staff and be better equipped. In this regard 
Brahimi’s views, suggest that an analysis should be addressed in the manner of the 
expectations of international institutions like the UN (Keohane, 1988: 387). It can be 
argued that the costs of MONUC’s outcomes were relatively low compared to the 
benefits of peace and security in the field of peacekeeping. MONUC was therefore, set-
up to improve the ability of the State to provide security, particularly by facilitating the 
creation of a new national army incorporating former warring groups. Warlords however 
frequently challenged such attempts to expand State control into the areas in which they 
operated.  
 
After the signing of the Global and All Inclusive Agreement in Pretoria in 2002, Rwanda 
officially withdrew its military forces from the DRC.101 However, the political reasons for 
Rwanda’s initial involvement had not abated, as the FDLR was still active and militia 
groups continued to threaten Tutsi communities (Hilgert and Spittaels, 2008: 8-11). 
Rwanda’s actions perhaps explain the accusations since 1998, that it was funding and 
supporting dissident rebel groups in the DRC. It seems to be clear that Rwanda 
maintained a covert presence in North and South Kivu through its proxy RCD-Goma, 
CNDP, and later M23.  
 
In the Eastern DRC, province of North Kivu in the mid-2007, General Laurent Nkunda’s 
insurgence, like many others, was arguably a creation of Rwanda’s hegemony. It 
defined itself primarily in relation to the perceived failures of the central State. General 
Laurent Nkunda’s party, the CNDP claimed that it was primarily concerned with the 
protection of Tutsis from the genocide forces that arrived in the Kivus from Rwanda 
(Carayannis, 2009: 5). Notably, the claims that the DRC government had failed to 
provide security in the east and that Nkunda’s group was filling a State function in doing 
so were not without merit. Low-level fighting between government forces and troops of 
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the renegade Tutsi General Laurent Nkunda escalated into a major confrontation. Since 
then, clashes killed more fighters and civilians forcing the civilian population to relocate 
(HRW, 2008: 1-3). The report stated that the DRC was again facing the largest 
humanitarian disaster in the world. While MONUC had adopted a more proactive 
attitude between 2005 and 2007, the mission’s activity became more limited after the 
transition period, which came to an end after the DRC had a legitimate elected 
government and had to be considered a sovereign State. This implied that it had now 
become the government’s primary responsibility to protect civilians. This was 
emphasised by the UNSG report (S/2007/156) which declared that the mission’s role 
from then onwards would be mainly restricted to supporting the FARDC, as had been 
demonstrated in the field. 
 
In defiance of a national army that was still under restructuring and the 3,500 
peacekeepers from MONUC who were deployed in North Kivu, from 2004 to 2008, 
supported by Rwanda, Nkunda continued to resist the authority of the State. His forces 
carried out assaults on the provincial capitals of North and South Kivu, fighting against 
MONUC and the FARDC. His attacks, though brutal and often leading to human rights 
abuses by troops under his command, were justified by his supporters as being 
necessary to protect Tutsis in the DRC and, by extension, those in Rwanda (HRW, 
2004). The FADRC’s inability to exercise an effective monopoly of force meant that 
different groups, including those led by warlords, local militias and MONUC, provided 
some localised security in the areas they controlled. The existence of areas beyond the 
effective control or interest of the DRC government had, effectively facilitated the growth 
in power of private actors (Tull, 2003: 431). 
 
MONUC’s failure to protect Goma and Kiwanja meant that the peacekeepers struggled 
to protect civilians, due to the fact that MONUC was facing several logistical and 
technical constraints (HRW, 2008:22). According to its mandate, MONUC was required 
to provide both support to the FARDC and monitor ceasefire lines between the FARDC 
and the CNDP. When FARDC elements withdrew, MONUC was left behind to protect 
civilians from the CNDP (Reynaert, 2010: 18). Consequently, civilians and UN troops 
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ended up in a fire fight and were used as living shields. The protests prevented MONUC 
from performing its duties and consequently led to a reduction in the number of patrols 
in the region of Kiwanja. The DRC government proposed to Nkunda a progressive 
integration of his forces into the army, by granting them a period of “confidence-
building”, during which they could remain based in North Kivu. His troops were to be 
“mixed” into FARDC.102 The government demanded that all armed groups still “in 
dissidence” to disarm and choose between their integration into the unified national 
army or demobilisation. 
 
4.2.1 Failure of the “mixage”103 and its dramatic humanitarian consequences 
 
In early 2006, and again in August and November 2006, Nkunda’s troops fought against 
FARDC, making plain their continued autonomy and refusal to allow the integrated force 
to take part in the brassage process. In an effort to avoid further military operations, 
FARDC and Nkunda reached a compromise at the end of December 2006. There was 
no written agreement, and both sides have contradictory accounts of what they had 
committed to. According to the government, the agreement had been strictly military, 
dealing with the progressive integration of Nkunda’s troops into the national army, a 
process called “mixage” (Scott, 2008: 190-192). Scott posits that six brigades were to 
be created out of Nkunda’s 81st and 83rd brigade, together with three non-integrated 
government brigades. Nkunda agreed to participate in the mixage process of 
incorporating his troops into the FARDC (Ibid, 192).  
 
The implementation of the mixage process began in January and February of 2007. 
Unfortunately, within months the arrangement would collapse, but even before that 
happened, participants presented different versions of what had actually been agreed to 
between the parties. Although this may seem to be an unusual strategy for a warlord, it 
reflects a pragmatic calculation on Nkunda’s part (Scott, 2008: 190). Integration offered 
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him the chance of formalising his status in North Kivu and achieving his military 
objectives of destroying or repatriating Rwandan Hutu militias. Essentially, Nkunda used 
the integration process as a resource to pursue his own objectives. His soldiers were all 
given new uniforms and received salaries, but they remained largely independent from 
the government’s army (HRW, 2008: 18). Nkunda also continued to support and form a 
separate militia, while setting up a parallel civil administration, including the police, 
which was still under his control. The operations against Rwandan Hutu rebels in areas 
with high concentrations of Hutu populations, particularly in the Rutshuru territory, led to 
the massive displacement of populations. These operations were accompanied by 
serious abuses against civilians, who were often suspected by the military of being 
members of the “mixed” brigades provided by Nkunda, in collaboration with Rwandan 
Hutu fighters. 
 
However, the failure to neutralise Nkunda through negotiations, resulted in the 
escalation of the suffering of civilians emitted by Nkunda militarily. Predictably, Nkunda 
immediately reacted by launching an attack on Sake, seizing the town despite 
MONUC’s presence, as the national army crumbled due to the breakdown in logistics 
and desertions (Hilgert and Spittaels, 2008: 6). He then advanced on Goma, despite 
warnings from MONUC. For the first time, UN peacekeepers reacted forcefully against 
Nkunda, with an attack by helicopters and infantry, killing between 200 and 400 
insurgents.104 It was suggested that although warlords may ‘‘possess the capability to 
create separate States by virtue of their de facto control’’ (Reno, 1998: 172), their 
strength was often directly related to their position within regional and local political and 
security dynamics.  
 
In May 2007 the government declared the end of the mixage process and called for the 
return of all the mixed brigades, while announcing the deployment of integrated 
brigades to replace them. The government also launched an immediate appeal to 
mainstream the process of mixage or demobilisation of all other Congolese armed 
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groups that were still present in the Kivus. It also once again urged the Rwandan Hutu 
fighters to disarm and leave the DRC. Even after abandoning the mixage, Nkunda’s 
military strength was reinforced by frequent trips to Rwanda to recruit fighters from the 
Congolese refugee camps, and reportedly, by direct military aid from Rwanda.105 
However, mixage was poorly organised and executed and in addition, there was no 
formal agreement, timetable or follow-up.  
 
This compromise collapsed by mid-2007, leaving Nkunda in a far stronger position 
militarily and politically than he had been at the end of 2006. The failure of the attempt 
to achieve a political solution also undermined the efforts of national authorities to 
reassert administrative control in the region, and increased ethnic tensions. Events in 
east DRC appeared to primarily reflect decisions and policies made in Kigali rather than 
Kinshasa, as illustrated by Rwanda’s willingness to back, and in Nkunda’s case remove, 
warlords who have acted as their proxies (Tull, 2003: 442-443). Rwanda’s influence in 
the Kivus was a powerful illustration of the need for MONUC’s troops deployed to the 
town of Sake to calm the situation, and Nkunda’s troops withdrew. 
 
The failures of the mixage process, which led Nkunda to take over the town of Goma, 
and the failure of MONUC’s troops to protect civilian populations, resulted in the 
predictable crisis between the DRC government and MONUC becoming a reality. The 
DRC government and MONUC did not seem to have had a good relationship since 
October 2008. MONUC troops, who had refused to be enlisted in the initial offensive, 
observed hundreds of troops fleeing towards Goma and southwards along the shores of 
Lake Kivu, denouncing the treason and dismal military leadership.106 This distrust was 
exhibited in the conduct attributed to MONUC staff, including their complacency and 
complicity against CNDP’s rebels. MONUC’s credibility was greatly damaged by its 
                                                 
105
 These reports were based on a confidential UN report, which claimed that the FARDC had been cooperating with 
Hutu militias to fight Nkunda in 2008, whilst Rwanda had supplied aid and child soldiers to Nkunda to back his 
campaign. See, DR Congo rebels ‘‘stalling talks, BBC News Online, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/africa/ 
7776990.stm, [accessed on 15 April 2010]. 
106
 Interview with Mr Mamadou Kuyate, Head Office MONUC, Pretoria/RSA, on Friday, 1 October 2010, in his 
office. 
103 
 
 
 
inability to prevent the CNDP offensive and stop the repeated assaults on civilians by all 
sides. As a result the DRC government pushed for the withdrawal of MONUC.  
 
4.2.2 Context surrounding the DRC government’s request for the gradual 
withdrawal of MONUC 
 
The DRC government’s demand for the withdrawal of MONUC had aroused much 
debate in the DRC and at UN Headquarters, resulting in indignation and fear among all 
actors involved in the DRC peace process. For the civilian population, the fear of 
renewed violence by armed groups was real.107 Humanitarian organisations operating in 
the eastern part of the country warned that any premature withdrawal of UN forces 
would be disastrous for the stabilisation of the country. In a report entitled “A Fragile 
Future”, Oxfam stated that without a strong UN presence in the DRC, there would be a 
general resumption of hostilities, which would destroy the achievements of the historic 
2006 elections.108  
 
In this regard, it is necessary to examine the motivations for the DRC government's 
request. The Congolese opinion concerning the MONUC mission was that it was not a 
guardian angel of peace, but rather a means for covering up the Congolese deaths at 
the hands of the Rwandan army.109 However, with regard to the alleged weaknesses of 
MONUC, there was also “almost constant involvement of countries which contributed 
troops” (Vircoulon, 2005: 82). This refusal of peacekeepers to protect civilians from 
rebel groups demonstrated the weaknesses in the command of the UN troops in the 
DRC. The involvement of these States was manifested in two ways: the refusal of 
States to send troops to fight against rebels, and the reluctance of States to place their 
troops under UN command. The contribution to a country’s peacekeeping operation 
sometimes affected the balance of power of the great power. Warner (1995: 181-182) 
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suggested that peacekeeping was not used as an effective tool for keeping peace. It 
can be argued therefore, that the disarray in MONUC’s leadership and the confusion 
over its strategy led to the resignation of the then new force commander, Spanish 
Lieutenant General Vicente Diaz de Villegas y Herrería who disagreed with the 
mission’s political direction, and who had been appointed by the UNSG to lead the 
MONUC forces.110 MONUC faced the wrath of civilians in the field, who blamed it for 
doing too little to protect them, and it became a target of choice for all forces, while 
deadly skirmishes continued. 
 
In the interest of not losing troops to the DRC, the concerned States providing troops 
asked the DRC’s military not to intervene, even when it came to protecting civilians. 
This became a dilemma for the DRC military which ought to have protected its 
population in the face of danger. Furthermore, the following of the conditions set by the 
sending States were a necessary component of the agreement. The commitment and 
interest had generated a mercantilist taste in peacekeepers, some of whom did not 
hesitate to indulge in mining. This resulted in solidarity between the UN and armed 
groups. Viewed in this light, the warm embrace of Laurent Nkunda by Colonel Chand 
Indian Sahora111 at the end of the mission did not come as a surprise. Shaw (1995: 1) 
noted that peacekeepers made efforts to behave towards the hostile groups with 
impartiality. This behaviour by some MONUC officials greatly offended the DRC 
authorities. It can be suggested that the mission’s ineffectiveness in establishing 
security in the eastern DRC, in particular in the insurgency-prone provinces of North 
and South Kivu, as well as Orientale, was compounded by allegations of the UN’s 
alleged involvement in plundering resources, running guns in exchange for minerals or 
ivory and sexual exploitation and abuse (Månsson, 2005: 512-514). MONUC was also 
accused by the DRC government of creating opportunities for powerful Western nations 
                                                 
110
 Great Lakes Echoes, 2008. General Diaz was of the opinion that MONUC has insufficient capacity to fulfil the 
task before it at a time when the situation in the Eastern DRC was rapidly deteriorating, www.eurac-network.org, 
[accessed on 15 February 2010]. 
111
 The case of the Indian Colonel Chand Saroha who had made comments in support of General Nkunda before 
leaving the DRC. http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2008/081003_Doss.doc.htm, [accessed on 15 February 
2010]. 
105 
 
 
 
to advance their parochial interests in the DRC. This can be equated to the famous 
Trojan horse. 
 
Widespread frustration at the mission’s continued presence led President Joseph Kabila 
to request for MONUC’s withdrawal from the DRC starting before 30 June 2010, the 50th 
anniversary of DRC independence (Autesserre, 2010: 235-239). The UNSC met in May 
2010 to discuss the mandate and configuration of MONUC, as well as the future for a 
UN presence in the country (UNSG report (S/2010/288)), and it was decided that 
MONUC should withdraw gradually, with all the peacekeepers leaving the country by 
December 2013. Many other claims were made with regard to MONUC’s complicity in 
relation to the illegal plundering of natural resources and arms trafficking for Congolese 
militias. It was in this context that the request for the withdrawal of MONUC was born, 
with a view that this would serve the interests of peace in the DRC. 
 
The mandate of MONUC would sadly soon come to an end, even though the country 
was arguably home to the most deadly and violent humanitarian crisis that the world 
had ever seen. President Joseph Kabila called for their immediate departure, and the 
Human Rights Watch accused MONUC of complicity with regard to the massive human 
rights abuses against the local population. In addition, the abandonment of many 
illegitimate children parented by MONUC workers would happen if MONUC left the 
country. However, there was an obvious necessity for some stability as the local 
population was in desperate need of a change from wide-spread violence and an 
incredibly corrupt government system.112 President Kabila subsequently requested the 
UN to submit a proposal, including a calendar, for its progressive withdrawal, preferably 
commencing by June 30, 2010, based on the evolution of the security situation in the 
country.  
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[accessed on 15 April 2012]. 
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4.3 DETERIORATION OF TRUST BETWEEN THE DRC GOVERNMENT AND 
MONUC 
 
The DRC government and MONUC as outlined had not been on good terms since 
October 2008. There were several difficult challenges for the UN to address, which were 
the basis for a philosophical discussion on the use of force. Wedgwood (2001: 78) 
concluded that inadequate force structures were often the reasons for the reluctance of 
member countries to contribute troops. However, Wedgwood emphasised that this 
amounted to an unwillingness to admit that collective security requires robust action and 
that the UN cannot substitute itself for States and hope to avoid the modalities found 
necessary by States (78). Very little could be accomplished through the Chapter VII 
mechanism to muster armed forces into collective military action.  
 
4.3.1 Passivity of MONUC regarding the massive violations of human rights 
 
The approach by the UNSC and, in particular, the UNSG with respect to the protection 
of civilians was one of willingness but with precaution. It reflected the UN’s fear of 
becoming involved in problematic situations where peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement became blurred and impartiality was lost, as in Bosnia and Somalia 
(Murphy, 2007:153-155). This contradicted MONUC’s mandate to protect civilians, as 
highlighted in the following words: “The deteriorating situation had placed MONUC in an 
uncomfortable position”. North Kivu, Ituri, South Kivu and North Katanga were steeped 
in insecurity. So what did MONUC do? Much criticism has been levelled against 
MONUC in this regard (Obotela, 2008: 855). Some events in eastern DRC appear to 
primarily reflect decisions and policies made in Kigali rather than Kinshasa, as 
illustrated by Rwanda’s willingness to back, and in Nkunda’s case remove, warlords 
who had acted as their proxies (Tull, 2003: 442-443). MONUC officers had been 
accused of sexual abuse since 2004 (UNSG Report (S/2004/650)). In spite of these 
announcements; MONUC’s public image had been seriously tarnished by these 
allegations.  
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At the beginning of the transition in 2004, Major Joseph Kasongo113 rebelled against the 
DRC Government’s point of view, which violated the agreements made by the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue. Under pressure from MONUC, Kasongo was freed and sent back 
to Bukavu the following day. It was noted that the large scale killings in Bukavu were 
attributed to Colonel Jules Mutebusi and General Laurent Nkunda, without any 
intervention by MONUC (ICG, 2004: 3-4). The UNSG’s explicit call upon the UNSC to 
authorise MONUC to protect civilians through the use of force was ground-breaking, but 
also to be expected. Gray (2002:180) emphasised that the provision was called a 
‘pertinent development’, introducing a ‘new legal and moral dimension’ to 
peacekeeping. However, the HRW report (2008:22) indicated that what most shocked 
the local and international community was the fact that UN peacekeepers had allowed 
civilians to be massacred by CNDP soldiers, without any intervention from them.  
 
4.3.2 MONUC acting as a permanent force of occupation in the DRC  
 
The doctrine of the occupation of State territory by UN peacekeeping operations did not 
give concrete examples from which one can identify the characteristic elements of such 
an occupation. Moreover, how can one contribute to the notion of developing a doctrine 
of territorial occupation? For some authors, a military occupation refers to the more or 
less prolonged presence of military forces of a State in the territory of another State. 
Because of this presence, the occupying State believes that it has the right to behave 
like a territorial authority against persons and property in the occupied territory (Nguyen 
et al., 2002: 485). As defined above, military occupation should not be confused with the 
requested intervention of a military force, such as that of the UN in the DRC. However, 
shifts from military occupation to the intervention of a military force and vice versa were 
possible. Could the case of the DRC be an example of this shift? 
 
The question that has been posed above is one that seeks facts. There is minimal 
evidence of the shifts in MONUC to a passive or active occupying force. With the 
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 Major Joseph Kasongo was a RCD-Goma officer, together with other RCD Generals Nyabiolwa and Nkunda, 
Colonel Jules Mutebutsi was fighting the DRC government in Bukavu, on 24 February 2004. 
108 
 
 
 
passage of time, certain documents were declassified, in which the emergence of this 
new doctrine was confirmed in relation to the presence of UN forces in the DRC. 
Vircoulon (2007: 9) referred to this as the “new figure globalisation in Africa”. It can be 
seen in the renewed intervention of the UN, which was extensive, and the role of the 
international community in national affairs. A perfect illustration of this role was provided 
by the Global and Inclusive Agreement, which delegated an international warranty to the 
Inter-Congolese Dialogue.114 This guarantee was made by the International Committee 
of Support to the Transition (CIAT).115 The role of this institution was essential to the 
success of the transition, and formalised “controlled sovereignty” in the DRC (Vircoulon, 
2007: 14). 
 
International trusteeship through CIAT was tolerated because of the post-conflict 
situation in the country. This persistence of the desire to keep the DRC under 
“international control” was highlighted in the case of the Belgian statesman Karel De 
Gucht,116 who apparently claimed the status of a new Leopold II in an independent DRC 
fifty years later (Breackman, 2009: 37). While the DRC authorities struggled to get rid of 
this tutelage which had become cumbersome, some members of the MONUC military 
contingents were engaged in acts against the sovereignty of the DRC. These UN 
peacekeeping forces in the DRC were easily assimilated into “active occupational 
forces” due to the fact that they had ceased to be under UN command and obeyed 
their respective governments’ “passive occupational forces”. To support this opinion, 
Breackman (2009: 224-225) described this situation as decompressing the hidden side 
of MONUC, when she noted that: “The behaviour of MONUC itself worsened the effect 
of these betrayals: Congolese battle plans were designed with MONUC officers and 
helicopters had been promised support. But at the last minute, the Indians refused to fly 
their aircraft, thereby depriving the government troops air cover expected”. The order 
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 Annex IV of the Global and Inclusive Agreement, Pretoria, 17 December 2002; CIAT's role was to ensure the 
proper implementation of the Agreement and to support the programme of transition in the DRC.  
115
 Consisting of the ambassadors of the five permanent members of the UNSC, Angola, South Africa and the 
European Union as major donors, CIAT had intervened in the management of government affairs and forced the 
Parliamentary Assembly to rework the electoral law that had been established, as well as outlining the work of the 
government by enacting a legislative agenda. 
116
 On 18 July 2004, Karel de Gucht was appointed Foreign Minister of the EU, replacing the liberal Frenchman 
Louis Michel. 
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was said to have had come from New Dheli, which banned the Indian contingent to 
initiate air operations. Subsequently, MONUC reserved little publicity to an internal 
report produced by its own office investigation, which established that peacekeepers 
had sold arms and ammunition to Nkunda, meaning the official representatives of the 
MONUC were further fuelling the conflict by indirectly armouring Nkunda. 
 
4.4 FORMALISING THE REQUEST FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF MONUC 
 
The announcement of the intention of the DRC to get MONUC to withdraw within the 
proposed time-frame had led to misunderstandings, which were amplified by the 
repetitive interviews held with the DRC Minister of Information and Communication.117 
As a result, there was a need to determine the contents of government’s request for 
withdrawal of MONUC and the policies that accompanied it. 
 
4.4.1 Ambiguity of the contents of the government’s request for the withdrawal of 
MONUC 
 
When President Kabila announced his desire to see MONUC withdraw from the DRC, 
there was confusion among interested observers. The first speculation was that 
President Kabila was going to demand the immediate withdrawal of MONUC.118 
However, he changed his view regarding the withdrawal process in the UNSG report 
(S/2009/623, para. 48), which emphasised the misinterpretation of his original message. 
His change of view was driven by the continued presence of armed groups in the 
eastern DRC, the DFLR, ex-FAR/Interahamwe and the dissident militia of Laurent 
Nkunda in the province of North Kivu. It now seemed clear that the purpose of the 
request by the DRC government was the presentation of a MONUC withdrawal plan by 
30 June 2010. 
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 Mende said that an official request was sent to the UN and that it was examined by the concerned parties. 
http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/kinshasa-asks-un-mission-leave-country-within-year, 
[accessed on 22 June 2012]. 
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 After the inauguration of President Joseph Kabila on 6 December 2006, the UNSC considered it necessary to 
keep MONUC in the DRC before extending its mandate until 31 December 2008. 
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It was on 29 November 2009 in Mbuji-Mayi that President Kabila held a press 
conference, during which he announced the extension of the MONUC mission with a 
changing mandate. To confirm what President Kabila had said that the Minister of 
Government’s spokesman Lambert Mende gave the position of the DRC: 
 
At the press conference Lambert Mende said that the DRC government doesn’t see 
what MONUC have not been able to do in 12 years that must be done in two or three 
years. Mende thinks that the DRC must come back to a traditional [relationship] with 
the UN in general, not an exceptional one. He emphasised that the MONUC was an 
exceptional relationship.119 
 
This move by the DRC government suggests that it was aware that the mandate of 
MONUC as it stood was ineffective. Despite the disagreements between the DRC 
government and the UN mission in the past, many advocacy organisations were of the 
view that the time had not yet come to put an end to the peacekeepers' stay. Andrew 
Philip from Amnesty International and specialist researcher on DRC, while commenting 
at the press conference of Lambert Mende; he denounced the move by the DRC 
government as being self-motivated and against the interests of its own citizens. This 
observation made by Phillip suggests that the crisis was further compounded by the 
lack of dialogue between the DRC government and the DRC civilian population. 
 
Philip also said at the press conference that the UN was deeply concerned. For the 
UN it was a reckless request and a reckless decision because the security situation 
in the eastern part of the country, where MONUC was primarily concentrated, was 
not yet stable enough to allow for a substantial reduction of peacekeepers. The 
humanitarian situation remains catastrophic. He emphasised that the real problems 
that remain in the East have not been dealt with.120 
 
In analysing the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1906), President Kabila, as reported by 
Radio Okapi, did not present a withdrawal plan which was due to begin on 30 June 
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 Voice of America, 07 March 2010, UN Backs New DRC Offensive, http://www.voanews.com/content/un-backs-
new-drc-offensive--86921042/153613.html, [accessed on 15 June 2010]. 
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2010. The situation between the DRC and UN was therefore not a new development for 
either party in this regard. Following the reactions from international organisations 
working in the DRC, especially humanitarian organisations, President Kabila was 
obliged to provide more information. He stated that the DRC government had not asked 
MONUC to pack up and leave the DRC immediately, but instead to begin to prepare 
itself for withdrawal. He later stated the following:  
 
We have asked MONUC to give us a disengagement plan, and my hope was that 
this will be done by the end of this year. It was based on this plan that 
discussions will be held with MONUC regarding the practicalities of progressive 
withdrawal.121 
  
The adoption on 23 December 2009 of UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1906) had 
exacerbated the differences between the views of the DRC government and UN 
regarding the future of MONUC. The reaction of the DRC government to this UNSC 
Resolution was unequivocal and it was up to the UN mission to present a plan for the 
gradual withdrawal of MONUC by the end of June 2010.122 The researcher witnessed a 
standoff between the DRC government and the UN for the first time since the inception 
of MONUC and its establishment in the DRC territory. 
 
From a historical perspective, it appeared that the situation was now reversed. In 1963, 
the initiative for the withdrawal of ONUC came from the UN, but in 2010, the demand for 
the withdrawal of MONUC came from the DRC government. This comparison also 
assists to identify similarities between these two periods with regard to the presence of 
MONUC in the territory. Two similarities are evident. Firstly, the national army was not 
capable of defending the territory as a whole on its own and the independence of the 
country, and the police were not able to ensure the safety of persons and their property. 
Secondly, the disagreement between the DRC government and the UN did not only 
affect the time of MONUC’s the withdrawal, but also provided a kind of authoritarianism 
which restricted the “prerogatives” of sovereignty.  
                                                 
121
 http://www.radiookapi.net, [accessed on 15 June 2010]. 
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 http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu, [accessed on 15 June 2010]. 
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4.4.2 Measures accompanying the government’s request for the withdrawal of 
MONUC 
 
The first measure accompanying the government's decision dispelled doubts about the 
willingness to see MONUC’s gradual withdrawal from the DRC, and this was the 
convocation of the Supreme Council of Defence, headed by President Kabila123 whose 
objective was to examine the withdrawal process of MONUC. It aimed mainly to 
determine what the government should do after the withdrawal of MONUC forces, in 
order to avoid instability in the DRC. It then looked at how to prevent the possible 
interference in the peace already established after MONUC’s gradual withdrawal.  
 
The meeting of the Supreme Defence Council was held when the Frenchman Alain Le 
Roy, Deputy UNSG in charge of the UN peacekeeping mission, arrived in the DRC to 
speak to the DRC authorities about the presence of MONUC. The objectives of the 
Supreme Defence Council were devoted to the essential tasks to be accomplished 
before MONUC’s withdrawal began. Among these tasks, the professionalisation of the 
FARDC could be achieved through various types of training provided by bilateral and 
multilateral partners (MONUC Magazine, 2009: 11). Another task was to provide 
equipment to support FARDC operations against the FDLR and the LRA through 
“Operation Amani Leo”, which was planned and conducted jointly with MONUC in 
respect of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.124 
 
The Supreme Defence Council found it impossible to accomplish complex tasks that 
would also strengthen the capacity of the army in the five months prior to 31 May 2010. 
The tasks were immense: MONUC and the FARDC had to make an inventory to 
facilitate the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers, particularly in the sensitive areas of 
Eastern DRC, but also to ensure that it did not undermine the security issue. The UNSC 
Resolution (S/RES/1906) instructed MONUC to redefine the terms of its reconfiguration, 
while giving priority to the protection of civilians and coordination of operations with the 
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 In accordance with Article 83 of the Constitution of the DRC, the President of the Republic is the Supreme 
Commander of the Armed Forces. He presides over the Council of the Defence. 
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FARDC to disarm Congolese and foreign armed groups, in particular the FDLR and the 
LRA. 
 
The drawdown arguments of the DRC government, and especially the timing of its 
announcement, also probably demonstrate internal political calculation. The fact that the 
government wanted the MONUC withdrawal to be scheduled to take place just before 
the elections in September 2011 suggests that it aimed to have full control over the 
implementation of these elections. 
 
The DRC government therefore had reason to fear a decline in genuine electoral 
support next time around, and may have sought ways to maximise the leverage of 
incumbency, in order to ensure victory in 2011. In such a situation, the continued 
presence of the large UN mission may therefore have been regarded as an 
inconvenience whose withdrawal would assist the government to achieve its aim. 
 
4.5 UN POSITION REGARDING THE FUTURE OF MONUC IN THE DRC  
 
With regard to the requirements of the DRC government, the UN seemed to maintain 
dialogue with the DRC authorities, because of the speculation and claims by the 
government regarding the withdrawal of MONUC. Therefore, one may ask whether or 
not this attitude of the UN was arguably its way of acting according to its own principles, 
and even the government seemed to accept this. The government was trying to save 
face, despite its failures, by making the withdrawal of MONUC a matter of national 
opinion. It can be concluded that in this way, the government was able to defend its 
independence and sovereignty, and there was no evidence that the UN had refused the 
government’s request. The position of the UN can be found in UNSC Resolutions 
(S/RES/1906) of 23 December 2009 and (S/RES/1925) of 28 May 2010. 
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4.5.1 Position of UN and the DRC government in UNSC Resolution (S/RES/ 1906) 
of 23 December 2009 
 
The position of the UN with regard to the gradual withdrawal of MONUC, according to 
the request of the DRC government, created the need for consultations between the 
DRC government and UNSC. This was necessitated because the UNSC Resolution 
dated 23 December 2009 went in the opposite direction namely in the name of stability 
and regional security. However, the adoption of this UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1906) 
and the reactions that accompanied it, emphasised the need for dialogue between the 
two parties involved in the future of MONUC, in order for them to determine how to 
reconfigure the mandate of MONUC and find reasons to justify the withdrawal of UN 
forces from the DRC. 
 
The spokesman for the DRC government announced, after a meeting between 
President Kabila and UN envoy Alain Le Roy that MONUC troops would be reduced by 
the end of the year and would focus exclusively on conflict areas. According to him, the 
entire contingent of UN peacekeepers would be withdrawn by July 2011.125 
 
Alain Le Roy, Deputy UNSG in charge of UN peacekeeping operations, indicated that 
Kinshasa had asked for a “gradual withdrawal” of UN peacekeepers from the end of 
June 2010 at the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the independence of the 
DRC. He said that there was “no agreement on a specific date” and did not know “what 
teams” would be affected by the gradual withdrawal, and that both parties should 
discuss the withdrawal “in the coming days”.126  
 
This policy brief presents the two key positions in the debate on MONUC’s drawdown, 
and analyses their background. It then discusses the broader question of what was 
required to complete the peacekeeping job in weak States such as the DRC. The 
peacekeepers were bound by the Chapter VII mandate, which allowed them to take 
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“necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its troops and as it deems it within its 
capabilities, to protect UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the 
security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under imminent 
threat of physical violence.” However, the inadequate mandate of MONUC was 
seriously criticised in terms of its capacity to protect the civilian population. In theory 
their role was essentially to provide stability, security and protection in the country while 
monitoring human rights abuses and assisting in DDRRR. The mission seemed to be 
flawed, however, as violence kept on increasing among the civilian population. The UN 
and DRC perspectives were very different, but both raised the question of what 
conditions had to be met before the peacekeeping task in the DRC could be said to be 
done. This highlighted the issue of what kind of “progress on the ground” was needed, 
and how the peace of the drawdown could be adjusted in relation to it. This was a 
complex question involving a number of challenges, which go beyond reaching an 
agreement as to where and in what aspects there should be progress before 
withdrawal.  
 
4.5.2 Dialogue and consultation between the DRC government and the UN 
 
On 3 March 2010, the UNSG for Peacekeeping Operations, at a meeting with President 
Kabila, presented the DRC authorities with the proposals for the technical assessment 
mission with regard to the progressive withdrawal of the MONUC forces over a period of 
three years. These proposals included a list of critical tasks that would need to be 
accomplished in keeping with the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1906, para. 2), and specific 
areas in which the UN could support the implementation of the government’s plans for 
addressing the on-going conflicts in the East, including SSR, building juridical and 
correctional institutional capacity, consolidation and peacebuilding.127 
 
The withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping operation had to be planned and implemented 
in consultation with all local and international partners, in order to minimise the 
disruption of international programmes and the impact on the population and 
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environment of the country (UNPKO, 2008:99-101). The understandable reaction of the 
UN and humanitarian organisations towards the decision of the DRC government to 
demand the withdrawal of UN forces from the beginning of June 2010 necessitated a 
stable security situation in the DRC. Considering the fact that MONUC forces were 
supportive structures that lived alongside the local population, they were supposed to 
be aware of the reality on the ground. The UNSG report (S/2010/164, para. 100) noted 
that President Kabila explained his government’s vision of building the capacity of 
national institutions to enable them to assume the role that MONUC was playing, 
stressing that the time had come to allow the country “to fly with its own wings”. In this 
context, President Kabila expressed the view that the withdrawal of the MONUC forces 
was to begin in June 2010 and be completed by June 2011 (para. 99). 
 
From the foregoing, the risk of a return to conflict was highlighted. However, it was 
important that the withdrawal of the MONUC forces should be conducted in a prudent 
manner. They would safeguard the achievements made thus far, help to build upon and 
consolidate this progress, and enable the national rule of law and security institutions to 
develop the capacity to take over the current role of MONUC. With regard to the 
protection of civilians, it was important to facilitate humanitarian access and prevent the 
creation of a potentially destabilising security vacuum. President Kabila agreed to 
designate a team of senior government officials to further discuss, with a team from the 
technical assessment mission and MONUC, outstanding issues and charting the way 
forward. These discussions were concluded on 9 March 2010.128 The two teams 
reconfirmed the government’s agreement to the proposal of the technical assessment 
mission that the withdrawal of the MONUC forces would be conducted in several 
successive phases.129  
 
In terms of these arrangements, a total of up to 2,000 MONUC troops would withdraw 
from the DRC by the end of June 2010 (S/2010/164, para. 104). The UNSC approved 
the process, arguing that it was essential for the government and MONUC to jointly 
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 The role of the MONUC forces would be limited to the FARDC Defence Zone 3 (covering the two Kivus, as well 
as Orientale and Maniema Provinces), where military operations against FDLR and LRA were on-going. 
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agree on specific benchmarks for measuring progress towards accomplishing the 
identified urgent tasks. In this regard, it was important for the government and MONUC 
to define specific tasks, informed by a regional perspective, under which they would 
declare that the threats from FDLR, LRA and the FARDC had been reduced to a level 
where they could be addressed by the DRC authorities without MONUC’s support. 
 
The UNSG (S/2010/164, para. 138) recommended that the protection of civilians 
remained the first priority of the Mission. In the eight provinces from which the MONUC 
forces were to withdraw, the civilian components of the Mission would continue to work 
with the UN country team to support the initiatives of stabilisation and peacebuilding. 
The Mission would continue to give priority to the protection of civilians through the 
promotion and monitoring of respect for human rights, and the strengthening of the 
capacity of security institutions and rule of law. With regard to the later stages of the 
withdrawal of MONUC, Mr Ban Ki-moon (S/2010/164, para. 91-95) noted the position of 
the DRC government, which wanted the complete withdrawal of MONUC by 30 August 
2011 at the latest. He also noted the agreement reached with the government to put in 
place a policy of successive phases of withdrawal. Thus, he recommended to the UNSC 
that it supports the endorsement of a process that would allow the UN and the 
government of the DRC to continue their dialogue on the terms and timing of successive 
phases of withdrawal.  
 
4.6 THE UNSC RESOLUTION (S/RES/1925) OF 28 MAY 2010 
 
Although signs of DRC’s impatience with MONUC had been perceptible for some time, 
the drawdown debate was triggered in December 2009, when President Kabila voiced 
his position on the future of MONUC. The UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1925) of 28 May 
2010 met the expectations of all stakeholders involved in the process of consolidating 
peace in the DRC. It was curious that in spite of their divergent views, both the 
supporters of the gradual withdrawal of MONUC and the proponents of maintaining 
MONUC’s presence in Eastern DRC were satisfied.  
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4.6.1 Position of the DRC government  
 
This UNSC Resolution provided the UN mission in the DRC with a plan for the year 
ahead. However, its adoption was preceded by a largely polarised debate on the 
mission’s future. A sound understanding of the two key positions in this debate was 
therefore useful in order to facilitate constructive cooperation between the DRC and its 
international partners in the time to come. 
 
The DRC government’s apparently uncompromising stance can be understood against 
the background of the history of the DRC. MONUC’s own performance as well as its 
relationships vis-à-vis the Congolese were also key to understanding local scepticism. 
When measured against the goals that had been set for the mission, performance was 
often disappointing. A crucial issue was the fact that MONUC had repeatedly failed to 
ensure “the protection of civilians under immediate threat of physical violence”, a task 
which had been part of its mandate since 2002 (Månsson, 2005: 505-508). 
 
The mission succeeded in monitoring the ceasefire and withdrawal of foreign armies 
from 2000 to 2003, and in assisting with the holding of the elections in 2006. 
Nevertheless, despite the fourfold increase in troop numbers over its first decade, as 
well as attempts at organisational learning within the UN, MONUC had repeatedly failed 
to protect civilians in Ituri in 2003, Bukavu in 2004, North Kivu in 2008, and more 
consistently in relation to foreign militias operating in the country, such as the FDLR and 
LRA. In the view of the DRC government, MONUC had to update its mandate according 
to this issue of protecting civilians. 
 
4.6.2 Position of the UN  
 
The UN, for its part, hesitated to accept the government’s suggestion of a fixed 
timetable for MONUC’s drawdown. In adopting this stance the UN had at least three 
concerns. The first resonated with other contemporary spheres of an international 
military presence such as Afghanistan and Iraq, where a vital consideration of involved 
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outsiders was to ensure that when they left, they could do so “with their heads held 
high”. MONUC’s status as – the largest UN peacekeeping force in the world, deployed 
in a crisis-ridden region, – made it a test case for peacekeeping. It was important for the 
UN’s prestige that the exit from the DRC was conducted in a way that was seen not to 
jeopardise the organisation’s core values of international peace and security. 
 
The second UN concern was that a quick withdrawal might create a political and military 
void, paving the way for an upsurge in violence. The concern was that unless 
institutions were in place, that provided basic services to the population, and unless the 
army and police were able to protect civilians and the entire country from mass 
violence, the UN force’s departure might be followed by the emergence of new attacks. 
Linked to this view was the idea that in the areas most affected by violence, the 
drawdown should be based on progress in terms of dimensions considered to be key to 
ensuring that the DRC was prepared to “stand on its own feet”. 
 
The third concern related to the idea of an international “responsibility to protect”. If this 
norm could be applied, it would seem counter-intuitive to let a mission endowed with 
this task to leave a country where violence against civilians remained widespread in 
certain areas. MONUC may often have been unable to protect Congolese civilians from 
violence, but if its departure would lead to a worsening of their conditions, then in many 
respects this was no solution at all. 
 
4.7 FROM PEACEKEEPING TO PEACEBUILDING 
 
The complicated, controversial, and sometimes counterproductive nature of civilian 
protection by the military means supporting the emerging suggestion in both the UN and 
Congolese circles that the international presence in the DRC needed to shift its focus 
from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. These two approaches, after all, had different 
logical underpinnings. Peacebuilding focuses on building institutions, reducing poverty, 
and addressing the deeper reasons why individuals resort to violence. Peacekeeping, 
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on the other hand, operates according to the logic of military deterrence and deals more 
with the effects than the causes of conflict.130  
 
To protect civilians under immediate threat of physical violence has been part of 
MONUC’s mandate from the start. Even so, thousands of civilians have been exposed 
to violence during and in the areas of MONUC’s deployment. The causes of failure were 
rooted both in institutional realities (the nature of MONUC’s mandate and the UN 
system, and of the DRC’s responsibilities) and in the intricacies of the idea that 
peacekeepers should protect civilians from physical violence when they are under 
immediate threat. This demanding requirement was fairly new in the history of UN 
peacekeeping, as it only become prominent at the end of the 1990s; at around the same 
time that MONUC itself came into being (UNSG report (S/1999/957) of 8 September 
1999).  
 
The MONUC experience could arguably be deduced as meaning that the protection of 
civilians by peacekeepers was both complicated and controversial. This should 
therefore stimulate renewed thought about civilian protection as a peacekeeping task. 
The presence of an external force which promises to fight non-state armed groups may 
act as an incentive for violence, given that the attention thus accruing to the groups may 
improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis the provincial, central, or regional elites 
(Waal, 2009:99-113). The discourse on civilian protection often implies that these 
civilians are mainly women and children, even though civilian men are also vulnerable 
to various forms of violence in conflict situations. An important indicator of the protection 
challenges in the DRC was the consistently high level of human rights violations 
throughout the country, as well as the high level of internal displacements, which lies at 
the core of humanitarian needs.  
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4.8 MOTIVATIONS OF THE UNSC RESOLUTION (S/RES/1925) OF 28 MAY 2010 
 
An analysis of the underpinning motivations of the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1925) of 
28 May 2010 was restricted by the UNSC to preserve the goal of peace already 
achieved and the urgency to consolidate this peace in a sustainable manner. The UN 
was committed to defending the integrity of the DRC and ensuring the protection of the 
civilians who lived there. Based on these objectives, the members of the UNSC were 
motivated to adopt this resolution (Ibid para. 12). 
 
4.8.1 Affirmation of the principles guiding the work of the UNSC 
 
To answer the criticism raised by the DRC government about the UN presence in the 
DRC, which recalled the Soviet position in 1963 in relation to ONUC, the UNSC had to 
reaffirm its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence 
of the DRC. In other words, the continued presence of the UN forces in the DRC did not 
constitute a violation of the country’s sovereignty and independence. Instead, it worked 
for their protection and obliged the UN to assist the government of the DRC to increase 
its capacity in all areas of sovereignty. 
 
This principle was firstly that the primary responsibility of the DRC government was to 
recover all the occupied territory in the country. Secondly, it was therefore up to 
government authorities to ensure the safety of the entire national territory and to protect 
civilians, as well as ensure respect for the rule of law, human rights and international 
humanitarian law.  
 
However, these principles were conventionally responsibilities of the DRC government 
but were far from being achieved because of the absence of a professional army.131 In 
addition, the presence of armed groups in the eastern part of the country in which the 
                                                 
131
 Refers to all the preambles of all UN Resolutions on the DRC, which theoretically stipulated that the first 
responsibility for security lay with the DRC government [… ] this sovereignty, in practice, was limited, despite 
the UN Charter emphasising the equality of all States throughout the world. 
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State authority was defeated rendered the government unable to fulfil its conventional 
duties as a sovereign State.  
 
The UNSC, concerned about the long-term stabilisation of the DRC, felt the urgent need 
to implement a comprehensive reform of the security sector and an appropriate 
programme for achieving DDR and DDRRR. For members of the UNSC, the 
establishment of security conditions was an indispensable asset to sustainable 
economic development, and the involvement of international partners in all these areas 
was encouraged. This required stable security in the DRC, especially in North and 
South Kivu and the Orientale Provinces. The continued presence of armed militias, the 
weakness of state authority, the risk of renewed conflict with the return of refugees and 
displaced persons, and the continued illegal exploitation of natural resources were 
constant threats to stability in the DRC. 
 
4.8.2 Progress towards the achievement of the MONUC mandate 
 
The 31st report of the UNSG report (S/2010/164, para. 22, 23 and 24) stated that 
significant progress had been achieved in the DRC over the past decade. Landmark 
achievements included the official end of the conflict in 2003, the successful transition, 
which restored the territorial integrity of the country, the successful holding of 
democratic national elections in 2006, the on-going infrastructure development 
programme and improved relations between the country and its eastern neighbours. 
 
In the east, positive developments in 2009, including the alliance between the DRC and 
Rwanda, the end of the CNDP rebellion, the launch of military operations against FDLR 
and LRA, and an increased rate of voluntary participation in the programme of DDRRR 
by FDLR elements, created unique possibilities for addressing the presence of armed 
groups in the eastern part of the country. However, significant challenges still remained 
in the country in relation to the continued presence of FDLR and LRA; large-scale 
humanitarian needs; and the persistence of serious human rights violations, including 
sexual and gender-based violence against civilians by FDLR, LRA and FARDC. 
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The UNSC recognised its urgent need to support the efforts of peace-building in order 
to strengthen and advance the country's stabilisation. This explains why the UNSC 
Resolution (S/RES/1925) of 28 May 2010 placed particular emphasis on the need for 
continued international support for the achievement of early recovery and to lay the 
foundation for sustainable development. Meanwhile, the exploitation of and illicit trade in 
natural resources continued, and its connection with the proliferation and trafficking of 
arms was one of the major factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in the country and 
throughout the Great Lakes region. This situation involved both internal and external 
aspects, which poisoned the environment and contributed to further destabilisation of 
the DRC. 
 
To all UN member States, particularly those of the Great Lakes region, the UNSC 
recommended the full implementation of the measures specified in the UNSC 
Resolution (S/RES/1856, para. 3) of 22 December 2008. The UNSC had resolved to 
closely monitor how these measures were implemented and enforced by the States 
concerned. Unfortunately, the political influence that drove the UN measures did not 
allow the MONUC to closely monitor these measures. In addition, the UN was very 
complacent in respect of Rwanda which allowed Nkunda to again get access to military 
support from Rwanda with the knowledge of the UN. 
 
While at the national level, as stated earlier, the UNSC expressed its support for the 
efforts of the Congolese government to draw up the final schedule of local elections in 
the general constitutional framework, in order to consolidate democracy and promote 
the rule of law. However, the humanitarian situation was of great concern to the 
members of the UNSC. According to them, the entire situation, including that of human 
rights in areas affected by armed conflict was disastrous. In this regard, the organ of the 
UN condemned, in particular, the targeted attacks against civilians, widespread sexual 
violence, recruitment and use of child soldiers, and extrajudicial executions. 
 
The UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1925) of 28 May 2010 highlighted the obligation of the 
DRC government to act urgently, in cooperation with MONUC and other stakeholders, 
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to put an end to violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, fight 
against impunity, bring perpetrators to justice and provide victims with medical care, 
including humanitarian and other forms of aid. Thus, the UNSC welcomed the 
commitment by the DRC government to bring the perpetrators of atrocities committed in 
the country to justice. In this sense, the cooperation of the DRC authorities with the 
International Criminal Court was a source of satisfaction for the members of the UNSC. 
The following section analyses the principal decisions in this UNSC Resolution. 
 
4.9 PRINCIPLE ELEMENTS OF THE UNSC RESOLUTION (S/RES/1925) OF 28 MAY 
2010  
 
Given the ineffectiveness of the MONUC mandate, the challenges of implementing it 
and the lack of consensus from the concerned stakeholders, it became a necessity to 
change the trajectory of the operation. In other words, given the compelling practical 
situation on the ground, the rules of the game had to be changed, as it were. The 
change had to be gazetted by the UN as it was the UN that initially brought in 
peacekeeping forces. 
 
The content of this UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1925) revealed the important decisions 
taken by the UNSC regarding the presence of MONUC in the DRC. It was, for example, 
decided to extend the mandate of MONUC, as well as to achieve its transformation into 
MONUSCO. Other elements included the withdrawal of some peacekeepers, conditions 
for the modification of MONUSCO’s mandate, and the need for cooperation and 
partnerships for sustainable peace and security in the DRC. 
 
4.9.1 Extension and reconfiguration of MONUC’s mandate  
 
The first decision contained in this UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1925 para. 1), was in 
relation to the extension of the mandate of MONUC by a month, from 31 May to 30 
June 2010. The end of the MONUC mandate was therefore fixed to almost the same 
date as that end of ONUC, which was 30 June 1964. However, unlike ONUC, the end of 
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the mandate of MONUC did not put an end to the presence of the UN mission in the 
DRC. The disengagement of ONUC took place in a context that was similar to that of 
MONUC, in that it was the ability of the State to support this process which prevented 
irrational decisions from being made. 
 
The technical assessment mission agreed with the view expressed by the government 
that the reconfiguration of the mandate should reflect the new realities in the field, and 
should aim to build the capacity of national security and rule of law institutions to a level 
at which they could be sustained. The mission also believed that the reconfigured 
mandate of MONUC should reflect the on-going need to prioritise the protection of 
civilians. However, it should also recognise the different needs of the various regions 
within the country and give national institutions the space to operate independently 
where possible. This allowed MONUC to focus on critical tasks with a clear, strategic 
objective and exit strategy, while paying commensurate attention to peacebuilding 
needs. This would lay the foundation for the progressive transition to an UN presence 
that focused more on peacebuilding and sustainable development than on security, as 
local conditions allowed (UNSG report S/2010/164, para. 96). 
 
Since the DRC was entering a new phase, according to the UNSC, the UN mission had 
to change its name to refocus its mandate in relation to the practical realities in the field. 
This resulted in MONUC being called “Mission of the United Nations for the Stability in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo”, abbreviated as “MONUSCO”, as from 1 July 2010. 
Its mandate would run from that date until 30 June 2011. In order to protect the civilians, 
judiciary and penitentiary, MONUSCO had a maximum number of 19,815 troops, 760 
military observers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 members of established police units 
(UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1925 para. 2)). Therefore, there was not much change 
involved in the transformation of MONUC into MONUSCO. Rather, this transformation 
was a sign of a significant deterioration in the relationship between the main partners, 
who were supposed to share common goals. It can thus be inferred that the purported 
change in the mandate of MONUC was essentially a change in name alone. There is 
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very little evidence, if any at all, that points to a substantive change in the pragmatic 
implementation of MONUSCO.  
 
4.9.2 Withdrawal of UN peacekeepers 
 
The end of MONUC was accompanied by the UNSC’s decision to withdraw a maximum 
number of 2000 military peacekeepers by 30 June 2010. This withdrawal had to be 
achieved in areas where security conditions were satisfactory (UNSC Resolution 
(S/RES/1925).  
 
The Eastern provinces of the country were affected by this withdrawal, to which the 
Equatorial Province could be added, although it is situated in the northern region of the 
DRC. This is why the UNSC authorised MONUSCO to concentrate its military forces in 
the east, while maintaining a reserve force capable of rapid deployment elsewhere in 
the country. This action by MONUSCO did not absolve the DRC government of its 
responsibility to ensure security, consolidate peace and promote development 
throughout the country. In this regard, the UNSC encouraged the DRC authorities to 
remain firmly committed to the protection of the civilian population, develop professional 
security forces, promote non-military solutions as an integral part of the overall-effort to 
reduce the threat posed by Congolese and foreign armed groups, and fully restore state 
authority in areas from which armed groups had withdrawn. 
 
In order to avoid a heightened security risk as MONUC withdrew from the Kivus and 
Orientale Provinces. The government and the UN had to agree on the necessary 
capacities and strategic areas where the presence of trained FARDC troops was 
considered to be indispensable. In addition, there had to be arrangements for 
determining their readiness for deployment, which required consultation with the 
bilateral partners involved in their training. Their ability to protect civilians against 
violence, including sexual violence, and facilitate humanitarian access was critical 
factors in this regard. Concerning the establishment of State authority in areas from 
which the armed groups in North and South Kivu had withdrawn, the government and 
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the international community had already agreed, within the framework of the 
Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan and the International Security and Stabilisation 
Support Strategy, on the areas where State administration should be established. 
 
4.9.3 Need for cooperation and partnerships 
 
Among the challenges faced by the UN and the DRC government were multiple forms 
of insecurity which required strong collaboration between all partners involved in the 
search for solutions. The attitude of the DRC government in brandishing the rope of 
sovereignty, gave the impression that the government wished to ignore the necessity for 
collaboration in order to make decisions that constrained the activities of other actors in 
the process of consolidating peace in the DRC. 
 
Thus, the UNSC requested, through the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1925, para. 7), the 
strengthening of exchanges and partnerships between the DRC government and the 
UN mission in the DRC. It therefore decided to pay constant attention to the 
strengthening of the Mission in terms of changes that were made by the UNSG and the 
DRC government. Assessments were sent to the UNSG in terms of progress towards 
achieving the objectives of MONUSCO. The UNSG was obliged to report regularly on 
these assessments to the UNSC, in order to enable the UNSC to make informed 
decisions and seize opportunities for reconfiguration.  
 
Within the framework of the cooperation between the UN and the DRC government, the 
UNSC had paid tribute to the improvement of relations between the DRC and 
neighbouring countries, namely Uganda and Rwanda. In addition, the UNSC (UNSC 
Resolution S/RES/1925, para. 8) called upon all countries, particularly those of the 
Great Lakes region, to unite in their efforts to build sustainable peace in eastern DRC. It 
was interesting to note that this UNSC Resolution was innovative in naming those 
countries which played a crucial role in the deterioration of Kivu peace and giving 
MONUSCO a different mandate will be discussed in the following section.  
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4.10 MANDATE OF MONUSCO 
 
MONUSCO's mandate included the protection of the civilian population, as well as the 
stabilisation and consolidation of peace. This led the researcher to conduct an analysis 
on different concepts that laid the foundations and represented the innovations of the 
UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1925) of 28 May 2010. The following analysis is based on the 
understanding of those concepts of protecting civilians, stabilisation and consolidation of 
peace, which will determine the effectiveness of the UN action in the DRC. 
 
4.10.1 Protection of civilians 
 
The protection of the civilian population constituted a range of different activities that 
contributed to making people feel safe in their homes or in the camps where they were 
living as refugees. In addition, this involved destroying the armed groups and working to 
ensure that perpetrators of crimes committed against civilians were brought to justice. 
Indeed, the protection of civilians had to be effective. It also included the protection of 
humanitarian personnel and those responsible for defending human rights, especially 
when civilians were under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular violence 
committed by any of the parties to the conflict. The protection of civilians entailed the 
protection of personnel, facilities, installations and equipment of the UNSC Resolution 
(S/RES/1925, para. 12, point a) and b)). Amnesty International’s priority was the 
protection of civilian populations, access to humanitarian aid and opening up of 
humanitarian corridors throughout the province or conflict zone.132 Support for actions 
that would lead the DRC government to protect civilians against violations of 
international humanitarian law and human rights133 were included in the mission 
assigned to MONUSCO (UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1925, para. 12, c)). 
 
                                                 
132
 Amnesty International sent a letter to this effect to the UNSC on December 16, 2008, with special reference to 
the issue of the embargo contained in the agenda, as well as the extension of the mandate of MONUC. Amnesty 
International also asked members of the UNSC to put pressure on the governments of the DRC and Rwanda to not 
provide support to armed groups, particularly the CNDP and FDLR. 
133
 This protection included protection against all forms of sexual and gender violence, including the implementation 
of its policy of "zero tolerance" regarding breaches of discipline by members of the security forces, especially 
soldiers who had been newly integrated. 
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The imposition of peace included the application, with the authorisation of the UNSC, of 
coercive measures, including the use of military force to maintain or restore peace in 
situations where the existence of a threat to peace, breach of peace or act of 
aggression had been identified.134 With an on-going armed conflict in the Kivus, 
MONUC had entered a phase of peace enforcement, in which its tasks were to assist 
the government to dismantle the FDLR, protect vulnerable communities against 
violence committed by the rebels, and establish the authority of the State and the rule of 
law.135 
 
However, the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1291, para. 7) decided to give MONUC the 
right to take the ‘necessary measures’ in the areas of deployment of its infantry 
battalions and, as it deemed to be within the limits of its capabilities, to protect 
personnel, facilities and equipment of the UN, as well as those of the Joint Military 
Commission, which shared the same premises. It also had to ensure the security and 
freedom of its staff, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. 
MONUC had been authorised to use force, except in self-defence, in order to defend 
the civilian population (UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1856, para. 3) of 22 December 2008). 
MONUC’s mandate was strengthened by UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1493, para. 16, 17, 
22 and 25) of 14 July 2003, which authorised MONUC to assist in the DDRRR of foreign 
armed groups situated on DRC territory, especially Interahamwe. Indeed, the DDR had 
been present in the MONUC mandate since 2003. 
 
According to UNSC Resolutions (S/RES/1856, para. 3, f) and (S/RSE/1906, para.5, b); 
para.19 and 28), UNSC was fully available to provide support, as long as such 
operations were planned together, and were conducted by FARDC battalions who were 
trained by MONUC. It was in this context that the military operations by the FARDC in 
                                                 
134
 This mandate authorised MONUSCO to use all necessary means, within its capabilities and areas of deployment 
of its units, to deter any attempt to use force to threaten the political process and to ensure the protection of 
civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. 
135
 These measures applied equally to the consolidation of peace.  
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the eastern part of the DRC, with the support of MONUC,136 continued to rob foreign 
and Congolese armed groups of their fiefs and allowed the government to extend its 
control in areas which were previously inaccessible. 
 
With regard to the judicial system of the DRC, MONUSCO, under the UNSC Resolution 
(S/RES/1925, para. 12, d)) was given the mission to support efforts at national and 
international levels, in order to ensure that perpetrators of violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights were brought to justice. With regard to children, 
MONUSCO (S/RES/1925, para. 12, e)) had to work closely with the government to 
ensure the implementation of its commitment to prevent abuse against children, and to 
finalise the Action Plan for those children who had been demobilised from FARDC, as 
well as to ensure that there were no new recruitments, with the support of the 
Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism. Women occupied an important place in the 
mandate of MONUSCO, which, under the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1925, para. f)), had 
to implement the strategy of the UN system for the protection of civilians in the DRC. 
 
According to the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1925, para. 12, g)), MONUSCO had to 
support the efforts of the government, together with international partners and 
neighbouring countries, in order to create conditions that would allow displaced persons 
and refugees to return home freely, safely and with dignity, or to be voluntarily 
reintegrated or resettled. 
 
4.10.2 Stabilisation and consolidation of peace 
 
The process of stabilisation and consolidation of peace in the DRC covered the security 
and judicial sectors. These areas required a profound reform, for which the role of the 
DRC government was a necessary, but insufficient requirement. The UNSC 
recommended to MONUC that it should support, in close cooperation with international 
partners, the efforts of the DRC authorities to strengthen and reform security institutions 
                                                 
136
 For example, after the launch of the Uganda-DRC joint offensive against the army of the Lord's Resistance Army 
(LRA) in December 2008, the security of the Eastern Province had deteriorated significantly. According to 
MONUC military reports, 82 joint military operations were conducted against the LRA. 
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and the judiciary. A proposition supported by institutional liberalism that this study 
advances. The assistance provided by MONUC had to include the FARDC reform in 
order to strengthen the capacity of the military, including military justice and the military 
police. It also involved the harmonisation of activities, as well as the exchange of 
information and experiences (UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1925, para. 12, k)). 
 
The stabilisation and consolidation of peace included measures targeted to reduce the 
risk of a resumption of conflict137 and to lay the foundations for sustainable 
development, including through the strengthening of national capacities for conflict 
management at all levels (UNPKO, 2008: 19). This is also supported by the theory of 
institutional liberalism that is endorsed by this study. Activities related to the 
consolidation of peace were the structural causes of armed conflict through a 
comprehensive approach. With regard to the consolidation of peace in the DRC, the 
UNSG stated the following:  
Consists, in a country coming out of a conflict, to restore the authority of the 
state, to pre-launch the dialogue between government and civil society, to 
enable it to regenerate and to establish the foundations of institutional economic 
and social development (UNSG report (S/2010/164, para.  75-78). 
 
To consolidate the achievements of peace, the UNSC requested MONUSCO to support 
the efforts of the Congolese authorities to strengthen and reform security institutions 
and the judiciary (MONUSCO, 2010:7). Curiously, the situation in the DRC already had 
its own challenges, which had resulted in the UNSC reconfiguring the mandate of 
MONUC. This current mandate consisted of providing support to the government in 
some areas, particularly within the framework of the Stabilisation and Reconstruction 
Plan prepared by the government (STAREC) and the International Strategy to Support 
Security and Stability (ISSSS). In other words, institutional liberalism was affirmed by 
this move, as it was sought to instil values of closer cooperation, toleration, dialogue 
and therefore peace for all involved.  
                                                 
137
 Officially, the armed conflict ended in 2003 with the signing of the Global and All Inclusive Agreement by the 
Congolese parties, and this agreement paved the way for the transition that would lead to elections in 2006. 
Therefore, theoretically speaking, operations began in 2003, although in reality, some actions related to the 
consolidation of peace took place well before the end of the conflict. 
132 
 
 
 
MONUC had kept in touch with all parts of the Transitional Government, and had played 
the role of facilitator for the three joint commissions. By this, one can observe the 
institutional liberal values at play in the progression of the resolution of the DRC conflict. 
Through the assistance of MONUC, the political and administrative unification of the 
country had already been achieved and a sense of national security began to be 
restored. This is a perfect example of the corollary of institutional liberalism.  
 
The UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1925) focused on the strengthening of the authority of 
the State. The UNSC identified this as one of the key indicators to determine the 
beginning of the withdrawal of the mission. These indicators included, at least, the 
deployment of an effective police force and civil administration in areas from which 
armed groups had withdrawn, in order to avoid a security vacuum that could lead to 
institutional instability and volatility. The implementation of the national security forces 
and sustainable business, and the establishment of effective legal institutions were 
necessary steps towards the restoration of a sufficient level of security and the rule of 
law. 
 
With regard to the reform of the security sector and other activities in the field of the rule 
of law, the MONUC mandate included the obligation to provide basic training in the 
short term to members and units of the integrated FARD brigades deployed to the east 
of the country, in order to continue to develop the capacity of the Congolese National 
Police and related agencies for enforcement in accordance with the standards and 
criteria of internationally recognised human rights. This can be interpreted as an 
affirmation of the institutional liberal theory that informs this study. As such, the MONUC 
mandate also included the use of force and criminal justice, advising the government on 
how to strengthen the capacity of the judicial and penal systems, and contributing to the 
efforts of the international community to assist the DRC government in the initial 
planning process for the reform of the security sector. It can be argued that meaningful 
reform can be brought about through constructive and sincere dialogue, a value 
endorsed by institutional liberalism.  
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In short, MONUC, in cooperation with other international partners, participated in 
strengthening the rule of law in the DRC by providing direct support to the reform of the 
judiciary and various legislative reforms. In terms of electoral assistance and the 
security of the electoral process, the MONUC mission was informed by two UNSC 
Resolutions (S/RES/1496) and (S/RES/1565). This task was carried out by the Electoral 
Division of MONUC, which was mandated to provide assistance to the Independent 
Electoral Commission. 
 
4.11 CONCLUSION 
 
Significant progress has been achieved in the DRC over the past decade. Landmark 
achievements include the end of the civil war, successful transition, which restored the 
territorial integrity of the country, the successful holding of democratic national elections 
in 2006, the on-going infrastructure development programme and improved relations 
between the country and its eastern neighbours. 
 
The MONUC mandate to protect the civilian population achieved mixed results. Whilst 
there were significant successes, it was marked by the suffering and physical violence 
experienced by the civilian population, especially in the eastern DRC. Thus, the 
MONUC mandate to protect civilians was not very successful with regard to violations of 
human rights, physical violence, sexual violence and abuse of women and children by 
armed groups, opportunistic criminal elements and foreign nationals. With regard to the 
reform of the security sector, the MONUC mandate also achieved mixed results. 
However, with regard to the consolidation of peace, the MONUC mandate achieved 
great success. 
 
Thus, an evaluation of the MONUC mandate in relation to the protection of civilians, 
consolidation of peace and reform of the security sector shows that it had contributed 
greatly in terms of stabilising the dramatic and disastrous human situation in the DRC. 
MONUSCO is likely to achieve the same mixed results as MONUC, due to the impact of 
political factors surrounding the UNSC’s decisions. 
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MONUC did not have the means ‘to provide broader protection’ to civilians in general. If 
MONUC was to take the steps necessary to enable it to protect civilians under imminent 
threat of physical violence more effectively, it would have been necessary for the UNSC 
to consider adjusting the strength of MONUC, with a view to reconfiguring and re-
equipping contingents considerably, in order to enable them to intervene more actively. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter summarises the role of MONUC and presents findings, recommendations, 
and conclusions. It also suggests how best to achieve peace and security, and places 
emphasis on the protection of civilians according to the MONUC mandate. The chapter 
focuses on: 
1. Providing an outcome of findings in the DRC war since 1998 to 2010;  
2. Sketching the complexity of the DRC Conflict and the multiplicity of actors;  
3. Outlining the reluctance of members of the UN to send troops to the DRC;  
4. Referring to the problems encountered when collecting information as a result of 
the language system;  
5. Making an assessment and criticism of the UN mission in the DRC.  
 
The outline will be followed by the recommendations regarding the UN mission in the 
DRC; necessary conditions for a corrective approach to the MONUC mandate; 
requalification of the conflict; identification and condemnation of aggressors, and 
regional approach.  
 
5.2 FINDINGS 
 
The DRC was torn apart by the “African World War” between August 1998 and July 
2003, after the Rwandese and Ugandans invaded the country in support of the rebel 
group RCD and MLC. These Rwandan and Ugandan armies wanted to occupy 
Kinshasa. The conflict was subsequently internationalised through the intervention of 
Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan and Zimbabwe at the request of Kinshasa. After the 
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed on 10 July 1999, fighting with heavy weapons 
once again took place in order to oppose the Rwandan and Ugandan armies in 
Kisangani in May 2000. However, most of the belligerent countries eventually withdrew 
from the DRC. In 2003, although they had officially withdrawn, Rwandan troops still 
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backed rebel groups in the North and South Kivus until 2011. In November 1999, the 
UNSC voted to send a UN observer mission to the DRC.  
 
There were major obstacles facing the MONUC in carrying out its mandate. Firstly, the 
conflict was very complex and multifaceted. Secondly, the MONUC’s mandate was too 
broad in a large country with relatively modest means. Thirdly, the UN member 
countries did not express enthusiasm to send troops to the DRC. Fourthly, System 
Information Mission (SIM) collection was severely handicapped by language problems. 
And fifthly, the actors in the crisis required a lot of MONUC support but were reluctant to 
collaborate openly with it. These factors affected the involvement of MONUC in the 
problematique of peace and security in the DRC.  
 
5.2.1 Complexity of the DRC Conflict and the multiplicity of actors 
 
The DRC has been characterised for more than twenty years by political instability, and 
has since 1996 experienced two major wars. The first war led to the fall of the Mobutu 
regime in May 1997, and the takeover by the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Congo-Zaire under the leadership of Laurent Desiré Kabila. The second 
case was from August 1998 in which, the DRC government was engaged in a conflict 
with armed rebels of the RCD-Goma supported by Rwanda and the MLC supported by 
Uganda (Reyntjeans, 2009: 2-8). The security and territorial integrity of the DRC was 
threatened by this war, which forced the UN to intervene in order to maintain peace and 
security under Chapter VII of its Charter.  
 
The causes and origins of the DRC conflict were numerous, including the following: 
 Ethnic and communal rivalries, which arose during the colonial period, and have 
been highlighted since the declaration of independence; 
 The matter of poor governance spanning 32 years of repressive policies and 
mismanagement of the Mobutu regime, which led to on-going frustration and 
resentment within the Congolese community; 
137 
 
 
 
 The Rwanda Genocide in 1994 which led to a multitude of Rwandan people in 
eastern  DRC;   
 The influence of conflicts between the DRC and its neighbouring countries 
Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda on the natural resources; 
 
All these events resulted in the conflict of 1998, during which many Congolese and 
foreign rebels supported the motives and interests of stakeholders (Reyntjeans, 2009: 
24). The armed conflict consisted of three dimensions: an international dimension, with 
fighting between the armies of foreign countries; a national dimension engaging the 
rebels against FARDC; and a local dimension, which involved fighting among ethnic 
groups. 
 
At the time of the signing of the ceasefire in Lusaka, at least six countries and 10 foreign 
and Congolese armed groups were directly involved in the conflict. The UNSC 
Resolution on this conflict did not require an approach and complex strategy, nor could 
regional organisations or the UN clearly define the above dimensions of the DRC 
conflict at the time of the creation of MONUC. In any event, it appeared, soon after the 
first signs of MONUC’s immobility, that such a strategy could be satisfied only through 
the military action of a peacekeeping force or even the imposition of peace.  
 
5.2.2 Reluctance of members of the UN to send troops to the DRC 
 
ONUC, which was established in July 1960 to prevent civil war and ensure the territorial 
integrity and political independence of Congo, was able to mobilise, a year after its 
creation, 19,800 soldiers.138 In comparison, in November 2000, one year after its 
creation, MONUC, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, had failed to mobilise 
the number of soldiers requested. Only 224 unarmed military observers out of the 500 
were provided, and from November 30, 1999 until May 2001, there were no armed 
military personnel out of the 5037 that were provided. The first armed MONUC troops 
arrived in June 2001 and it took until mid-2003 to achieve the quota of 5,000 soldiers.  
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At the beginning of 2000, the UN was involved in more than 15 peacekeeping missions 
throughout the world.139 In light of this, one can see that the ability of member States to 
provide troops to peacekeeping countries was unable to address the growing demand. 
However, the complexity of the DRC crisis in 1998, as described above, and the 
ambiguity of the political and military strategy implemented to control it, raised fears in 
many countries providing troops that their soldiers would be placed on the frontline of 
the conflict.  
 
The MONUC was still facing the same difficulty of finding a country that could make a 
contingent available. The powerlessness of MONUC also came from this difficulty. 
Countries that sent their troops were those in Asia and Africa, where the real problems 
of coordination, strategy and understanding weakened the actions of MONUC in the 
field. In order to resolve the problem of MONUC’s weakness, only African countries 
contributed troops to the DRC conflict, as these countries, by virtue of being African 
possessed a better understanding of the problems experienced by countries on the 
continent. 
 
5.2.3 Problems encountered when collecting information as a result of the 
language system 
 
The quality of information is a fundamental element for the success of any military 
operation in general and peacekeeping operations in particular. Monitoring of the 
ceasefire, respect for the embargo, especially the ability to detect conflicts that have not 
yet been properly identified and that can escalate into armed conflict, in order to take 
preventive measures, were based on collecting reliable information. MONUC used 
observer military teams (Milobs) as the primary instrument for collecting information and 
intelligence. These teams relied primarily on visual observation and verbal information 
gathered from local populations. 
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 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/military.shtml, [accessed on 28 October 2013]. 
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The weakness of this system greatly reduced the anticipatory capacity of MONUC, and 
was largely due to a linguistic handicap at the internal and external level. 
 
At the internal level, the Milobs were composed of UN military personnel, of different 
nationalities, in response to the condition of the UN Charter on the mixing of cultures 
within the UN. However, this did not promote the internal communication necessary for 
the cohesion and effectiveness of the information system because of the different 
nationalities and languages. English was supposed to be the common language, but 
was in reality far from being mastered by all within the MONUC. 
 
Externally, English was chosen as the working language of Milobs. Therefore, it was 
assumed that the majority of the members were English speaking. However, French is 
DRC’s official language, and the Milobs thus had a limited ability to communicate with 
the local population. This lack of an effective communication strategy caused much 
concern among the civilian population, who believed that the Milobs were the solution to 
the attacks and threats by armed groups. In similar vein it was for example recognised 
that in addition to the powerful weapons used by Operation Artemis, French troops had 
a major advantage over the quota of Bangladesh. French troops were able to 
communicate directly with local populations in French without having to go through 
interpreters in the area of Bunia.  
 
5.2.4 Assessment and criticism 
 
The members of the peacekeeping mission were faced with difficulties on an 
unprecedented scale and complexity, which carried considerable risks. Their role was to 
support the political dialogue between the parties, assist governments to extend State 
authority, strengthen the protection of human rights and the rule of law. It also was to 
provide advice on the reform of the security sector, support the DDR, and protect 
civilians. In all the UNSC Resolutions, the UN peacekeeping missions were expected to 
work within the means at their disposal. However, MONUC had difficulty in exercising its 
mandate in its entirety. 
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5.2.4.1 Evaluation of the MONUC’s mandate 
 
The MONUC mandate was marked by the reactive rather than preventive management 
of the crisis. The policy of the international community was to react to catastrophic 
situations, instead of anticipating them. MONUC had adequate military resource abilities 
to protect civilians. The implementation of these methods through offensive action 
against recalcitrant armed groups was combined with diplomatic pressure by CIAT and 
regional and sub-regional organisations. This combination of efforts led to the crisis 
decreasing steadily in intensity from the beginning of 2005, and this resulted in the 
fragile peace that delayed the completion of the electoral process in late 2006. 
 
Over the ten year period of MONUC’s mandate, it achieved mixed results, especially 
during the first seven years between 1999 and 2006. During this period, it was true that 
the flashover experienced by the DRC from August 1998 to mid-2006 had decreased in 
intensity. However, many local conflicts continued to take place, claiming the lives of 
many civilians. The humanitarian and human rights situation was continually 
deteriorating.  From 2005 to 2009, the results of peacekeeping operations had improved 
significantly because of a favourable political and security situation because the 
elections had been achieved. The problem of measuring the results of MONUC, 
according to Bernath and Edgerton (2003: 9-10), is the fact that the definitions of the 
“successes” and “failures” of the UN Mission depend on who you are… and, where you 
are located. However, in the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1291) of 24 February 2000, the 
UNSC decided, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, that MONUC could take the 
necessary measures in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions.  
 
It was nevertheless, evident that MONUC’s primary responsibility and mandate was to 
protect those who were under imminent threat of physical violence, and especially in the 
eastern parts of the DRC, where MONUC was consequently deployed. To simplify 
matters and avoid getting bogged down in endless controversy, this assessment 
considered the fact that MONUC was involved as a major player in the peace process in 
the DRC. As such, MONUC was at least co-responsible for the successes and failures 
141 
 
 
 
of this process. Thus, in all UNSC resolutions, the MONUC’s mandate was clearly that 
of achieving peace in the DRC, but the achievement of this mandate was inadequate in 
relation to the realities of the DRC conflict. 
 
The powerlessness of MONUC’s mandate was already seen in the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement, when in its Chapter 8, it announced the creation of a UN peacekeeping 
force in collaboration with the then OAU. The MONUC mandate was concerned with 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and not the protection of the civilian population 
under physical imminent threat or to put an end to this aggression. However, in spite of 
its “Chapter VII” mandate, which allowed the utilisation of force, MONUC remained 
powerless against belligerents who signed agreements to which they did not comply, as 
well as many armed groups. However, it should be noted that the inability of MONUC 
did not mean total failure, as it also achieved some degree of success. 
 
5.2.4.2 Inadequate UN mandate and difficulty in implementing it 
 
MONUC was initially assigned traditional peacekeeping functions such as supervising 
the ceasefire, in a situation which was more evidence of an aggression. The following 
was stated in this regard: the “MONUC, led by UNSG Special Representative 
(S/RES/1279, para. 1 and 5) of 30 November 1999), in accordance with the UNSC 
Resolutions (S/RES/1258) and (S/RES/1273) of 6 August 1999 and 5 November 1999, 
establishes an alliance with the Joint Military Commission and provides technical 
assistance in the exercise of its functions under the ceasefire, including the investigation 
of violations of the ceasefire”. However, the UN had been involved as guarantor of the 
agreements, alongside the OAU and SADC, in the Lusaka negotiations.  
 
Therefore, to limit MONUC’s mandate to the supervision and monitoring of the ceasefire 
by unarmed observers was inadequate. This conflict met all the criteria of a second 
generation peacekeeping mission. It should have then been given a proper mandate. 
However, it had to wait for the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1291) of 24 February 2000, in 
order for the mandate of MONUC to be extended by providing a strong contingent of 
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5,537 military personnel and 500 observers. Thus, through the UNSC Resolutions 
(S/RES/1355) and (S/RES1376) of 15 June 2001 and 9 November 2001, MONUC’s 
mandate extended DDRRR to volunteer soldiers. Despite the expansion of its mandate, 
MONUC always struggled to work effectively because of the deterioration of the 
situation in the field. The UN, however, could use force to restore peace, and chose to 
entrust the European Artemis force with the mandate to deal militarily with belligerents 
in the Bunia area, in order to restore calm. The success of the Artemis operation 
allowed the UN to realise that the use of force to protect civilians was both necessary 
and possible. 
 
The UNSC as a result, amplified the powers of MONUC through the UNSC Resolution 
(S/RES/1493) of 28 July  2003, authorising MONUC, pursuant to Chapter VII, to “use all 
necessary means to fulfil its mandate in the district of Ituri and, to the extent it deems 
within its capabilities, in North and South Kivu”. The UNSC increased the MONUC’s 
powerbase to 23,900 men, but this did not improve MONUC’s capacity. However, in the 
field, massive violations of human rights, and massacres of civilians, had multiplied, 
particularly in Ituri, and new armed groups, who were not signatories to the Lusaka 
Agreement, began to emerge.  
 
The evolution of MONUC’s mandate reinforced the firm and offensive approach adopted 
in October 2004. The UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1592, para. 7) of 30 March 2005 
stressed that MONUC was authorised to “use all necessary means”, within its 
capabilities and areas of deployment of its units. In this regard, the UNSC transformed 
the UN peacekeeping mandate into an UN enforcement mandate in order to discourage 
any attempt to use force to threaten the political process on the part of any armed 
group. These armed groups were either foreign or Congolese, in particular the ex-FAR 
and Interahamwe. It also stressed that MONUC could “use tactics of encirclement and 
research to prevent attacks against civilians and disrupt the military capability of illegal 
armed groups that continue to use violence” in the eastern parts of the DRC. 
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The concept of operations and the rules of engagement were carefully reviewed by the 
UNDPKO and MONUC, and were revised to meet the requirements of the robust 
mandate of MONUC, as outlined in the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1856) of 22 
December 2008. The revised concept of operations provided the military component of 
MONUC with clear strategic objectives and outcomes. While highlighting the priority of 
protecting civilians, the concept of operations made it clear that the main area of focus 
was in the eastern DRC. As in 2006 and 2007, the second half of 2008 saw renewed 
fighting in the DRC between FARDC and the Mai-Mai, FDLR and the CNDP. The only 
difference was that in 2008, the CNDP, under Laurent Nkunda, not only defeated the 
FARDC, but had the understanding that it could, when it saw fit, and despite UN 
peacekeepers and the mandate of Chapter VII, seize Goma, the capital of North Kivu. 
 
In conclusion, the UNSC gave MONUC an inadequate mandate, under “Chapter VII” of 
the UN Charter, which made the work of MONUC less effective. It should however be 
emphasised that the mandate of MONUC was a long process. The UNSC tried several 
times to add a new function to MONUC or increase its workforce. The terms should 
have been more responsive and clear from the beginning of the UN intervention. 
Furthermore, the hybrid nature of the MONUC’s peacekeeping mandate combined both 
traditional and modern peacekeeping missions, and this made it more difficult to 
achieve success in fulfilling the mandate, since the people responsible for applying the 
mandate did not know what to do. Nevertheless, the report of former UNSG Boutros 
Boutros Ghali (1992: 822-823), in “An Agenda for Peace”, expressed the hope that the 
UN peacekeeping mandate was “clear and achievable”. This recommendation was not 
complied with in the DRC for at least 10 years after the UN peacekeeping mandate, as 
it continued to be vague and difficult to implement, leading the UN mission to achieve 
mixed success. 
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5.2.4.3 Mixed results of MONUC’s mandate 
 
The results of the MONUC mandate in the DRC conflict were quite mixed, ranging from 
extreme success to failure. As part of its mandate, MONUC was supposed to effectively 
protect civilians plagued by physical violence and secure areas of instability. However, 
in some cases, MONUC remained powerless, as confirmed by the Reuters news 
agency of 10 December 2012, which stated that “no piece of land in eastern DRC 
escapes insecurity”. Villages were besieged and their inhabitants burned alive. In the 
town of Nindja, 15 people were killed with machetes, and 171 women were raped. 
According to Human Rights Watch, sexual violence140 against girls and women was 
common. In Walungu, the UN identified “177 executions and 320 rapes”. Faced with the 
ubiquity of uncertainty, marked by unprecedented violence, there was reason to wonder 
where MONUC was, or rather “Miss Monique”141, as it was called in the DRC, because 
of its slow response in rescuing civilians. 
 
In addition to the failure to protect civilians, MONUC was also not able to disarm armed 
groups, as recommended by the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. The FDLR, who 
constituted the greatest threat to peace, was not completely disarmed and continued to 
plague eastern DRC. The Comprehensive Review found, among other things, that 
peacekeepers had enticed desperate women and children to engage in sexual acts for 
a pittance of money or a small piece of food, sometimes giving them money or food 
after raping them in order to make the intercourse appear consensual, and that these 
crimes were widespread and on-going (UNGA Resolution (A/59/710, para. 8) of 24 
March 2005). In retaliation for Bangladeshis killing nine peacekeeping soldiers in Ituri, 
50 FNI militiamen were killed, as well as innocent children and women who they were 
supposed to protect. 
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 UN News Center, 2005. Peacekeeper's sexual abuse of local girls continuing in DRC, UN finds. 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=12990&Cr=democratic&Cr1=congo, [accessed on 12 January 
2012]. 
141
 Monique was the nickname that the Congolese gave to MONUC because of its weakness to protect civilian 
population. 
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5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.3.1 Necessary conditions 
 
The crisis in the Great Lakes region has involved a multitude of local, national, regional 
and international actors with various motivations and interests. The armed conflict had 
the following three dimensions: 
 The regional and international dimensions, which involved fighting between the 
official armies of seven foreign countries, including those of the African Great 
Lakes, Central Africa, Southern Africa and the international community (UN, AU 
and EU). This dimension seemed to be out-dated since the cease-fire in Lusaka. 
 The national dimension, in which rebel forces were engaged in fighting against 
government forces. This dimension was relevant and continues to benefit several 
people and foreign companies. The rebellions never ended, despite the presence 
of MONUC over 10 years later. Eastern DRC has become the battlefield of 
rebellion because of the natural mineral resources. 
 The local dimension, which involved fighting between ethnic groups, Mai-Mai 
militias and rebels fighting against government forces. This dimension of the 
conflict was a time-bomb that the UNSC had neglected in the drawing up of the 
MONUC mandate. This dimension has caused much suffering to the civilian 
population. The aggressors used this strategy to divert the attention of the 
UNSC, with the influence of multinational companies. 
 
The corrective approach of the MONUC mandate should have taken into account the 
three dimensions of the conflict and do a more in-depth analysis of these actors, by 
clearly identifying them in a UN resolution and in each level of responsibility and 
importance in this conflict. In truth, the conflict in the Great Lakes region was the result 
of the proliferation of armed groups, and their persistence does not appear to be by 
chance or circumstance. The various interests of Western countries, African industries 
and multinational corporations are hidden behind the persistence of armed groups in the 
region. 
146 
 
 
 
5.3.2 Requalification of the conflict 
 
The requalification of the DRC conflict, the identification and punishment of aggressors, 
and revision of the MONUC mandate under Chapter VII of UN Charter would be the 
strong answer to protect the civilian population. To achieve this, MONUC should have 
adopted a corrective approach that took into account all of the above elements, which 
the UNSC neglected during the elaboration of the mandate of MONUC. This could 
potentially have had a direct impact on conflict resolution. 
 
The DRC conflict was an aggression or regional aggression led by Rwanda and Uganda 
against the DRC sovereignty because of an uninvited presence in the country. It can 
also be asserted that requalification was based on the following observations and 
indicators: 
 The war in the DRC was not intended for the seizure of power (which has served 
as an accompanying effect) let alone securing the borders of neighbouring 
countries. Instead, it lent itself to a war for the reconstruction of political space and 
predation in favour of the triple alliance between Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi; 
 Testimonies were given by people in the occupied territories and, through various 
national and international media, by all Congolese who had disassociated 
themselves from the RCD and MLC said that this war was not an “armed 
rebellion supported by Rwanda and Uganda”. But an occupation war of the DRC 
by Rwanda and Uganda (UN Special Reporter Garret (E/CN.4/1999/31, para. 
14).142  
 Three cases of heavy fighting between the Rwandan and Ugandan government 
army in Kisangani (May, August 1999 and June 2000) in Congolese territory 
showed a hegemonic border struggle between Rwanda and Uganda. The UNSC 
should immediately have reclassified the DRC conflict, adopting a clear UNSC 
Resolution that could state clearly that the conflict in the DRC was an aggression 
                                                 
142
 The UN Special Reporter Garret spoke about the internal armed conflict with the participation of foreign forces. 
Given the influences within the UNSC, the report of Special Reporter Garret was changed with regard to certain 
issues, which clearly demonstrated that the DRC was assaulted, as claimed loud and clear by its authorities. 
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of its neighbouring countries. Hence, the MONUC mandate would also be 
affected by this UNSC Resolution. 
 
Therefore, under the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/3314) of 14 December 1994, at the 
UNGA, it was stated that the DRC was a victim of foreign aggression.143 This was the 
evidence to call upon the UN to reconsider its attitude on the situation in the country 
because the UNSC Resolution was made to be applied. In addition, this requalification 
should, under the theory of a contrary act, have entailed ipso facto the revision of the 
MONUC mandate, in order to focus on the problematique of peace and security in the 
DRC. MONUC should have given priority to achieving its mission of maintaining peace 
and security in the Great Lakes region. The requalification of the DRC conflict would be 
important in the sense that it took into account all stakeholders and correctly interpreted 
the conflict. It should have allowed MONUC to be more active from the beginning of the 
deployment of the units in the field of peacekeeping operations. 
 
5.3.3 Identification and condemnation of aggressors 
 
Requalification of the conflict should potentially have resulted in fairness, safeguarding 
of peace and security in the Great Lakes region, and the banning of the aggressor 
States, Uganda and Rwanda, by the international community. Defining the role of the 
UN in the 21st century, UNSG Kofi Annan (Annan, 2000:12), reminded the people of the 
UN that “the provisions of the Charter are based on the assumption that external 
aggression, in which one state attacks another, constitutes the most serious threat to 
relations between States.” The UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1304) of 16 June 2000 
recognised that “Uganda and Rwanda have violated the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the DRC.” Although both aggressor States were specifically named, there 
should have been a formal condemnation by the UNSC by responding to international 
justice.  
                                                 
143
 According to the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/3314) of 14 December 1994, “Aggression is the use of armed force 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State by another State”. On 14 
December 1974, the UN General Assembly adopted, by consensus, UNSC Resolution (S/RES/3314), 
incorporating the definition of aggression which had been adopted by the fourth special committee. 
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Meanwhile, the UNSC should have, in accordance with the Convention of 9 December 
1948, in order to correct its mistakes, announced the establishment of an international 
commission of inquiry into war crimes and crimes against humanity, including genocide, 
which had been declared in the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1304, para. 13 and 14), and 
against the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other wealth of the DRC by the 
aggressors (S/PRST/2000/20). The UNSC requested, on 6 June 2000, the UNSG to 
appoint, for a period of six months, a group of experts to examine the issue. With 
regards to the massacres of Rwanda; to paraphrase Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the 
humanitarian situation in the DRC was the shame of the UN. 
 
Given the involvement of multinational companies and their influence on the UNSC, as 
well as the influence of powerful permanent members of the UNSC, there would always 
be an obstruction somewhere to recognise the involvement of their businesses. Despite 
the various reports of UN experts that have been quoted above, as well as reports of 
NGOs such as HRW, Amnesty International, Global Witness among others, and those 
of the Congolese government which clearly identified the aggressors but the UNSC 
remained silent. The powerful permanent members, such as the US and its allies, would 
have done anything to delay or prevent the passing of a UNSC Resolution clearly 
condemning the aggressors and multinational companies that were involved in the DRC 
conflict. The identification and condemnation of aggressors would have allowed 
MONUC to have a clearer and more precise mandate for its mission of peacekeeping 
and security in the DRC, because the problems had already been identified. 
 
5.3.4 Regional approach 
 
There was therefore no progress or positive development that would justify a more 
optimistic view. Recent events, as well as the development of relations between the 
countries of the region, have shown some progress. The restoration of normal 
diplomatic relations through mutual accreditation of ambassadors was an important first 
step in this regard. This approach was extended to the regional level through the 
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effective re-establishment of the Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries 
(CEPGL). 
 
A positive outcome is that the countries of the Great Lakes region agreed to 
permanently open their borders from 1 September 2009. In this regard, if armed 
violence remains a problem in the eastern DRC, it was more as a result of interventions 
by neighbouring States. The prospect of more open borders, however, may not facilitate 
the state control of natural resource exports. These developments demonstrate that 
only a regional approach will ensure real progress in terms of peace and reconstruction. 
 
Peacekeeping missions have traditionally had a diverse makeup, with costs and 
contributions in relation to personnel being divided between as many States as were 
willing to participate. The logistical and organisational problems arising as a result have 
been outlined above, and a leaner, less diversified force could perhaps accomplish, in 
less time and with less effort, what the current MONUC has taken years to achieve. 
 
On the other hand, the involvement of regional organisations such as the African Union 
(AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) do not necessarily bring greater stability to 
the region. Lacking resources, experience, training and impartiality (because of shared 
ethnic groups), these organisations – perhaps unlike their Western counterparts – do 
not yet have the capabilities necessary to engage in long-term, independent 
peacekeeping. The absence of common values among member States, reluctance 
amongst SADC States to surrender a measure of sovereignty, and the overall 
weakness of many of the member States were some of the fundamental problems. 
 
Added to this was the fact that the rebels and militias were not the only parties guilty of 
misconduct. For example, corrupt officials in Kinshasa siphoned off funds allocated to 
the military, leaving soldiers without pay. As a result, Autesserre (2007: 426-430) wrote 
“was that the soldiers' commanders, who did not have the resources to remunerate their 
troops adequately or provide them with basic supplies and to encourage them to make 
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a living from the local population”. The rural population could not always tell the 
difference between militias and Blue Helmet peacekeepers from their uniforms alone. In 
such an environment, peacekeeping soldiers of African descent dispatched to high-risk 
areas were often mistrusted and feared by the locals. This lack of trust in the armed 
forces, combined with the absence of law enforcement, undermined the very purposes 
of peacekeeping and peace-building. The DRC was a special case, and one to which 
the African Union, SADC and ECOWAS troops may no longer be the best suited. 
 
MONUC has made enough mistakes to highlight the Congolese position. However, it is 
difficult to imagine how the country would be without this UN force, which has acted as 
a deterrent against adventurous Congolese politicians from all walks of life, acting to 
safeguard the existence and survival of the country, and to ensure the smooth running 
of the electoral process. Unfortunately, MONUC, despite having experienced significant 
losses (more than 150 deaths in the ranks of MONUC), also gained a bad reputation 
because of the excesses of some of its men. It was mostly confined to a support role, 
and was often unable to carry out disarmament or neutralise rebel groups fighting 
against the Congolese army.  
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5.4 GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter provides a summation of the observations, arguments and the conclusions 
of the study. I addition, some propositions on the improvements that could have been 
done to the mandate of MONUC as a UN mission in the DRC are suggested. After 
several large political and humanitarian crises and rehearsals, wars have occurred in 
the DRC, starting on 2 August 1998, which continued at the time of this study. Massive 
violations of human rights, among which were the massacres of civilian populations by  
rebel groups in Ituri in 2003, the Bukavu crisis in 2004 and, recently, the actions of 
renegade Laurent Nkunda, which resulted in the displacement of hundreds of 
thousands of people.  During the course of 2008, MONUC underwent yet another major 
crisis in the Kivus, with Nkunda’s troops extending his influence in the province by force, 
threatening to take Goma, the capital of the North Kivu Province. The MONUC mandate 
was not to make war but was based on a peace agreement. This peace agreement was 
challenged in a violent way and it was up to the parties in the conflict to resolve this 
problem. In this logic when the war broke out, the UN's role ended. These words clearly 
reflect the absurdity of the UN mandates and their interpretation. The protection of 
civilians figured prominently in the UNSC Resolutions, but there was obviously not a 
declaration of war. How could they protect civilian victims of violence without confronting 
potential aggressors? This was the real question that peacekeepers should have been 
asking and trying to answer. Without pretending to exhaust the topic of this study, 
especially as it is a sensitive topic in the DRC, the researcher hopes that this study has 
been able to answer the selected questions and has reflected the efforts made towards 
its realisation.  
 
As mentioned above, MONUC was established on 6 August 1999, pursuant to UNSC 
Resolution (S/RES/1258), as an observer mission for monitoring the implementation of 
the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement between belligerent groups. Following the signing of 
the All-Inclusive Peace Accord in 2002, the nature of the mission changed and MONUC 
became a multidimensional peacekeeping operation with a robust mandate. For 
multinational missions such as MONUC and Operation Artemis, political and military 
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leaders need to provide conceptual clarity regarding how the operation should approach 
the problematique of peace and security in order to protect civilian populations. Ideally, 
this strategy should be consistently understood throughout the leadership of the mission 
by the troop contingents and within the UNSC. After struggling for years, MONUC had 
by 2005 a clearer concept of its mandate. The mission operated more in accordance 
with its “Chapter VII” mandate. Peacekeepers conducted cordon-and search operations 
and worked with local populations to identify barriers to peace. MONUC leadership 
began to use the goal of protection as an organising tool to integrate civilian and military 
roles. A new mission strategy attempted to address civilian vulnerability across the 
board, from human rights monitoring and reporting to the provision of humanitarian 
space and coercive physical protection. No single concept defined the mission’s civilian 
protection efforts - rather, the mission embraced multiple ideas and strategies. 
 
However, the biggest question that remains is whether or not sustainable peace and 
security, which are both important and complex, will be achieved before the final 
completion of the UN mission in the DRC? At the time of conducting this study, the 
transformation from MONUC to MONUSCO had not resolved the weaknesses of the UN 
mission in the DRC. The UN mission in the DRC was aimed at establishing sustainable 
peace, especially in the eastern DRC and, given some remarkable progress in the field 
of peacekeeping operations, it seemed necessary for the UN to review its mandate in 
accordance with the objectives of the stabilisation and reconstruction of the country. 
This affected the time-frame of its mission in the DRC. 
 
The assessment of MONUC’s performance is a delicate task, as one can expect views 
to differ in this regard, depending on people’s situations and positions. As far as 
ordinary Congolese were concerned, MONUC failed, especially with regard to its 
protection mandate. The mission was unable to protect them against violence 
perpetrated by FARDC rogue elements and Mai-Mai militias, or to put an end to foreign 
armed groups such as the FDLR and the LRA. For the UN and optimistic observers, 
MONUC represents a success story, proof of the international community’s readiness to 
make an immeasurable amount of resources available, as well as its commitment to 
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state-building in fragile societies and the preservation of international peace and 
security. 
 
Taking the predicaments of the DRC prior to the deployment of the UN mission into 
account, there was no doubt that MONUC achieved much, including preserving the 
independence and territorial integrity of the DRC. This was achieved especially when 
considering that this was achieved despite inadequate resources and a lack of genuine 
commitment on the part of the presumed beneficiaries of the process, namely the 
national and regional parties involved in the crisis. On the other hand, given the tasks at 
hand and the scope of its mandate, MONUC could have achieved more. 
 
The most important barrier to MONUC’s greater success was that the politically 
designed mandate was not aligned with the operational situation in the DRC. DPKO 
measured the success of MONUC in terms of the warring parties’ adherence to the 
ceasefire agreement, which at the time of this study had become irrelevant. Although at 
the time of this study there was no fighting along the original ceasefire line, there was 
fighting throughout the eastern part of the country among groups that were not part of 
the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. In addition, the mandate called for a Chapter VII 
protection response capability, but the political wording of this part of the mandate made 
agreement based on its meaning almost impossible. Within the context of the political 
realities of the world, the UNSC and DPKO must clarify the mandate in light of the 
military and security situation that currently exists in the DRC. 
 
MONUC can also accomplish more within the framework of its current mandate and 
resources than it accomplished under its previous mandate. MONUC’s implementation 
of its humanitarian assistance and human rights mandate had, until recently, been weak 
and unimaginative. Recent personnel changes and additions at MONUC Headquarters 
have resulted in many positive changes. The problem, again, is a politically acceptable 
mandate that was out of sync with operational realities. The mandate calls for specific 
activities, but these activities were not properly resourced. If the political leadership was 
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serious about this part of the mandate, they should have provided adequate resources 
for it. 
 
With regard to the main purpose of this study, the researcher concludes that the 
MONUC mandate was incorrectly defined because the United Nations misinterpreted 
the DRC conflict as a civil war, rather than as a regional conflict and an aggression. The 
MONUC mandate does not meet the peace and security problematique in the DRC, 
which is an internal conflict and aggression, which is why the UNSC was still, at the time 
of this study, updating the MONUC mandate according to the realities in the field of 
peacekeeping operations in the DRC. All UN missions and the realities of conflicts are 
different. This is why this study suggests a systematic reform of the UNSC, in order to 
put an end to the influence and interests of donor nations, as well as those of the five 
permanent members of the UNSC. Otherwise, the UN will be at risk of failure, just like 
the League of Nations. 
 
MONUC was mandated to protect civilians from physical violence and to restore peace 
and security in the DRC. The mandate in this regard has become even stronger. While 
previous mandates seemed to have limited this task to violence committed by foreign or 
Congolese armed groups, the UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1856) of 22 December 2008 
enabled the Mission to take action to protect civilians from physical violence “by any 
party”. There will be no sustainable peace in the DRC without security sector reform. 
Progress in this area has been slow. MONUC should intensify its efforts to this end, and 
the international community should better coordinate its initiatives in order to support the 
government’s implementation of SSR.  
 
The MONUC mandate was clear: missions authorised by the UNSC to protect civilians 
need to understand the level of force that can be used to achieve their goals, and 
whether or not they were coercive protection operations. As demonstrated in the DRC, 
mission leaders must make tough, inevitable choices about protecting civilians in hostile 
environments. The strategy of protection should be based on an understanding of the 
causes of civilian insecurity and the best remedy for the environment. Traditional 
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strategies of supporting humanitarian space and conducting peacekeeping operations 
can fall far short of protecting civilians, such as in the DRC, where irregular armed 
groups have operated with total impunity. The UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1925) of 28 
May 2010 commended the valuable contribution that the MONUC has made to the 
recovery of the DRC from conflict and to the improvement of the country’s peace and 
security. Protecting civilians may require destroying the capacity of armed groups to 
commit violence, and possibly using military force to defeat or disarm them. Such 
actions risk a counter insurgency-type response if the armed groups refuse to stand 
down. A well-led UN force could adopt this approach, if UN member States are willing to 
provide the capacity and personnel for the operation. 
 
Finally, as recognised in UN mandates, the role of peacekeeping operations in providing 
protection was always balanced by their relationship with the sovereign country in which 
they operated. In most UN operations, the government maintains primary responsibility 
for the welfare of its people. When a State is on the verge of failure or recovering from a 
conflict, such as that in the DRC, the distinction between its responsibilities and those of 
a UN peacekeeping operation become blurred. The UN must continuously strike a 
balance between taking responsibility for protecting the Congolese populace, offering 
support to the political process, and cooperating with the government. 
 
Given the above, The UNSG and UNSC, who support peacekeeping missions, must be 
aware that such missions are in urgent need of conceptual clarity and better tools for 
preparing and supporting those sent to restore peace. MONUC’s experience in the DRC 
has shown that these issues need to be addressed both in the country and in any future 
peacekeeping missions or interventions that are aimed at offering protection. This study 
has contributed to an examination of the performance of MONUC, and offered some 
suggestions on how it could be bettered. 
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